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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
Fifth Circuit   
 
Claimant ID 100236236 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 16-30521, 2017 WL 
2791395 (5th Cir. June 27, 2017).  
 
Property Owner filed a Business Economic Loss claim in July 2013, under 
the Deepwater Horizon Economic & Property Damages Settlement 
Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). To recover under the Settlement 
Agreement, Property Owner must have been an entity doing business or 
operating in the Gulf Coast areas between April 20, 2010, and April 16, 
2012. Property Owner’s last commercial lease ended in August 2008. 
Property Owner then employed a broker until September 2009, to find 
someone to lease the property. Although, Property Owner alleges that the 
broker continued to search for tenants that could rent the property, up until 
the time of the oil spill, and claims that there were serious offers to rent the 
property at the time of the spill. Property Owner’s first claim was denied in 
November 2014. Claims Administrator stated that Property Owner was not 
doing business in the designated areas at the time of the spill, because he 
received no revenues during the designated time-period. In October 2015, 
Property Owner filed a notice of appeal. The Appeal Panel affirmed the 
denial. Property Owner appealed to the district court, and it refused to 
review his appeal. Property Owner appealed that decision. The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
choosing not to review Property Owner’s claim because it did not involve a 
question on how to interpret or implement the Settlement Agreement. 
Therefore, because the district court’s decision to not review was not an 
abuse of discretion, the denial was affirmed. This is an unpublished opinion 
of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing 
the case as precedent.    
 
Claimant ID 100128765 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 16-31087, 2017 WL 
4310087 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017). 
 
A Louisiana Real-Estate-Appraisal Company (“Company”) negatively 
affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was required to show causation 
to recover losses in a class-action settlement against Producer. To recover 
losses, Company was required to establish causation through one of various 
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tests, one of which was the “Decline Only” test. This test contained the 
following three subparts: (1) The decline in percentage of revenue over 
three consecutive post-Spill months in 2010 compared to the same months 
in the Benchmark period; (2) specific documentation that identifies factors 
outside the control of the claimant that prevented the recovery of revenues 
in 2011; and (3) the Customer Mix Test. The prong at issue was the second 
prong which lists six possible factors, one of which must be supported by 
documentation for Company’s claim to be upheld. Company submitted two 
articles explaining the struggles of appraisal companies in 2011 because of 
the passage of the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The claims 
administrator denied Company’s “Business Economic Loss” claim because 
the documents submitted were not “sufficient to establish that [its] lost 
revenue occurred as a result of the Spill.” The appeal panel upheld the 
denial of Company’s claim, the district court then denied discretionary 
review, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Company’s petition for discretionary 
review. It reasoned that Company did not satisfy its requirement to provide 
specific documentation addressing one of the second-prong enumerated 
factors of the “Decline Only” test. 
 
D. North Dakota  
 
Raaum Estates v. Murex Petroleum Corp., Case No. 4:14-cv-024, 2017 WL 
2870070 (D.N.D. July 5, 2017).  
 
Operator is the successor-in-interest to an oil and gas lease granted by 
Lessors. Operator created a saltwater disposal system that piped saltwater 
from a well on Lessors’ surface estate to be injected into the subsurface of 
an adjacent estate. Operator obtained a right-of-way grant to construct 
pipelines for the system and an access road consent to haul saltwater from 
Lessors. After construction, Operator used the system to dispose of 
saltwater from on-lease, off-lease, and third-party wells. Lessors noticed a 
substantial increase in truck traffic due to the increase in disposals and 
spoke with Operator about additional compensation. Negotiations between 
Operator and Lessors broke down when the parties could not come to an 
agreement. Lessors then brought several claims against Operator. The 
district court found that: (1) neither of the two agreements between 
Operator and Lessors, nor the original lease, gave Operator right to dispose 
of off-lease and third-party saltwater; (2) Operator’s use of the property for 
off-lease saltwater disposal was civil trespass; (3) Operator was 
permanently enjoined from using property for off-lease saltwater disposal 
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unless agreement was made with Lessor to allow; and (4) Lessor was 
entitled to damages plus interest for the past trespasses of Operator.     
 
E.D. Arkansas  
 
JS Interests, Inc. v. Hafner & Assoc., CASE NO. 4:16CV00586 BSM, 2017 
WL 3612857 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2017). 
 
Oil and gas production company (“Company”) and Landowner entered into 
oil and gas leases (“Leases”) giving Landowner working interest in the oil, 
gas, and other minerals sold by Company. Leases were governed by joint 
operating agreements (“JOAs”). Landowner assigned royalty interests in its 
Leases with Company to Third Parties giving them a small percentage of 
profits acquired by Landowner. After the death of Landowner, Third Parties 
had not received royalty interest payments owed to them and sued for 
breach of contract and willful withholding of overriding interest payments. 
Company cross claimed, asserting that Landowner’s estate must indemnify 
Company for any judgment Third Parties receive against Company. 
Company moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court: 
(1) denied Company’s motion for summary judgment on Third Parties’ 
breach of contract claim because they were third-party beneficiaries of the 
JOAs between Company and Landowner; (2) denied Company’s motion for 
summary judgment on its claim for indemnification from Landowner’s 
estate because there was a material issue of fact as to whether Company’s 
failure to pay Landowner’s estate under the JOAs’ terms was a material 
breach relieving Landowner’s estate of its obligation to indemnify 
Company; and (3) granted summary judgment against Third Parties’ claim 
to an Arkansas statutory penalty because Third Parties failed to provide 
notice to Company of their claims. Accordingly, the court denied in part 
and granted in part Companies summary judgement motion.   
 
Lipsey v. SEECO, Inc., No. 4:16CV00149 JLH, 2017 WL 2662977 (E.D. 
Ark. June 20, 2017).  
 
Lessor commenced action against Companies alleging they failed to pay 
him the full amount of royalties owed to him under his lease. Lessor sued 
under the theories of: (1) conversion; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of 
state oil and gas royalties code; and (4) violation of the Arkansas Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”). Companies moved for summary judgment 
on all four counts, and Lessor conceded his claims to count three. Lessor 
removed case to federal court on the theory of diversity jurisdiction. 
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However, the federal district court held that there was no diversity 
jurisdiction because it demonstrated, to a legal certainty, that the amount in 
controversy would not meet the minimum monetary requirement. However, 
subject-matter jurisdiction was obtained under the Class Action Fairness 
Act (“CAFA”) because it was likely the amount in controversy would be 
met with the number of class members. The court granted summary 
judgment for Companies for several reasons. First, Lessor failed to establish 
a claim for conversion because Companies had the right to possess the gas, 
because they had a lease with Lessor. Second, Lessor cannot assert unjust 
enrichment because unjust enrichment does not apply when an express 
contract exists, except in special circumstances. Lessor did not argue those 
special circumstances, so the court did not do it for him. Third, Lessor 
cannot sue under the ADTPA because its “safe harbor” provision does not 
allow for a private right of action.  
 
E.D. Kentucky  
 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Magnum Hunter Prod. Co., 5:16-CV-150-JMH, 2017 
WL 3052979 (E.D. Ky. July 19, 2017). 
 
Lessor sued Operator alleging a variety of breach of contract claims 
stemming from Operator’s: (1) failure to pay unremitted shut-in fees, 
royalties, overriding royalties; (2) underpayment for the sale of natural gas; 
and (3) improper post-production deductions from royalties. The claim 
arose from eleven Farmout Agreements (“FOA”) that allowed Operator to 
drill wells on Lessor’s land in exchange for royalties. The FOAs provided 
for the deduction of Lessor’s proportionate share of applicable severance 
tax, transportation, and processing costs before determining the adjusted 
basis for the Lessor’s royalty payments. Because the FOAs, does not 
explicitly define “oil and/or gas”, the court analyzes the FOAs under 
subsets based on whether: (1) the respective FOAs incorporate a defining 
Model Form Operating Agreement; (2) the FOAs themselves define “oil 
well” and “gas well”; or (3) the FOAs fail to define the relevant language. 
The court held that the FOA’s “gas well” language does not contemplate 
produced NGL from subject wells since NGLs are liquid in form and, thus, 
excluded in FOAs using the term “gas”. The court accordingly granted each 
parties motions in part and denied in part. 
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N.D. West Virginia  
 
JJK Mineral Co. v. Noble Energy, Inc., Civ. Action No. 5:16CV112, 2017 
WL 2662196 (N.D. W. Va. June 20, 2017). 
 
Sublessees asked Lessor to amend an oil and gas lease (“Lease”) to include 
pooling rights. Lessor subsequently executed an amendment and 
supplement. Sublessees later notified Lessor that they refused to execute the 
terms but nevertheless drilled wells on the Lease units to produce natural 
gas. Lessor filed a civil action against Sublessees alleging: (1) willful 
breach of the Lease; (2) breach of good faith and fair dealing under the 
Lease; (3) the amendment and supplement were invalid; (4) Sublessees did 
not have pooling rights; (5) Sublessees owe royalties; and (6) the Lease had 
been rescinded by Sublessees’ willful breach. In response, Sublessees filed 
motions for partial dismissal. The court found that willful breach of the 
Lease was a “duplicative breach of contract claim.” Accordingly, it granted 
Sublessees’ motions for dismissal of the breach of good faith and fair 
dealing count. Regarding rescission by willful breach, the court found that 
equitable forfeiture or partial rescission may be an appropriate remedy, and 
Lessor had sufficiently alleged facts to establish that damages alone would 
not remedy the breach. The court made no conclusions regarding the 
appropriateness of forfeiture or partial rescission as a remedy or whether 
damages would be sufficient to remedy any breach. Thus, the court denied 
Sublessees’ motions as to rescission by willful breach.  
 
Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV28 2017, 
2017 WL 3446529 (N.D. W. Va., August 10, 2017). 
 
Company sued Corporation claiming that Corporation was not a bona fide 
purchaser of mineral rights arising out of an oil and gas lease (“Lease”). 
This dispute follows a chain of assignments of the Lease, and Company 
claimed that it lawfully acquired the mineral rights from the last entity to be 
assigned the Lease. This court granted Company’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied Corporation’s motion for summary judgment for one 
primary reason. Despite Corporation’s contention that it conducted due 
diligence to assess all property interests and that Company failed to inform 
Corporation that the assignment at issue was recorded in a different county 
than the other Lease assignments, Corporation was on inquiry notice of a 
competing claim. Inquiry notice of a competing claim was found even 
though the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has before deemed a party a 
bona fide purchaser despite “non-specific references to contractual 
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obligations,” but that is not the case here. In this case, during the two-year-
long negotiation between Company and Corporation, Corporation was 
obligated to investigate competing claims when its legal manager was sent 
an email which implied a third party’s interest and concern in the mineral 
rights and Lease. Moreover, an ownership report given to Corporation 
before purchase listed a third person as the owner of the mineral rights. 
Therefore, even though Corporation claims to have made a purchase with a 
clean chain of title, other circumstances put it on inquiry notice of a third 
party’s interest. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision 
from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Bankruptcy  
 
In re Samson Res. Corp., 569 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
 
Heirs sought royalties from an oil and gas lease. Heirs dispute whether the 
lease was valid and the amount of the royalties owed therefrom. Heirs had 
the burden of proving the validity of their claims by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Heirs asserted four primary arguments: (1) the lease terminated 
and is not a valid lease; (2) Debtor underpaid Heirs on their royalty 
interests; (3) Heirs own an interest in the sixty-nine-acre tract; and (4) Heirs 
believe their claim should be classified as a secured claim, priority claim, or 
an administrative claim. Debtor argued: (1) the lease was valid; (2) Heirs 
received all of their royalty interests in the twenty-five-acre tract; and (3) 
Heirs could not prove any valid interest in the sixty-nine-acre tract. 
Therefore, Debtor did not believe Heirs’ claims were valid. The court found 
that the lease remained in effect because a well which was drilled within the 
primary period of the lease continues to produce. The court also found that 
Heirs did not prove their ownership of any royalty interests in the sixty-
nine-acre tract. Finally, the court found Debtor did not owe Heirs a larger 
royalty payment because the effective lease had been perpetuated by 
production. There was a final issue regarding the legitimacy of the transfer 
of one-half of one of the Heirs’ interest to National Locater and the 
payments from Debtor for that transfer, and the court found that the 
particular Heir transferred one-half of his royalty interests to National 
Locater and that Debtor complied with the terms of the transfer. The court 
sustained the Second Omnibus Objection, in part, and disallowed Heirs’ 
claims in their entirety. The Claims Reserve Motion was found to be moot 
regarding Heirs’ claims.  
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Upstream – State  
 
Colorado  
 
Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72.  
 
Taxpayer appealed decision regarding action challenging the retroactive tax 
assessment on oil and gas leaseholds. The amount taxed is based on 
“quantity and value” of the tapped resource, but this value is based on 
Taxpayer’s assessment of value given in its produced annual statement. 
This assessed amount is based on the price “at the wellhead,” but the value 
is not assessed there, requiring Taxpayer to speculate the proper amount. 
This estimate includes an evaluation of how much it can deduct for 
processing. Here, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that Taxpayer 
deducted more than it should have for production costs because it was 
dealing with a related company, while taking the higher deduction allowed 
in using an unrelated company. The court was tasked with determining 
whether it was acceptable to retroactively assess a tax when only the 
estimated price from the wellhead was inaccurate or underreported. Also, 
the court determined whether the calculations were wrong because 
Taxpayer was dealing with a related party, or whether that designation was 
inaccurate. For both questions, the court determined that the Board of 
Assessment Appeals got it right in its decisions. First, the court found that 
underreported value is considered “omitted property” judging from the 
legislative history of the applicable statutory scheme, and so should be 
subject to the tax. Also, the court offers that audit procedures are in place, 
that would be irrelevant if there was no related authority to impose remedial 
retroactive assessments. The court also agreed that the companies were 
related because of a substantial partnership interest, so Taxpayer estimated 
the incorrect amount of deduction. Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court 
affirmed the appellate court’s decision that this retroactive tax assessment 
was acceptable. 
 
Kansas 
 
In re Matter of Protest of Barker, 398 P.3d 870 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Landowners operated an oil lease in Kansas. The Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BOTA”) found the lease but not the equipment used to produce oil and 
gas on said lease to be tax-exempt under state law as a “low-production oil 
lease.” Landowner appealed that decision, arguing that the definition of “oil 
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lease” in the exemption statute included the equipment used to produce the 
oil. By considering the statute’s plain language and other relevant statutory 
provisions the Kansas Court of Appeals first noted that tax exemption 
statutes are construed in favor of imposing the tax. Second, the court found 
relevant a provision in the state appraisal guide which states that 
“production equipment [does] not qualify for the exemption.” Third, the 
court disagreed with Landowners main argument—that the words “together 
with” in the statutory phrase “oil and gas leases and all oil and gas well . . . 
together with all casing . . . and all other equipment” is an inclusive phrase 
which expands the exemption to include the equipment. Instead, the court 
held that “together with” was a distinguishing phrase, which separated the 
equipment from the oil lease itself. The court therefore concluded that 
equipment is not exempted under the statute and affirmed the decision from 
BOTA.  
 
Lewis v. Kan. Prod. Co., 401 P.3d 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Landowners property was subject to an oil and gas lease (“Lease”) dating 
back to 1972 which granted the right to explore for and produce oil on a 
160-acre tract. Assignor acquired the lease and in 1994, assigned his 
interest to Assignee who then partially assigned his interest to his 
Production Company. Assignor retained the upper strata and continued to 
produce oil from them. Production Company never produced oil or gas 
from the deeper strata. In response to a 2004 lawsuit that sought to 
terminate Production Company’s Lease, Production Company drilled a 
well, and the court declined to terminate the lease. After several years of no 
exploring or developing, Landowners sued to terminate Production 
Company’s Lease. The district court found Production Company had 
breached an express provision of the lease by never producing oil or gas 
and had also breached a statutorily implied covenant to explore and develop 
in the Deep Horizons Act (“Act”) and terminated Production Company’s 
Lease. The appellate court affirmed part of the ruling finding Production 
Company breached the Act’s implied covenant to explore; however, the 
express terms of the Lease were not breached, because habendum clause 
does not apply to each leasehold interest when a portion of an oil and gas 
lease is assigned. Furthermore, the habendum clause was satisfied by 
Assignor’s production of oil in producing quantities; the demand letter sent 
by Landowners’ attorney did not waive any breach; and the time between 
the district court’s order from an earlier suit, July 2009, and the time 
Landowners sued in November 2013 was the appropriate time-period for 
measuring a breach of the implied covenant. This is an unpublished opinion 
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of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing 
the case as precedent.  
 
Louisiana  
 
Glassell Producing Co. v. Naquin, 16-0549 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/5/17); 224 
So. 3d 56. 
 
Current Operator impleaded Buyer of royalty interests and Sellers of 
royalty interests in inherited land to determine which party was entitled to 
current royalty payments. Subsequent to a lease in 1947 to Previous 
Operator, Sellers sold their royalty interests at the rate established in the 
1947 lease to Buyer in 1993. In 1998, the lease to Previous Operator was 
released and surrendered, so Buyer leased the land to Current Operator. 
Sellers contended that the 1993 deeds only conveyed the royalty interests 
under the previous lease, and the royalty interests reverted to Sellers once 
the lease terminated. The lower court found that the deeds conveyed all of 
Sellers’ royalty interests in the land, and that Sellers were not entitled to 
royalty payments under the new lease. The appellate court reversed and 
held that the 1993 deeds conveyed only the royalty interests that were 
attached to the lease at the time it was executed, and that the general royalty 
interests reverted to Sellers once the previous lease was terminated. 
 
Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 51-077 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
6/2/17); 223 So.3d 1202. 
 
Lessor granted a mineral lease to Lessee, granting exclusive right to 
produce minerals from any depth under the land. Lessee then assigned an 
undivided forty-nine percent interest to Assignee. Lessee and Assignee both 
obtained individual mortgages from Bank. Lessee contracted with an oil 
and gas company to drill on the property of the lease. Lessor notified 
Lessee that lease had expired in part or in whole due to lack of production 
in paying quantities. Lessee did not release the lease. Lessor brought action 
against Lessee and Assignee alleging that they failed to produce a 
recordable act showing continuation of lease, that not releasing the lease 
prevented Lessor from releasing the interest, and that Lessee and Assignee 
failed to pay royalties A bench trial declared the lease expired due to lack of 
drilling and no production. Lessee appealed. The appellate court affirmed 
the trial court holding it correctly awarded unpaid royalties and damages for 
the unpaid royalties because it may do so when the lack of payment was 
fraudulent, willful, or without reasonable grounds.  
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North Dakota  
 
Abell v. GADECO, LLC, 2017 ND 163, 897 N.W.2d 914. 
 
Producer entered into a contract with Landowner for the mineral rights to 
her property. The contract posited that Producer had the right to develop the 
mineral interests on the property for a primary term of five years, 
terminating on January 9, 2017. Producer entered into discussions with 
Landowner concerning surveying and staking areas for well locations 
multiple times throughout the primary term. Landowner gave permission to 
survey and stake one area and then told Producer that it must move 
somewhere else on the property which it did. Upon receiving a well permit 
from the Industrial Commission to drill, the primary term had passed and 
Landowner sued seeking costs and attorney fees for violating a terminated 
lease while Producer brought a counterclaim for breach of contract and 
damages. The trial court granted Landowner summary judgment declaring 
the lease had terminated and awarded Landowner costs and attorney fees. 
Producer appealed. The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment finding the lease had 
terminated because there were genuine issues of fact concerning the 
preparatory activities. The court said that the trial court’s language in 
determining summary judgment was “cryptic” and did not address these 
issues. The court also found the trial court’s language concerning the 
dismissal of Producer’s breach of contract claim “puzzling” and only 
consistent if the lease termination ruling was upheld which it was not. The 
court reversed and remanded the judgment. 
 
Dixon v. Dixon, 2017 ND 174, 898 N.W.2d 706.  
 
Trustee brought action against trust Beneficiary, seeking injunctive relief, 
declaratory judgment, and to quiet title to mineral interests, or alternatively, 
for reformation of Warranty Deed that granted Beneficiary a life estate 
which transferred mineral interests to the exclusion of his siblings. The trial 
court reformed the Warranty Deed to reserve and except the minerals, and 
to retain the mineral interests as property of the trust. Beneficiary appealed, 
arguing there was no mutual mistake and the statute of limitations 
precluded the reformation claim. The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
affirmed. The court held: (1) it was the intent of the trustor, as evidenced by 
the trust agreement, that the mineral interests connected to the subject 
property be reserved and retained as property of the trust; (2) that the 
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Warranty Deed conveying the mineral interests into a life estate held by 
Beneficiary was made in error; (3) that a subsequent mineral deed failed to 
correct the mistake as it conveyed a fee simple interest to the original 
beneficiaries from Beneficiary’s life estate; and (4) that reforming the 
Warranty Deed to reflect the true intent of the trust agreement was justified. 
The court disagreed that latent ambiguity existed in the above-referenced 
conveyances because no doubt existed as to “the object which the intention 
applies.”. The court did not consider Beneficiary’s argument that the statute 
of limitations bars Trustee’s reformation claim.  
 
Fahey v. Fife, 2017 ND 200, 900 N.W.2d 250. 
 
The children of previous mineral interest owner (“Children”), sought 
cancellation of a quit claim deed of mineral rights executed by their mother 
to their deceased father. The lower court deemed the deed invalid, but the 
mineral rights then became subject to the state’s intestacy scheme, which 
distributed the rights to the deceased father, and consequently, his surviving 
spouse. Through this action, Children questioned their mother’s 
competency in executing the deed and, because they did not want the rights 
in question to go to their father’s surviving spouse, Children argued that the 
court did not value the estate accurately. This valuation impacts the 
application of intestacy laws in their jurisdiction, thus impacting Children’s 
distributed share of their father’s estate. In review, however, the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota presumed the lower court’s competence with such 
matters and in the absence of clear error it found that Children did not 
address the issue of undervaluation, or the lack of accounting of the real 
property with the mineral rights in earlier proceedings, and therefore cannot 
bring up the issues on appeal. The court thus denied Children’s claim for 
equitable relief, offering that unfortunate circumstances do not necessarily 
change the law or how it is applied. The court affirmed the lower court’s 
judgment that the subject mineral rights were property distributed to the 
surviving spouse’s wife, pursuant to the relevant intestacy scheme.  
 
Hokanson v. Zeigler, 2017 N.D. 197, 900 N.W.2d 48. 
 
Under a Contract for Sale patent from the State Board of University and 
School Lands of the State of North Dakota (“Board”), North Dakota retains 
the legal title to the property as security for the purchaser's compliance with 
the contract. North Dakota also retains fifty percent of the mineral interests 
in the property. The purchaser holds equitable title until the terms of the 
installment sales contract is completed and a patent has been issued. 
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Thereafter, the legal title merges with the equitable title, perfecting title, 
relating back to the date of the contract. In 1957, Board and Purported 
Owners entered into an Installment Sale Contract for the purchase of 
property. Then in 1967, Purported Owners conveyed the property to 
Predecessor by Warranty Deed excepting and reserving any mineral 
interests. Then in 1971, Predecessor conveyed to Surface Owners the 
property by Warranty Deed “except easements of record and subject to 
exceptions, reservations of . . . minerals of record.” Additionally, in 1971, 
North Dakota issued a patent for the property to Predecessor. In 2014, 
Surface Owners initiated a quiet title action, claiming a fifty percent 
mineral interest in the property. Surface Owners argued they received this 
interest because the property was conveyed to them from Predecessor with 
no reservations of mineral interest appearing in a 1971 Warranty Deed. 
Surface Owners argued the predecessor-in-interest to Predecessor was 
North Dakota who conveyed to Predecessor the surface and fifty percent 
minerals by a 1971 Patent. The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded 
that an Installment Sales Contract for patent is the same as a Contract for 
Deed regarding the ability to convey and reserve equitable interest. 
Therefore, Purported Owners reserved equitable title to fifty percent of the 
minerals in the 1957 Warranty Deed. Therefore, Surface Owner did not 
have title to any of the mineral interests.  
 
Langveld v. Continental Res., Inc. 2017 ND 179, 899 N.W.2d 267. 
 
Mineral Owner challenged the North Dakota Industrial Commission’s 
(“Commission”) approval of Developer’s application to modify and create 
oil and gas well spacing units and well set requirements for several pools. 
Mineral Owner claimed that the granted application negatively impacted his 
bargaining power with Developer and that his royalty payments would 
decrease. At an evidentiary hearing, Developer offered evidence in support 
of its application demonstrating the inefficiency of the current spacing unit 
scheme and demonstrated that it was unsuccessful in negotiating surface 
use agreements with Mineral Owner. On the other hand, Mineral Owner 
failed to present any expert evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 
Consequently, Commission approved Developer’s application because, the 
evidence suggested increased efficiency. In reviewing Commission’s 
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized its limited review of 
Commission orders. Given the substantial deference the court gives 
Commission compounded by the facts that Mineral Owner failed to present 
expert evidence at the evidentiary hearing and the “substantial evidence” 
supporting increased efficiency—precisely the type of finding North 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
1028 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
Dakota law delegates to Commission—the court affirmed Commission’s 
judgment. 
 
Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 2017 ND 169, 898 N.W.2d 406. 
 
Surface Owners sued Operator for nuisance, trespass, and damages 
pursuant to North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation 
Act. Surface Owners allege that Operator unlawfully disposed saltwater 
into their pore space. At issue here are several certified questions issued by 
a magistrate judge to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The first question 
was whether Surface Owners own the pore space below their properties 
absent a conveyance of that pore space to a third person when Surface 
Owners have severed the mineral estate. The court reasoned that Surface 
Owners in this circumstance do own the pore space because North Dakota 
law specifically states that “[t]itle to pore space in all strata underlying the 
surface of lands and waters is vested in the owner of the overlying surface 
estate.” Second, the court concluded that Surface Owners may be entitled to 
compensation for lost land value and “lost use of and access to” their 
surface estate for three reasons. First, the answer to question one was yes. 
Second, it was the purpose of the North Dakota legislature to “provide the 
maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection to surface 
owners.” Third, as the pore space is part of the surface estate, Surface 
Owners may be entitled to compensation for lost land value and “lost use of 
and access to” their surface estate. Finally, questions three through five can 
be characterized as evidentiary issues determining the Surface Owner’s 
compensation. Ultimately, the court concluded that Surface Owners were 
entitled to compensation under one of the remaining certified questions. 
Specifically, the Surface Owners may recover damages for unlawful use of 
pore space when the only evidence available to calculate damages is what 
other Surface Owners are being paid and the number of saltwater barrels 
likely being injected into the pore space.  
  
Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2017 ND 231, No. 20160199, 2017 
WL 4296216. 
 
Successors in Interest (“Successors”) brought action against Board of 
University and School Lands (“Board”) for injunctive relief and a 
declaration regarding ownership of mineral interest in property, alleging a 
takings claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Board, 
determining that it owned certain property below the ordinary high 
watermark of the Missouri River, and that the disputed property was below 
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that watermark. However, while the case was pending, a new law was 
passed that governed mineral rights of land inundated by the Pick-Sloan 
Missouri Project Dams, which included the disputed land. This new law 
provided that the “state sovereign land mineral ownership of riverbed 
segments . . . extends only to the historical Missouri riverbed channel up to 
the ordinary high watermark.” Since this law was enacted while the case 
was pending, and since it does apply retroactively, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota held that it applied to this case. The ordinary high watermark 
determination under this law is retroactive and applied to all oil and gas 
wells spud after January 1, 2006, for purposes of mineral ownership. 
Successors also asserted that the district court erred in finding that Board’s 
actions were not a taking that required just compensation. Board 
compensated for the surface, but never for the mineral interest. Successors 
are entitled to compensation if it is determined that Board’s actions resulted 
in a “taking” of the mineral interests. The court held that the district court 
erred in determining there was no taking and that the district court must 
consider this issue on remand if it determines the Board owns the disputed 
minerals. Thus, the case is reversed and remanded.  
 
Ohio 
 
Sheba v. Kautz, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 14 BE 0008, 2017 WL 4167407 
(Sept. 18, 2017).   
 
Property Owner, and Company to which Property Owner gave an undivided 
oil and gas interest, brought action against Heirs of prior owners, who had 
transferred land in 1848 but reserved to themselves and Heirs the right to all 
the minerals and coal lying under a portion of the land. Property Owner 
sought a declaratory judgment and quiet title, claiming the reservation did 
not reserve title to the oil and gas, the oil and gas interest was abandoned 
under the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”), the oil and 
gas was abandoned under the new version of DMA, and adverse possession 
of the oil and gas. Trial court found for Property Owner and Heirs appealed. 
Appellate court held that the grantor in the 1848 deed did not reserve the oil 
and gas interests as the use of the term “mineral” in the reservation showed 
intent of the parties was to reserve coal and other non-migratory minerals, 
not migratory minerals. Important to the analysis was that the first oil and 
gas commercial well was not drilled in Ohio until 1860, so the parties likely 
did not intend to reserve oil and gas. Also, after looking to locality and 
timeframe, appellate court also noted that the deed’s easement language 
pertained to mining of minerals in place, and not migratory minerals such 
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as oil and gas. Furthermore, appellate court held that the lower court erred 
when it found the mineral interest was abandoned under the 1989 DMA 
because the 1989 DMA was not self-executing and could not result in 
automatic abandonment. Therefore, since the complaint in the present case 
was not filed until 2013, the 1989 DMA could not be applied and the newer 
version was applicable. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court.  
 
Pennsylvania 
 
United Ref. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 163 A.3d 1125 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2017).  
 
Refinery owns and operates an eighty-three-acre petroleum refinery, on 
which it has never drilled an oil and gas well. Operator applied for a permit 
to drill a slant well, with the top hole across the street from Refinery’s 
property, and the bottom hole underneath Refinery’s property. After some 
negotiation, the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”) 
issued permits for Operator’s desired wells, and Refinery appealed to the 
Environmental Hearing Board (“Board”), citing concerns about potential 
damage from Operator’s hydraulic fracturing operations. Board found that 
Refinery did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Department 
abused its discretion—acting unreasonably and/or in violation of the laws—
by issuing the permit, and dismissed Refinery’s appeal. Refinery appealed 
Board’s decision to the trial court. The court held that: (1) because Refinery 
failed to meet its burden of proof as to how the drilling or fracturing would 
have the negative impact it alleged, Board did not err in its conclusion that 
Refinery failed to show that Department abused its discretion in issuing the 
permit; and (2) whether Department considered that evidence in reaching its 
decision to issue the permit is immaterial. 
 
Texas  
 
Apache Deepwater, LLC v. Double Eagle Dev., LLC, No. 08-16-00038-CV, 
2017 WL 3614298 (Tx. App. Aug. 23, 2017). 
 
Property Owner sued mineral lessee (“Lessee”), demanding that Lessee 
relinquish its interest to several tracts of land. The land in dispute was 
divided in two four equal tracts. Property Owner argues that because the 
wells on three of the four tracts of land had stopped producing, that Lessee 
no longer had legal right to the tracts. Lessee, on the other hand, argued that 
because one of the wells was still producing at the relevant time-period, and 
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because the lease had a habendum clause, that the lease to the entire plot of 
land—including all four tracts—was still held. The court ultimately held 
that the entire tract of land was still under proper control of Lessee for 
several reasons. First, the language of “leased premises” used in the lease 
refers to the entire plot of land, including all four tracts. Second, there is 
specific language in this lease’s habendum clause and drilling operations 
clause which made clear that so long as one of the wells on one of the four 
tracts is producing or that drilling operations were taking place on it, the 
lease for the whole plot of land continues. This is despite Property Owner’s 
contention that the lease’s retained acreage clause ends the right to an 
individual tract when it stops producing because the lease itself contained 
no clear intent in the retained acreage clause to negate the habendum 
clause. Implicit in Property Owner’s argument is that the lease should be 
understood as a continual relinquishment agreement, but the court said that 
if that were intended, such language would have and should have been 
included in the original lease. 
 
Fairfield Indus. Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., No. 14-15-00586-CV, 2017 
WL 2882187 (Tex. App. July 6, 2017). 
 
Licensor, a provider of seismic data, sued Licensee, who contracted to use 
Licensor’s seismic data, after Licensee underwent a change in control, and 
attempted to unilaterally terminate the parties’ licensing agreement and not 
pay a transfer fee as set forth in the same agreement. Licensee’s theory for 
its actions was that since it returned Licensor’s seismic data, it was not 
obligated to pay the fee or continue to be obligated by the licensing 
agreement. At trial, Licensee moved for summary judgment to dismiss 
Licensor’s claims and the trial court granted Licensee’s motion. On appeal, 
the court reviewed the grant of summary judgement and the claims made by 
the parties. First, the court analyzed the licensing agreement to determine if 
a change of control would require Licensee to pay a transfer fee to Licensor 
for data licensed under the agreement that the acquiring company did not 
already have a license from Licensor for the same type of date. The court 
held that the unambiguous language of the agreement determined that any 
change in control of Licensee required that the fee be paid regardless of 
whether any of Licensor’s data was actually transferred to the acquiring 
party. Regarding the same matter, the court held that the trial court 
mistakenly found that industry custom and usage confirmed that Licensee 
was obligated to pay the transfer fee only if Licensee actually transferred 
the data to its acquiring company. Finally, the court analyzed the unilateral 
actions of Licensee. The court held that nothing in the agreement allowed 
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any unilateral actions by Licensee to terminate the contract, and its attempt 
to terminate would not relieve it of its obligation to pay the transfer fee.  
 
Freeman v. Harleton Oil & Gas, Inc., 528 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App. 2017).  
 
Owner of a working interest in deep rights below several oil and gas 
properties brought action against Vendors and Purchaser of such interests, 
asserting claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and 
unjust enrichment seeking specific performance and the imposition of a 
constructive trust. Purchaser answered, asserting that Owner lacked 
standing to sue, and filed cross-claims against Vendors. All parties moved 
for summary judgment. Trial court granted Vendors’ motions to dismiss 
Owner’s claims, and denied Purchaser’s motions against Vendors. 
Purchaser and Owner appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Owner's 
unjust enrichment claim was not entitled to benefit of tolling of two-year 
statute of limitations; (2) Purchaser's claims against Vendor were governed 
by agreement to assign rights, rather than a claim for unjust enrichment; (3) 
Purchaser could not recover supposed overpayment to Vendor; (4) Owner 
was not a third-party beneficiary to contract whereby Purchaser agreed to 
purchase interests from Vendors; and (5) president and sole-shareholder of 
Vendor could not be held individually liable for any damages stemming 
from Vendor's purported breaches of agreement.  
 
GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union Gas Operating Co., 527 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App. 
2017). 
 
Operator sued Manufacturer for several causes of action, including products 
liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties 
following the failure of Operator’s well during hydraulic fracking 
operations. Operator claimed the cause of the well failure was 
Manufacturer’s coupling. Jury found, that Manufacturer breached an 
express warranty resulting in $3 million in damages. After the trial, 
Operator was granted a new bench trial on attorney fees and the trial court’s 
final judgment included a damage award to Operator for “damages for 
breach of an express warranty and attorney’s fees, but did not reduce the 
damages award based on [Operator’s] own negligence.” On appeal, 
Manufacturer properly preserved four issues, but the court denied all issues 
and affirmed. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court’s finding, Operator provided evidence sufficient for the jury to 
conclude Manufacturer breached express warranties because the expert 
testimony presented by Operator directly addressed its theories of recovery. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1033 
  
 
Moreover, Manufacturer failed to cite any conclusive evidence in support 
of its counter evidence. Second, the evidence of other well failures 
presented by Operators was properly admitted because the presented 
evidence showed that the other failures “failed in the same way with many 
of the same factors as were present in the case at hand.” Third, the trial 
court was correct to refuse reduction of Operator’s damage for its own 
negligence because the statutory scheme that calls for such a reduction is 
not applicable in breach of express warranty cases. Finally, the trial court 
was correct to grant a new trial on attorney’s fees because the jury did not 
render an incomplete or inconsistent verdict, nor did Manufacturer cite any 
authority indicating Operator waived a new trial by first moving to accept 
the verdict.  
 
Hardin-Simmons Univ. v. Hunt Cimarron Ltd., No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 
WL 3197920 (Tex. App. July 25, 2017). 
 
Lessors sued Lessee for: (1) breach of express covenant to explore and 
develop land for oil and gas; and (2) breach of implied covenant to drill 
initial wells, develop premises, protect premises from damage, and market 
produced oil or gas. Lessors also sought a declaratory judgment concerning 
Lessee’s failure to file a release describing mineral interests. The trial court 
returned a verdict in favor of Lessee. Lessor appealed, asserting that the 
trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment and new trial because: 
(1) the subject lease expired at the end of the primary term regarding non-
productive acreage; (2) the jury’s finding that Lessee had not breached 
certain lease covenants was against the preponderance of the evidence; (3) 
the jury’s failure to find that Lessee had breached the lease by not executing 
a release was against the preponderance of the evidence; and (4) the jury’s 
finding that certain wells were producing in paying quantities was against 
the preponderance of the evidence. The appellate court determined that 
Lessors met their burden of proof regarding issues (1) and (3) but did not 
meet their burden of proof to show that issues (2) and (4) were against the 
“great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Accordingly, the 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s “take-nothing” judgment in favor 
or Lessee and declared the entire acreage of the subject lease terminated 
except for a forty-acre tract associated with certain wells.  
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Jarzombek v. Ramsey, No. 04-16-00571-CV, 2017 WL 2561556 (Tex. App. 
June 14, 2017).  
 
Landowners owned the surface estate of two tracts plus 1/16 royalty in one 
tract and the entire mineral interest in the second. Landowners executed a 
real estate transaction with Purchaser, in which Purchaser agreed to 
purchase the surface estate of both tracts of land. The contract stipulated 
that Landowners were to keep one-half of the mineral and royalty interest in 
the estates for a twenty-year period and the other half would be vested in 
Purchaser. However, upon closing of the purchase, the deed conveying the 
property to Purchaser only reserved a 1/32 royalty interest to Landowners. 
Landowners sued Purchaser seven years later on numerous causes of 
actions including deed reformation, alleging the deed was inconsistent with 
the language in the real estate contract. Purchaser claimed the statute of 
limitations (“SOL”) barred Landowners’ action. The court of appeals 
reviewed whether the trial court erred in concluding Landowners’ deed 
reformation claim was barred by the SOL. Landowners’ argument rests on 
the discovery rule, which would prevent the SOL from running until the 
discovery of the mistake in the deed. However, the court of appeals 
determined that Texas state law says a grantor or property owner is charged 
with knowledge of the material terms of an unambiguous deed upon 
execution of said deed.  The court held that the mistake in the deed was 
plainly evident on its face, thus Landowners were charged with actual 
knowledge of what the deed included, and subsequently the “discovery rule 
is inapplicable, and limitations began to run from the date the deed was 
executed.” 
 
Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).  
 
Lessors and Stakeholders requested review action regarding underpayment 
for mineral interests. The Lessors and Stakeholders originally claimed that 
an overlap in a pooling unit prevented them from receiving appropriate 
royalties for their interests. Lessee had previously conducted a re-
designation of boundaries for units applying to pooling agreements and in 
that process created the overlap of one assignment well to another unit. 
Lessee argues that the avenue for royalties amounts to a conveyance of 
legal title to property rights and thus cannot be conducted to two different 
parties. The Supreme Court of Texas however, addressed this case as a 
contract dispute, and held that Lessee breached the contract by not paying 
royalties as agreed upon pursuant to the valid contract. The court denied 
Lessee’s impracticability defense, determining that Lessee caused the 
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situation, and had notice prior to issues arising. Likewise, the court rejected 
Lessee’s defense that the overlap was a scrivener’s error as such error 
requires both parties to be under the same misunderstanding. Lessee’s 
quasi-estoppel claim was also rejected, despite Lessor’s and Stakeholders’ 
prior payments, because of the ambiguity of the payments. The court 
affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, and restricted Lessee from 
reclaiming any payments from Lessors and Stakeholders, because the 
payments were made voluntarily, with understanding of the pooling issues 
without effort to remedy.  
 
Spellman v. Love, No. 13-16-00011-CV, 2017 WL 3431801 (Tex. App. 
Aug. 10, 2017). 
 
Former Royalty Owner sued Mineral Interest Owner for money received 
pursuant to obtaining his expired royalty interest. Former Royalty Owner’s 
interest expired due to the lack of a producing well on the property on a 
given date. The month after that expiration, a well began to operate on the 
property, and Mineral Interest Owner—who had obtained the expired 
royalty interest—began collecting royalty payments. Former Royalty 
Owner sued on multiple counts, including money had and received, and 
unjust enrichment (the two at issue in this appeal). The trial court issued 
summary judgment to Mineral Interest Owner, and the appellate court 
affirmed.  The court held that money had and received is essentially an 
equitable doctrine existing to prevent unjust enrichment, and that because 
the record showed Former Royalty Owner had no claim, “[i]n equity or 
good conscience” to the money received by Mineral Interest Owner, 
summary judgment against him was appropriate. Summary judgment for 
the unjust enrichment claim followed naturally, because it is not an 
independent cause of action.  
 
Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).  
 
Grantor sued Grantee after a dispute regarding whether the language of 
their warranty deed that conveyed a mineral estate and the land above it 
passed the entire burden of a non-participating royalty interest (“NPRI”) to 
Grantee or if the burden of the NPRI was to be proportionately shared by 
both parties. When the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the issue, it 
stressed the importance determining the parties’ intent. The court held that 
it is intent that governs interpretation of the deed, not arbitrary rules. In this 
case, the deed and how the NPRI was to be paid was determined by the 
intent of the parties, using careful analysis of the deed and the provisions 
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contained therein. The court noted that parties are free to contract in the 
deed whatever division of interests they desire, and this express intent 
would control. Generally, a NPRI is burdened by the entire mineral estate, 
so without an express intention to stray away from that principal of mineral 
conveyance it would govern. This leads to the burden of the NPRI in this 
case to be proportionately shared by Grantor and Grantee because alternate 
intent was not expressed. Additionally, the court held that although the 
court of appeals reached the same conclusion, it did so incorrectly by 
relying only on a default rule that the NPRI should be proportionately 
shared by the mineral ownerships instead of reviewing the intent of the 
parties when the warranty deed was created. Therefore, the court affirmed 
the judgement of the appellate court, but on different grounds. 
 
Washington  
 
In re Estate of Johnson, No. 34315-4-III, 2017 WL 2984030 (Wash. Ct. 
App. July 18, 2017). 
 
Decedent owned mineral rights to a piece of land in North Dakota, which 
he purportedly left to his alleged testate successor (“Successor”) in 1977. In 
2011, Oil Company contacted Successor and entered into an oil and gas 
lease for the land. Oil Company began exploring for oil and asked 
Successor to probate Decedent’s estate, but the original last will and 
testament of Decedent could not be found. Successor brought action under 
the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”), seeking to admit 
and confirm the validity of her photocopy of the will. The trial court 
determined that the photocopy was authentic and admitted to probate. 
Successor’s children appealed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court 
affirmed, holding that: (1) the trial court had discretion under TEDRA to 
hold an evidentiary hearing; (2) the trial court did not err in applying the 
dead man’s statute; (3) the will was validly executed; and (4) the will was 
authentic. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing as the case precedent.  
 
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1037 
  
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
Second Circuit 
 
Constitution Pipeline Co. v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 
868 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 2017).  
 
Pipeline Company with proposed natural gas pipeline project applied for 
water quality certification from New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“NYSDEC”). After reviewing Pipeline 
Company’s application, NYSDEC denied the application for failing to 
provide sufficient information that its proposed natural gas pipeline would 
comply with state water quality standards. Pipeline Company petitioned to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for review. Pipeline Company 
contends that: (1) NYSDEC failed to issue its decision within a reasonable 
time and was therefore a nullity and (2) it submitted sufficient information 
and NYSDEC’s decision should be vacated on the grounds that denial was 
arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires. The court of appeals dismissed the 
petition in part and denied in part. First, on the nullity claim, the court 
found that a failure to act by NYSDEC would be within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, thus the 
claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Second, the court deferred to 
NYSDEC’s expertise in the information requested from Pipeline Company 
to determine the certification. Because Pipeline Company refused to 
provide relevant information despite repeated requests, the court held that 
NYSDEC’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious and denied the petition.     
 
Third Circuit  
 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 869 
F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
In 2015, Energy Company submitted an application to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for approval of an interstate pipeline 
project, which included a discussion and rejection of compression 
alternatives. FERC published its environmental assessment, recommending 
a Finding of No Significant Impact, then issued a certificate approving the 
project. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) then issued 
a Section 404 Permit authorizing construction. Environmental Organization 
petitioned for review of the Corps’ approval of Energy Company’s 
application to build an interstate pipeline project. Environmental 
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Organization challenges Corps’ approval of the project on the grounds that 
the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting a compression 
alternative. According to Environmental Organization, construction of the 
pipeline would lead to deforestation, destruction of wetland habitats, and 
other forms of environmental damage. Environmental Organization asserts 
that such damage could be avoided by building or upgrading a compressor 
station. The court held that Corps’ approval of the project was neither 
arbitrary or capricious, reasoning that the project’s basic purpose did not 
arbitrarily constrain the Corps’ alternatives analysis. The court also noted 
that, despite Environmental Organization’s argument that the Corps 
arbitrarily or capriciously ignored the compression alternative, a 
compression alternative was evaluated in Energy Company’s application 
and expressly referenced in the Corps’ findings. Lastly, the court held that 
the Corps did not erroneously reject the compression alternative, reasoning 
that a compression alternative would have more significant adverse 
environmental consequences than would result from Energy Company’s 
project. The court acknowledged the Corps’ well-founded and clear 
preference for temporary environmental impacts in direct contrast to the 
permanent impacts of compression. The Corps’ conclusion, therefore, was 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 870 
F.3d 171 (3rd Cir. 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization appealed Department of Environmental 
Protection’s (“DEP”) order approving Pipeline Company’s application to 
build an interstate pipeline project. Environmental Organization claimed 
DEP made an erroneous water dependency finding and improperly rejected 
a compression alternative to the pipeline project. Further, Environmental 
Organization challenged the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals to rule on the petition because it claimed DEP’s order was not 
final. The court held that it could exercise jurisdiction because DEP’s order 
was final and the Natural Gas Act grant the court jurisdiction over review 
of an order of a state agency. The court upheld the order because it 
determined DEP’s interpretation of water dependency was reasonable and 
worthy of deference, and DEP considered and rejected alternative definition 
for reason that were supported by the record.  
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Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easement for 2.59 Acres in Pine 
Grove Twp., Schuylkill Cty., Pennsylvania, Case No. 17-1829, 2017 WL 
1105237 (3rd Cir. Sep. 11, 2017). 
 
Landowner filed suit against Pipeline Company after the two parties failed 
to reach agreement on the compensation owed to Landowner after the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted Pipeline 
Company a certificate of public convenience and necessity to build a 
natural gas pipeline, which required rights of way on Landowner’s 
property. The certificate had been granted after thorough administrative 
review—in which Landowner did not participate—including notice and 
opportunity for Landowner to respond. The district court granted Pipeline 
Company’s motions for partial summary judgment—leaving only the issue 
of just compensation to be determined—and for a preliminary injunction for 
immediate possession of the rights of way. Landowner appealed, pro se, to 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling, 
holding that the district court did not err or abused its discretion in 
weighing relevant factors or issuing the preliminary injunction. The court 
held that: (1) Landowner’s received notice and opportunity to respond in 
FERC’s administrative proceedings, combined with the opportunity to 
litigate just compensation for condemned property at the district court, 
constituted due process in Landowner’s action under the Natural Gas Act; 
(2) Pipeline Company’s ability to demonstrate success on the merits of its 
eminent domain claim weighed heavily in favor of the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the rights of way; 3) 
monetary harm that would be suffered by Pipeline Company if possession 
was not allowed had not been weighed in favor of the injunction; and 4) 
because the public would be able to access natural gas carried by the 
pipeline, the public interest factor weighed in favor of granting the 
injunction. 
 
Forth Circuit  
 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or Less, In Baltimore 
and Harford Ctys., Maryland, No. 15-2547, 2017 WL 2983908 (4th Cir. 
July 13, 2017).  
 
Pipeline Company commenced a condemnation action seeking to acquire 
certain temporary and permanent easements over Landowners' properties to 
construct a natural gas pipeline. Pipeline Company was granted an 
injunction to take possession of the land and begin construction. Trial then 
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commenced to determine Landowners’ just compensation. Before trial, 
Pipeline Company filed motions in liminie to exclude testimony of 
Landowners’ expert, as well as exclude claims by Landowners alleging the 
size of the temporary easements that Pipeline Company took were larger 
than the easements described in the order granting possession. The district 
court denied both of these motions. Pipeline Company appealed the district 
court’s decision allowing the Landowners to modify the size of the taking 
and the court’s denial of Pipeline Company’s motions in liminie.  The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was within Pipeline Company’s 
discretion to determine the size of the easements. Landowners did not have 
a right to challenge that, but instead have a right to recovery through just 
compensation for the land that was taken and damages caused by 
construction to the remaining property. The appellate court also upheld the 
district court’s denial of Pipeline Company’s motions in liminie because it 
was challenging the expert witness’s opinion, not qualifications. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Tenth Circuit  
N. Nat. Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, 862 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2017). 
Company owned and operated the Cunningham Field, which was converted 
into an underground storage facility due to depletion of the field's natural 
resources. Before depletion, this area was certified by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for gas storage. In 2010, Company's 
certified boundaries expanded to a 12,320-acre area located about five 
miles north of the original boundaries. Company negotiated and obtained 
storage leases on approximately 3,040 acres of this Extension Area but over 
time realized that volumes of storage gas was migrating outside of the 
field's primary storage area boundaries. Company brought a condemnation 
action against Landowners to acquire the other 9,000 subsurface acres for 
its natural gas storage field. It also sought an immediate injunction against 
further exploration, production, and operation, asking the district court to 
order that Producers' wells be closed. The trial court entered a final 
judgment, at the recommendation of a court-appointed commission, 
requiring Company to pay $7,310,427 in principal, plus interest to 
Producers. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the 
value of storage gas in and under the Extension Area should be included 
when calculating the condemnation award, reasoning that Producers had no 
right to produce such gas after the date of certification because Company 
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owned all of the gas within its certified field boundaries after the date of 
certification. The trial court's valuation of gas storage and buffer rights for 
Extension Area traces, its valuation of Extension Area wells, and its denial 
of attorneys' fees were affirmed. 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 
Natural Gas Company sought approval from Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) to extend its natural gas pipeline. As part of the 
permitting process Natural Gas Company applied for a water-quality 
certificate from the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (“DEC”). DEC took no action for more than one year, and 
Natural Gas Company filed this action to compel DEC to act on the 
application. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
even if DEC put off acting on Natural Gas Company’s water-quality 
certificate application for over a year, that inaction constituted a waiver 
under the Clean Air Act, enabling Natural Gas Company to gain approval 
from FERC. That waiver erased Natural Gas Company’s alleged injury, 
meaning it lacked the ability to meet the actual injury requirement 
necessary for standing. Natural Gas Company also claimed that DEC failed 
to comply with the schedule issued by FERC. The court pointed out though, 
that FERC regulations state that its deadlines will apply unless federal law 
otherwise establishes a schedule—which the Clean Water Act does. The 
court dismissed Natural Gas Company’s petition for review. 
 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 
101(D.D.C.  2017). 
 
Tribes sued Government under Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
alleging that the construction of the pipeline violated National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”), 
and Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”). Both Tribes and Government moved 
for a partial summary judgment. Specifically, Tribes argued Government 
did not sufficiently consider the environmental effects of the pipeline before 
granting permits to construct it under a federally regulated waterway. 
Tribes seek summary judgment on three claims: (1) that not preparing an 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) is a violation of NEPA; (2) 
Government’s decision to grant an easement was arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to law because Government reversed a prior policy without reason; 
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and (3) Government wrongfully concluded that pipeline activities satisfied 
terms and conditions of Nationwide Permit 12 (“NWP 12”). “[A]n agency 
has taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental impacts of a proposed action if 
the statement contains sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and 
opposing viewpoints, and the agency’s decision is fully informed and well 
considered.” The environmental assessment (“EA”) was inadequate where 
it failed to address the effects of a spill on Tribes fishing and hunting rights, 
where it failed to consider the environmental-justice implications of the 
project, and failed to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences. 
These inadequacies were not enough to violate NEPA or require an EIS. 
Government’s grant of easement was not arbitrary and did not breach 
Government’s trust duties to Tribes because controlling law did not require 
fiduciary or trust duty toward Tribes. Furthermore, Government only had to 
show good reason for a new policy, which it did by displaying awareness 
that it was changing its position, and by providing a reasoned explanation 
for the change. The court held that Government did not have to comply 
with all conditions to receive the permit, but it must comply with conditions 
to remain eligible for the permit. district court ordered the parties to submit 
briefs arguing whether remand or vacate is the appropriate remedy in light 
of the EA’s deficiencies.  
 
E.D. Louisiana  
 
Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-
713, 2017 WL 3706314 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2017). 
 
This case involves Right of Way Servitude Agreements for pipelines, 
specifically addressing contractual obligations regarding width restrictions. 
Landowners claim that Pipeline Company had inadequately and negligently 
maintained pipelines causing property damage and that width restrictions 
were exceeded, breaching the agreement. Pipeline Company’s first 
argument in summary judgment is that remedies for the contract breach 
should be limited because: (1) there is no remedy in the servitude contract 
for restoration and (2) the jurisdiction only allows damages for the value of 
land lost. The court found Pipeline Company did not account for a remedy 
in the contract because it did not account for the impacts of erosion, 
therefore the omission of remedy provisions is not meaningful. Likewise, 
the court asserted a precedent that damages are governed by the contract, 
not the value of the property lost. The court refused Landowners’ claim that 
because the contract was breached in bad faith, damages are not restricted 
to value difference of land itself. The court ultimately relied on a “good 
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faith standard of foreseeability of damages at the time the contract was 
made.” The court also determined that Pipeline Company did not meet its 
burden of proof to establish that ownership of the eroded land shifted from 
Landowners to the state. The court also said it would be an absurd result to 
grant Pipeline Company’s last argument and allow it to take any actions 
within the right of way, even though the actions were initially restricted, to 
maintain the pipeline at a certain width. The court thus denied all motions. 
 
N.D. Ohio  
 
Rover Pipeline LLC v. 5.9754 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Defiance 
County, Ohio, No. 3:17CV225, 2017 WL 3130244 (N.D. Ohio, July 24, 
2017). 
 
Pipeline Company was granted a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to build a 713-
mile-long natural-gas pipeline running partially through Ohio. Pipeline 
Company filed suit to condemn the land on which its pipeline would run, 
and sought a preliminary injunction that it could take immediate possession 
of the land to start building, deferring the issue of Landowners’ just 
compensation. Pipeline Company proceeded to settle with all 141 defendant 
Landowners in the case as to immediate possession, and came to terms with 
all but eight landowners regarding just compensation. Regarding the eight 
landowners still arguing about the level of compensation, Pipeline 
Company filed this motion for the court to appoint a commission to 
determine just compensation. district court found that while Landowners 
requested a jury in the appropriate time frame, it was left to the court’s 
discretion to determine whether a jury or a commission would be the more 
appropriate body to determine just compensation. Landowners argued that 
the uniqueness of their individual tracts of land made individual jury trials 
the appropriate forum for this determination, and that being all represented 
by the same law firm would help maximize judicial economy. The court 
sided with Pipeline Company, deciding that a commission was appropriate 
because the proceeding involved multiple individually owned parcels, 
presented complex valuation issues, and would put a heavy burden on the 
court’s docket if sent to jury trial. The court also detailed the benefits of a 
commission—including party review of the commissioners appointed, and 
the ability to have experts examining complex subjects—as well as the 
process for appointing the commissioners.  
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Midstream – State 
 
Colorado  
 
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 2030 C.D. 2016, 2017 
WL 2805860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 29, 2017).  
 
Landowners appeal action stemming from Pipeline Company’s assertion of 
eminent domain for pipeline construction project. After other claims were 
foreclosed in a prior condemnation challenge, Landowners challenged 
Pipeline Company ’s authority to assert eminent domain under Property 
Rights Protection Act (“PRPA”), since Pipeline Company is a private entity 
not a public entity. The court agreed with Landowners that the PRPA does 
not allow the imposition of eminent domain for “private enterprise,” but 
ultimately agrees with Pipeline Company that it is an entity providing 
public utility services and therefore is exempted from this restriction. The 
court found that even though, as Landowners contend, there is no pressing 
necessity for additional services, the services provided by Pipeline 
Company are still considered a public benefit, and therefore it is irrelevant 
that no new activity is needed, as Pipeline Company was granted a 
Certificate of Public Convenience (“CPC”) by the Public Utility Council. 
The court also clarified that once a CPC is granted, and the entity is 
categorized as providing a public benefit, the court has no authority to 
challenge that categorization or determine if the designation was warranted. 
The court affirmed the lower court’s order overruling Landowners’ 
objections to Pipeline Company’s Declaration of Taking.  
 
Illinois  
 
Enbridge Pipeline, LLC v. Monarch Farms, LLC, 2017 IL App (4th) 
150807. 
 
The Illinois Commerce Commission granted Pipeline Operator eminent-
domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the 
construction of a pipeline project. Pipeline Operator filed separate 
complaints for “condemnation of permanent and temporary easements for 
common-carrier pipeline” against Landowners. In response, Landowners 
filed a “traverse and motion to dismiss,” seeking dismissal of Pipeline 
Operator’s condemnation complaints. Trial court granted a directed verdict 
to Pipeline Operator and awarded Landowners just compensation totaling 
$124,000. Landowners appealed. The appellate court held that the trial 
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court acted within its discretion in excluding proposed valuation testimony 
by Landowners’ experts, but the trial court erroneously considered 
Landowners’ traverse motion to be motions to dismiss asserting an 
affirmative matter outside complaint that barred or defeated action. 
Accordingly, the case was vacated and remanded for the limited purpose of 
conducting an expedited traverse hearing.  
 
Enbridge Pipeline, LLC v. Temple, 2017 IL App (4th) 150346. 
 
The Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) granted Pipeline Company 
eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over real property to 
facilitate planned construction of a 170-mile liquid petroleum pipeline. 
Pipeline Company then sued Landowners for “condemnation of permanent 
and temporary easements for common-carrier pipeline.” Landowners 
sought a “traverse and motion to dismiss,” which was denied by the trial 
court. Pipeline Company then filed for summary judgment regarding just 
compensation for the easements, alleging that it was entitled to such 
judgment due to procedural errors by Landowners and Pipeline Company’s 
compliance with state rules requiring the filing of affidavits in support of its 
motion. The trial court granted Pipeline Company’s motion, and 
Landowners appealed. The appellate court for the held that the trial court’s 
denial of Landowners’ traverse motion deprived them of the ability to: (1) 
rebut the statutory presumptions created by the Eminent Domain Act that 
the acquisition of private property for public use is “primarily for the 
benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public and [is] necessary for a public 
purpose” and (2) refute the ICC’s determination that Pipeline Company 
negotiated Landowners’ compensation in good faith. As such, the trial court 
failed to properly provide Landowners with their sole opportunity to 
challenge the ICC’s condemnation powers. Therefore, the court vacated the 
trial court’s denial of Landowners’ traverse motions, and remanded for 
further proceedings. The court declined to decide on the trial court’s 
granting of Pipeline Company’s summary judgment motion, waiting to 
make such decision until the traverse hearing was held and the new record 
was certified to the court. 
 
Michigan  
 
Lowery v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 898 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 2017).  
 
Company appealed appellate court’s decision finding for Landowner 
regarding a toxic tort claim. Landowner allegedly suffered injuries due to a 
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significant pipeline oil spill into a woodland area and nearby creek and 
river. Landowner claims he was exposed to toxic substances from the spill, 
subsequently developed symptoms that resulted in a major surgery. The 
Supreme Court of Michigan disagreed with Landowner’s ‘post hoc propter 
hoc’ reasoning regarding his injuries, saying that despite an alleged 
relationship between the spill and Landowner’s injuries, Landowner has not 
shown sufficient evidence of causation. The court accordingly reversed the 
appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s decision.  
 
Pennsylvania  
 
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 165 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2017). 
 
Condemnees sought review of the trial court’s dismissal of their 
preliminary objections to Pipeline Operator’s declaration of taking. Pipeline 
Operator intended to condemn easements on Condemnees’ property for 
pipeline construction. State law allows public utility corporations to 
condemn private property to transport natural gas for the public through the 
state’s regulatory commission. Noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
have been repeatedly held as not applying to eminent domain proceedings, 
the appellate court held that Pipeline Operator had demonstrated a public 
need or demand for the proposed pipeline. The appellate court held that the 
trial court did not err in dismissing Condemnee’s objections as Pipeline 
Operator’s notice of taking satisfied the requirement of demonstrating a 
public need for the proposed service. The court also held that Pipeline 
Operator’s notice of taking was not deficient since Condemnees were the 
only party responsible for defending any unrecorded bridle path easement 
as the neighboring community likely would not be harmed by Pipeline 
Operator’s alleged notice deficiency. 
 
Lankard v. Lauren Mountain Midstream Operating, LLC, No. 1367 WDA 
2016, 2017 WL 2539844 (Pa. Super. Ct., June 12, 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Midstream Operator (“Operator”) following the placement  
of a natural gas pipeline on a portion of Landowner’s property. Landowner 
alleged seven causes of action: (1) ejectment; (2) trespassing; (3) continuing 
trespass; (4) private nuisance; (5) conversion; (6) fraudulent 
misrepresentation; and (7) a demand for equitable accounting. The trial 
court granted Operator’s motion for summary judgment and Landowners 
properly preserved four issues on appeal. Appellate court denied all four. 
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First, the trial court did not improperly interpret the record against the non-
moving party because the trial court explicitly noted its careful review of all 
available materials regarding Landowner’s specific claims. Regarding the 
remainder of Landowner’s claims, the court—relying on the trial court’s 
analysis—agreed that the “crux of [Landowner’s] averrments [sic] is that 
[Operator] intentionally violated” the terms of a contract comprising of an 
easement and one separate letter of agreement agreed to by both parties. 
The court held the contract as valid because Operator “precisely followed” 
the terms of the contract. More specifically, the trial court had two reasons 
to enforce the contract and, thus, discount Landowner’s claims. First, 
introduction of parol evidence by Landowner to prove inducement was 
inappropriate because it was Landowner’s choice to sign the final contract 
and the final contract was clear enough to enforce. Second, the trial court 
was satisfied that there was no spoliation of evidence after four motions to 
compel were filed, no sanctionable discovery mishaps occurred. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 0.16 
Acres, Temp. Easement for 0.55 Acres, & Temp.Access Easement for 7.75 
Acres in Coal Twp., Northumberland Cty., Pennsylvania, No. 4:17-CV-
005445, 2017 WL 3412375 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017).  
 
This is one of seven cases Pipeline Company brought against various 
Landowners to use eminent domain to condemn the property. Pipeline 
Company seeks to build a new pipeline across multiple states, including 
Pennsylvania, and thus sought and received a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”). Pipeline Company was unable to reach a 
compensation deal with the various Landowners, and thus sought to 
condemn the lands through eminent domain. After filing its initial 
complain, Pipeline Company filed a motion for partial summary judgement 
and a subsequent motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted both 
motions finding that: (1) Landowners had been given a chance to challenge 
the FERC Order and failed to do so; (2) Pipeline Company is not required 
to negotiate in good faith; (3) it is not abuse of discretion to grant Pipeline 
Company immediate use and possession of the property while other cases 
are ongoing; and (4) the harm to Pipeline Company in delaying is more 
than just monetary harm. In the related cases, the court granted whichever 
motions were at issues, which varies as Pipeline Company and some 
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Landowners reached agreements on certain issues. These motions were 
granted based on the same reasoning above.  
 
Virginia  
 
Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 189 (Va. 2017). 
 
Company is engaged in the underground storage and transportation of 
natural gas and is subject to regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”). Company is seeking approval from FERC to 
construct a natural gas transmission line. Company sent Landowners along 
the proposed route letters seeking permission to enter their properties to 
conduct surveys, tests, examinations, and appraisals. When Landowners 
withheld their permission, Company provided Landowners with notices of 
intent to enter their properties “on or after” a specific date. The notices 
explained that Virginia law authorized operator to enter land without 
permission to complete the sought-after conduct. Landowners argued that 
the notices failed to “set forth the date of intended entry” as required by 
state law. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded “on or after” notices do 
not meet the requirement to “set forth the date of the intended entry” 
because they are too vague and do not provide Landowners with a way to 
determine when the entry would occur. The Virginia Supreme Court held 
that notices of intent must provide Landowners with intended dates in 
which Company is certain to enter the property. 
  
Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 2017). 
 
Pipeline Company sought permission to enter Landowner’s property to 
conduct surveys necessary to build a natural gas transmission line. 
Landowner denied Pipeline Company’s access to the property. Pipeline 
Company sought declaratory judgment granting entry to the property under 
state law. Landowner filed a plea in bar and a demurrer, claiming that the 
relevant statute applies only to Virginia public service companies and that 
the statute impermissibly burdens her fundamental right to exclude others 
from property. The trial court overruled Landowner’s plea and demurrer. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the statute applies to 
all corporations that are doing business within the Commonwealth of 
Virginia. Additionally, the court held that the Landowner’s right to exclude 
others is not absolute, and that Virginia law grants entry-for-survey 
privilege specifically to public service corporations and natural gas 
companies.  
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Downstream – State  
 
Illinois  
 
Vanguard Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Shihadeh, 2017 IL App (2d) 160909. 
 
Supplier alleges that Buyer breached several agreements in terminating his 
agreement to purchase natural gas and argues, on appeal, that the breaches 
should not be barred by the statute of frauds. Supplier contends that the gas 
was set aside for Buyer specifically, and that Supplier subsequently took a 
loss by salvaging the sale on the open market. Because a contract where the 
goods are specially manufactured specially for the buyer alone are still 
enforceable under the UCC absent a written contract, the court looked at 
whether: (1) Supplier intended the gas for Buyer in particular; (2) the gas 
becomes more difficult to sell without Buyer within Supplier's ordinary 
course of business; (3) Supplier had already substantially committed to 
fulfilling the agreements; and (4) the Supplier had reasonably indicated 
through its substantiated actions prior to Buyer providing Supplier notice of 
the contractual repudiation. The appellate court affirmed the trial court and 
held that neither the merchant exception nor the specially manufactured 
good exception applied in exempting Supplier's contract from the statute of 
frauds writing requirement.  
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 
Between 1967 and 2014, City sourced its water from Lake Huron via the 
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”). On March 29, 2013, 
City decided to join a water supplier, the Karegnondi Water Authority 
(“KWA”), that was still in the development stages. Shortly after this 
decision was made, DWSD informed City that its contract would terminate 
in April 2014, spurring City to decide on an interim water source to be used 
until the KWA was complete. Officials chose the Flint River despite a 2011 
report that determined that the water in the river would need to be treated to 
meet safety regulations and that the cost of the treatment of the water would 
be more than the proposed KWA contract. Immediately after the switch, 
residents complained that the water "smelled rotten, looked foul, and tasted 
terrible." In October 2015, County officials declared a public health 
emergency advising residents not to drink the water. Residents filed suit 
against Former City Managers citing twelve different causes of action both 
state and federal. The Residents filed for a preliminary injunction, seeking 
to enjoin Former City Managers from billing Flint residents for water but 
the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the 
district court said the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) precluded the 
federal claim, leaving only state law claims. Residents also sued Governor, 
citing six causes of action, four of which were federal. On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the residents' federal claims were not 
preempted by SDWA and reversed and remanded. This case has since been 
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.  
 
Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 865 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 
Landowners of a private lakefront property sued U. S. Forest Service 
(“USFS”), claiming that its prohibition of gas-powered motorboats and 
limitation of electrically powered motorboats to no-wake speeds exceeded 
USFS’s regulatory authority. The Michigan Wilderness Act of 2007 (“Act”) 
granted USFS the ability to regulate any use of the lake “subject to valid 
existing rights.” The district court dismissed the suit, holding that 
Landowner’s rights did not exist at the Act’s enactment, because 
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Landowners had not yet purchased the property. The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that the valid existing rights ran with the land, 
and Landowners inherited those existing rights when they purchased the 
property. In determining whether the regulations interfered with those 
rights, the court looked to the lake’s history and Michigan law and 
determined that the use of a gas-powered boat or an electrical boat above a 
low-wake-zone speed was “reasonable.” Accordingly, USFS’s regulations 
prohibiting recreational boating in this manner interfered with Landowners’ 
valid existing rights, and therefore were invalid. 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 
The district court entered a Consent Decree in 1935 to govern the 
distribution of water from the Gila River among Community, Tribe, and 
other landowners. The Decree allows parties to divert the water from the 
Gila River for the beneficial use and irrigation of land. Additionally, the 
Decree allows parties to change the point of diversion, if they do not injure 
the rights of the other parties. In 1993, the district court outlined the 
procedures to sever and transfer water rights. The party seeking to sever 
and transfer must file an application. If there are objections, either party 
may request an evidentiary hearing in which the applicant has the burden to 
show a prima facie case of no injury to the other parties. In 2007, 
Community, United States, and individual landowners entered into the 
Upper Valley Forbearance Agreement (“UVFA”). The UFVA allows 
parties to sever and transfer certain water rights to lands that were not 
originally covered by the Decree. Pursuant to the UFVA, in 2008, 
Corporation filed fifty-nine applications. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that Corporation failed to meet its prima facie burden of 
no injuries to other parties. The court held that Corporation failed to address 
the delay in time that parties would receive water downstream of the 
proposed diversions, the return flow of the water into the Gila River, the 
impact of the water quality, and the cumulative effect of the diversions and 
not just each individual diversions’ effect. The court also concluded that 
Corporation abandoned the water rights on a one and four-tenths acre parcel 
of land because Corporation failed to use the water rights for at least eleven 
years. The court held that Corporation’s involvement in prior negotiations 
and litigations does not defeat a claim of abandonment under Arizona law.   
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Federal Claim 
 
Magnus Pac. Corp. v. United States, No. 13-859 C, 2017 WL 3765524 
(Fed. Cl., Aug. 31, 2017). 
 
Corporation sued the United States Section of the International Boundary 
and Water Commission (“Government”) under the Contract Disputes Act 
(“CDA”) over a contract to restore a levee on the Rio Grande. Corporation 
brings four claims. In the first claim, Corporation asserts that it had to fill 
the levee more than a reasonable bidder on this contract should have. In the 
second claim (the “riprap claim”), Corporation asserts that Government 
required it to do work beyond the scope of the contract. In the third claim, 
Corporation asserts that Government wrongfully retained “disputed credit 
owed the [G]overnment for a mid-project change to the levee design.” In 
the final claim (the “slope change credit claim”), Corporation asserts that 
after a mid-contract design change to the physical slope of the levee, 
Government retained too much of the contract payments owed Corporation. 
The court found in favor of Corporation on all of its claims. The court 
found Corporation did fill more than was originally thought. Second, 
analyzing the riprap claim under the constructive change doctrine due to a 
change in the contract mid-performance, the court found that the riprap 
work done was beyond the scope of the contract documents and the fault 
for the constructive change lies with Government. Finally, because 
Corporation “realized minimal financial benefits from” the slope change in 
an amount “far less than [Government] retained from the contract price 
due” Corporation, Corporation prevails on the slope change credit claim. 
Because Corporation prevails on all of its contract claims, it is also 
inappropriate for Government to retain the contract funds. 
 
Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 133 Fed.Cl. 204 (Fed.Cl. 2017). 
 
District sued United States claiming that Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) 
failed to provide District with contractually required volumes of surface 
water from reservoir. The court determined that District was not entitled to 
expectancy damages based on Bureau’s breach of its contractual obligation 
to make minimum amounts or surface water available to District because: 
(1) District failed to produce sufficient evidence quantifying the level of 
demand required; and (2) even if the demand estimates were reliable, 
District did not show that Bureau’s breaching announcements were the 
actual cause of demand falling below what District had identified as 
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expected demands. Thus, the court determined that any expectancy 
damages would be speculative and were therefore unjustified. This case has 
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Zinke, Civil Action No. 02-2057 
(RMC), Civil Action No. 09-373, 2017 WL 3437658 (D.D.C. August 10, 
2017). 
 
Province sued under National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) to 
prevent the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) from proceeding with a 
project to supply water from a foreign lake to certain communities in need 
of water. The foreign lake water would transfer through pipes across a 
divide which separated two other large water basins, causing the waters to 
co-mingle. Province argued this co-mingling could introduce dangerous, 
invasive species into the existing basins and as a result, threaten the health 
of the indigenous species living there. Province also claims that the 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) provided by Bureau is insufficient. 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district curt assessed the 
EIS to ensure Bureau took a “hard look” at the environmental consequences 
of the project. The court determined that Bureau, after several years of 
“studious” efforts, produced an EIS which satisfies the NEPA. The court 
found that Bureau adequately considered the implications of the plan, 
proposed feasible alternatives, and showcased effort to mitigate the 
negative effects. Any deficiencies which were present in the previous EISs 
provided by Reclamation had been corrected. Accordingly, the court 
granted Bureau’s motion for summary judgment against Province. This case 
has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.    
 
D. Idaho 
 
Idaho Conservation League v. Atlanta Gold Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00161-
REB, 2017 WL 4099815 (D. Idaho Sept. 15, 2017). 
 
Corporation was responsible for contamination of a waterway and was sued 
by Conservationists in 2005 to reduce the contamination. The lawsuit was 
settled by a consent decree that required Corporation to construct a water 
treatment facility and obtain a discharge permit. The permit required that 
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Corporation keep the contamination below a specified level, which it failed 
to do on many occasions. Because of the failures, Conservationists sued 
Corporation a second time and obtained an injunction in 2012 requiring 
Corporation to comply with the terms of the permit. Following the 
injunction, Corporation took steps to comply with the permit, but progress 
was impeded by a large forest fire that occurred the same year. After the 
fire, Corporation had brought the contamination to significantly lower 
levels than it had been, but consistently not low enough to accord with the 
permit. In 2017, Conservationists filed a motion to reopen the case and a 
motion for civil contempt for Corporation’s consistent violations of the 
injunction. Corporation argued that compliance with the injunction would 
not be possible, considering the difficulties presented by the geography and 
climate of the region. The court held that although Corporation had suffered 
hardship by the 2012 forest fire and compliance with the terms of the 
permit would be costly because of its location, compliance was not 
impossible. The court found for Conservationists, imposed monetary 
sanctions on Corporation. The court also ruled that Corporation must 
comply with the permit limits within a year. 
 
D. Minnesota 
 
Richland & Wilkin JPA v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, Case No. 13-2262, 
2017 WL 3972471 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2017). 
 
Interest Group and Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) sued U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and Flood Diversion Board of Authority 
(collectively “Corps”), alleging a violation of state and federal laws when it 
signed a project partnership agreement and began constriction for a 
permanent flood protection project without obtaining requisite permits from 
the state. Interest Group and DNR further sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent Corps from continuing construction until it obtained the requisite 
permits. The court looked at four factors to determine if injunctive relief 
was appropriate: (1) the probability the moving part would succeed on its 
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party; (3) the 
balance of harms between the parties; and (4) the public interest. After 
weighing the factors, the court granted Interest Group and DNR motions for 
preliminary injunction to stop construction on the project. The court 
reasoned that construction of a project before compliance with state laws 
creates the risk of a steamroller effect that could make it difficult to 
mitigate damages. This case has since been appealed, but there is no 
decision from the higher court as of publication.  
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S. D. West Virginia  
 
Foster v. EPA, No. CV 14-16744, 2017 WL 3485049 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 
14, 2017).  
 
Landowner challenges an Administrative Compliance Order (“ACO”) 
imposed by EPA on four tracts of land. The substantive issue challenged is 
whether the “relevant reaches” of the property is considered federal 
“waters” under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). One section of the property 
was subject to violations of the CWA. The waters on the section were 
subsequently filled and questions arose regarding whether they were 
navigable waters and the definition of the term. The court analyzed the 
CWA violation pursuant to EPA’s counterclaim for “injunctive relief and 
civil penalties.” The court found affirmatively for most factors since the 
violation was carried out: (1) by a person (or entity); (2) by a “discharge”; 
(3) from a point source; and (4) without the authority of a permit. The court 
applied the decided-upon permanent flow test and nexus test to determine 
that the property was dry, with no substantial flow and no actual physical 
link to downstream water. Additional questions were raised of whether the 
water had a continuous flow prior to its filling and whether jurisdiction of 
the CWA was cut off due to the disruption of the “ordinary high water 
mark.” The court granted EPA’s motion for summary judgment regarding 
the procedural due process claim, First Amendment retaliation claim, and 
challenge to the reasonableness of the ACO pertaining to one section of 
land at issue. The court found that the administrative record supported 
EPA’s decision, with sufficient evidence provided. However, the court also 
granted Landowners’ motion for summary judgment regarding the 
reasonableness of the ACO pertaining to three remaining sections of land 
because it found insufficient evidence of those particular tracts’ impact on a 
navigable water in the administrative record.   
 
State  
 
California 
 
Orange Cty. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, 222 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
 County Water District (“District”) sued Operators and former Operators 
(collectively, “Operators”) for damages under state statute (“HSSA”), a 
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county water district act (“OCWD”), and tort claims for negligence, 
nuisance, and trespass. In this consolidated appeal, the court addressed each 
cause of action individually. First, District can bring an HSSA cause of 
action because it “incurred response or corrective action costs.” Moreover, 
on Operator’s motions for summary judgment, this court reasoned that no 
defendant made an adequate evidentiary finding to rise to the level that 
justified summary adjudication. Second, the trial court was incorrect to 
grant summary judgment on District’s OCWD claim in favor of Operators 
because merely characterizing their incurred costs as “investigatory” is not 
dispositive for an OCWD claim. However, the trial court was correct to 
grant summary judgment for one specific Operator because it was not 
responsible for a fire that caused the disputed water contamination. Third, 
applying the legal theory of “continuous accrual,” this court reasoned that 
due to the breadth of District’s complaint, most Operators insufficiently 
addressed each allegation. However, summary judgment against District’s 
negligence claim was appropriate as to an Operator which District merely 
acknowledged Operator’s statute of limitation argument and another for 
whom District failed to prove any causation under the OCWD. Fourth, 
District has generally “raised a triable issue of fact regarding its property 
interest in groundwater,” but because this is based on District’s recharge 
activities, District has a viable nuisance claim, but not a viable trespass 
claim. Finally, the court reasoned that District’s declaratory relief claim 
should be revived because it “incorporates the allegations of its other causes 
of action” and at least one other cause of action has been revived. 
Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.  
 
San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., 220 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
 Purchaser is an independent public agency that serves as San Diego 
County’s regional water wholesaler and is a customer of Seller. In Seller’s 
capacity as the state government’s water delivery company from the 
Colorado River and the Hoover Dam to the southern-most region of the 
state, Seller has developed a system of rate costs for water delivery. After 
many years of disputes concerning Seller’s prices, the two parties had 
reached an uneasy agreement with a set price that was subject to change 
over time. In June 2010, Purchaser filed an action challenging the water 
rates Seller adopted for 2011 to 2012 and then filed another action in June 
2012 challenging the 2013-2014 rates. The trial court coordinated the two 
claims together, bifurcating the bench trial, and found that the rates adopted 
by Seller “…over-collect from wheelers, because at least a significant 
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portion of these costs are attributable to supply, not transportation,” and 
invalidated the rates for both rate cycles. The court awarded Purchaser total 
damages of $234,932,782. The appellate court found that the lower court 
was incorrect in its valuation of damages in including State Water Project 
transportation charges and excluding Purchaser’s payments under the 
exchange agreement when calculating its preferential right to water supplies 
in the event of a shortage. Additionally, it concluded that Seller’s 
termination of Purchaser’s membership due to filing or participating in 
litigation against it was unconstitutional. The case was reversed and 
remanded. 
 
Colorado  
 
Gallegos Family Props., LLC v. Colo. Groundwater Comm’n, 2017 CO 73. 
 
Owner of senior surface water rights (“Senior Owner”) sought to de-
designate a portion of a designated ground water basin (“Basin”) and have 
its boundaries re-drawn to exclude twenty-five wells in order for the State 
Engineer to curtail those junior groundwater rights (“Junior Owners”) in 
favor of Senior Owner’s surface water rights. Junior Owners opposed the 
petition because so long as their properties remain within the Basin, the 
State Engineer is unable to curtail their groundwater rights. The trial court 
denied Senior Owner’s effort to de-designate a portion of the Basin, and 
issued an order awarding Junior Owners a portion of their litigation costs. 
Senior Owner appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court held that Senior 
Owner failed to meet its burden of providing enough evidence to show that 
Junior Owners were pumping water connected to the creek in a way that 
created future conditions, supported by data, justified de-designation of the 
Basin. That the creek and groundwater were connected at the time of 
designation was inadequate to de-designate a portion of the basin because it 
did not show that a condition arose or was discovered since the date of 
designation, and therefore does not satisfy the statutory requirements for 
de-designation. The petition also fails due to claim preclusion because 
connectivity—the question of whether a sufficient enough linkage between 
surface water and groundwater to mean augmenting or depleting 
groundwater would impact the availability or flow of surface water—could 
have been litigated during the designation proceeding. Finally, the court 
held that Junior Owners who had been joined as indispensable parties were 
able to recover costs as prevailing parties, and the expert fees they claimed 
were both reasonable and necessary. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision. 
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Idaho 
 
City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 396 P.3d 1184 (Idaho 2017). 
 
City applied for a water right to appropriate 9.71 cubic feet per second of 
groundwater to be used for irrigation. The Idaho Department of Water 
Resources (“Department”) denied the application. City appealed to the 
district court and again to the Supreme Court of Idaho. The court affirmed 
the district court, ruling that City must apply for a transfer of water 
resources to use water seepage for “recharge” of groundwater drawn for 
irrigation. To offset the injury resulting from the appropriation, City wishes 
to use 1,066 afa of mitigation credit resulting from seepage that occurs 
under Water Right No. 01-181C (“181C”). The court held that 181C 
authorizes five different use purposes: irrigation storage, irrigation from 
storage, diversion to storage, recreation storage, and irrigation. City argues 
that although “recharge” is not included in the purpose of use element, it is 
still an authorized use of 181C. The court rejects this argument finding that 
“recharge is a statutorily recognized beneficial use” and as such it must be 
included in the purpose of use element before being used for recharge. 
Additionally, the court found that since recharge is not a listed use, the only 
way to alter, add or subtract from a judicially decreed purpose of use 
element is through an application for transfer, so if City wishes to use 181C 
for recharge it must file for a transfer. The court ruled that a water right 
under 181C could not be used for groundwater recharge without an 
approved transfer application and could not be used as mitigation until such 
transfer was approved. District court finding was affirmed.  
  
Montana  
 
City of Helena v. Cmty. of Remini, 2017 MT 145, 388 Mont. 1, 397 P.3d 1. 
 
Junior Owner appealed Water Court’s decision to try and protect his water 
rights. The central issue is whether City forfeited or abandoned its water 
rights after a period of inactivity. The appeal addresses whether the Water 
Court was wrong to find a presumption by applying provisions of state law 
that City did not intend to abandon water rights. The court held that “[i]f the 
City can establish that it has used “any part” of the water right and also 
satisfies one of the four additional requirements under” the pertinent section 
of the law, then it is presumed not to have abandoned its water right. The 
Supreme Court of Montana determined that City’s construction activity on 
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the pipeline creates a presumption of nonabandonment because it displays 
City’s intent to use the water rights. The court ultimately held that there was 
error in the Water Master’s decision that City abandoned its water rights; 
holding instead that City did not abandon its water rights under state law. 
The court remanded, ordering the lower court to restore City’s entire water 
right.  
 
Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 2017 MT 184, 388 Mont. 205, 399 P.3d 295.  
 
The Montana Water Act allows permit exceptions for certain new ground 
water appropriations. It exempts appropriations of outside streams that are 
less than ten acre-feet per year and run for less than thirty-five gallons per 
minute, unless the combined appropriation from the same source was of 
two or more wells exceeds ten acre-feet, regardless of the rate of water 
flow. The Montana Department of Natural Resources (“Department”) had a 
rule in 1987 that stated that combined appropriation did not need to 
physically connect or have a combined distribution system to fall under the 
category of combined appropriation. Department issued a new rule in 1993 
defining combined appropriations “as an appropriation of water from the 
same source acquired by two or more groundwater developments that are 
physically . . . the same system.” Senior water rights owners (“Owners”) 
petitioned Department regarding the new rule and then moved for judicial 
review of the rule. The district vacated the 1993 rule finding the new rule 
inconstant with the statute and therefore invalid. On appeal, the Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision but reversed district court decision to 
award attorney’s fees to Owners under the private attorney general. The 
court reasoned that the award of attorney’s fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine only in cases “vindicating constitutional interests.” In the 
case at bar, the underlying issue was a challenge to a statute and therefore 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.  
 
South Dakota 
 
Rumpza v. Zubke, 2017 S.D. 601, 900 N.W.2d 601. 
 
Landowner’s property was separated from Neighbor’s property by a rural 
road. Neighbor’s property was immediately adjacent to West Neighbors. 
Water flowed from Landowner’s property onto Neighbor’s property via a 
culvert dug under the road. In 2012, Landowner constructed a dam and a 
ten-foot pit on his side of the culvert, with a pump inside. When the water 
in the pit reached a certain level, it pumped the contents of the pit over the 
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dam and onto Neighbor and West Neighbor’s property. Neighbor and West 
Neighbor sued Landowner, seeking an injunction and damages. They 
argued that the increased water flow onto their properties had extended the 
time that water lingers on the properties, ruining land that they had 
previously been able to farm. Trial court returned judgment for Neighbor 
and West Neighbor, prohibiting Landowner from operating the pump and 
awarding damages of $12,465 and $16,173 respectively. The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota held that the trial court did not err in granting the 
injunction against Landowner. The court held that as the dominant 
landowner, Landowner may not “transfer the burdens imposed by nature on 
his land to that of the lower owner.” Additionally, under South Dakota law, 
the dominant landowner may not transfer surface waters on his property to 
a lower owner in “unusual or unnatural quantities.” Because Neighbor and 
West Neighbor’s properties used to dry out gradually, and are now 
“continually wet” since the installation of the pump, an injunction to 
prevent the damage to their land was proper. However, Neighbor, unlike 
West Neighbor, failed to deduct appropriate expenses from his damage 
calculation. Therefore, the court did not have sufficient data to calculate 
Neighbor’s damages. The injunction and West Neighbor’s damages were 
affirmed; Neighbor’s damages were reversed. 
 
Surat Farms, LLC v. Brule Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 SD 52, 901 N.W. 2d 
365.  
 
Company appealed Board of County Commissioners’ (“Board”) decision, 
which found that Company impermissibly blocked watercourse drainage 
with tile installation. The circuit court affirmed Board’s decision. South 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that 
the award of injunctive relief was proper and supported by evidence. The 
court said the tile created a problematic elevation difference, which thereby 
caused significant water backup on an upstream Landowner’s property. The 
court determined that a “civil law rule” applies requiring that Company not 
interfere with drainage on another’s property under rural property 
requirements. The court denied Company’s claim that Landowner suffered 
no actual damages by highlighting the lack of evidence Company presented 
for this particular claim. Additionally, the court held that Company did not 
have the right to create water backup and impact a neighboring property 
owner’s land. The court also held that Company’s claim that Landowner 
misrepresented his property’s use was inaccurate and unnecessary, since 
damages were not calculated factoring in the use of the land. Thus, the 
court affirmed the injunctive relief granted to Landowner, enforcing 
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Company’s requirement to “restore the natural flow of water” on his own 
and Landowner’s property.  
 
Texas  
 
Bexar-Medina-Atascoas Ctys. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. 
Bandera Cty. River Authority & Groundwater Dist., No. 04-16-00536-CV, 
2017 WL 4014703 (Tex. App. Sept. 13, 2017).  
 
Bandera Water District (“Bandera”) sued the Bexar-Medina-Atascoas 
Counties Water District (“BMA”) seeking a declaratory judgment that 
BMA has no jurisdiction in Bandera County to do any of the following: (1) 
inspect private or public wells; (2) enforce any jurisdiction or rules over 
groundwater or surface water; (3) investigate any types of alleged water 
well violations; (4) promulgate any rules relating to groundwater; and (5) 
exercise any rights as a water control and improvement district. BMA 
entered a plea to the jurisdiction asserting contrarily, that Bandera could not 
show any of the five enumerated items have occurred or are imminent; 
therefore, there is no justiciable controversy for determination. The trial 
court denied BMA’s plea, and subsequently granted Bandera’s motion for 
summary judgment, however, the court denied Bandera’s request for 
attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded. In its holding, the court noted that there is no general right to sue 
a state agency for a declaration of rights, and that although Bandera 
attempts to define its claim as one challenging the validity of the 
application of a Texas statute, its challenge aims to restrain BMA’s actions; 
therefore, BMA is immune from the claims under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. However, Bandera requested that the case be remanded to allow 
it to amend its pleading to pursue ultra vires claims against BMA’s officers. 
The court held that because BMA raised its immunity challenge for the first 
time on appeal, Bandera did not have an opportunity to amend its pleadings 
and should therefore the proper course of action was to remand the cause 
with instructions to allow Bandera an opportunity to amend its pleading. 
 
Washington 
 
Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 399 P.3d 493 (Wash. 
2017). 
 
A local Environmental Group, sued lakeside Property Owner, seeking 
abatement and removal of fill material which Property Owner added to 
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elevate and keep its property permanently above the artificially raised 
seasonal water fluctuations of a public lake. Environmental Group’s cause 
of action was based upon the State of Washington’s public trust doctrine, 
which protects the public right to use water in place along navigable 
waterways. The lower court held that State previously consented to 
Property Owner’s fill and impairment pursuant to a “Savings Clause” found 
in the State’s statutes. The clause protects from public trust challenges to 
any fill improvements made pre-Wilbour (1969 case wherein Supreme 
Court held that private property owners may not extinguish the public right 
to use navigable waters by artificially elevating their own property). As 
Property Owner’s fill had been added in 1961, Environmental Group’s 
public trust claim was barred. Environmental Group appealed. The 
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower courts holding that State 
had consented to Property Owner’s fill improvement pursuant to the 
Savings Clause, however, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court 
to determine whether the Savings Clause violates the public trust doctrine 
all-together. The court also held that Environmental Group has standing to 
raise its claim under a public nuisance theory notwithstanding the 
provisions and protections afforded in the Savings Clause.   
 
Hamilton Corner I, LLC v. City of Napavine, 402 P.3d 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2017). 
  
Property Owner sued City, challenging the city council's ruling that 
Property Owner owed $170,329.02 after being assessed due to the 
construction of a public water system. City's local improvement district 
(“LID”) instituted water system improvements to promote development 
through providing City's water to an area not previously serviced by public 
water. City's public health and city code requirements required completed 
public water systems that provide potable drinking water and the appraisal 
cited that the completed public water system would allow for full 
development of Property Owner's property and surrounding properties. The 
LID appraised the improvements through obtaining “before and after” 
market values of Property Owner’s property. Property Owner did not 
present any alternative appraisals of its own and Property Owner only 
argued that its property was sufficiently serviced by its own private water 
systems. The court held Property Owner's argument that City's confirmation 
of the assessments was arbitrary and capricious as invalid because the LID's 
fundamental purpose was accomplished. While Property Owner does not 
benefit from a specific nearby well that was improved, the court found the 
special benefit gained by Property Owner to be related from the public 
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water delivery system improvements generally and that Property Owner 
was afforded reasonable notice to an opportunity to meaningfully present its 
objections to the city. The court therefore affirmed the assessment. 
  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
1064 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Agricultural Use 
 
Iowa 
Thompson v. JTTR Enviro, L.L.C., No. 16-1610, 2017 WL 3065159 (Iowa 
Ct. App. July 19, 2017). 
Landowner purchased 146 acres of farmland from Seller. The contract 
between them stated that Landowner would give Seller a permanent 
easement on the 146 acres and a separate manure easement agreement 
("MEA") that would be created at closing. The MEA was drafted, signed, 
and recorded as permanent and running with the land, binding upon all 
successors and interest, noting that Landowner would receive as much 
animal waste generated from the hog facility on Seller’s land as needed for 
his 146 acres, and that he would receive the benefit of reduced costs and 
expenses regarding fertilizer application. Months following the MEA, 
Neighbor purchased the neighboring 10.25 acres from Seller and filed a 
manure management plan, under which Landowner could only receive 
seventy-three acres of manure annually. Landowner filed suit, alleging that 
Neighbor breached the MEA. The trial court found in favor of Landowner 
and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that: (1) the terms of the MEA 
explicitly impose a burden upon Neighbor as Seller’s successor to supply 
Landowner with enough manure to cover the 146 acres; (2) nothing in 
Neighbor’s argument supports the conclusion that the MEA's broad 
wording was not meant to include manure from a finishing barn as opposed 
to that of a farrowing barn; and (3) simply because Landowner planted 
soybeans in year one—which do not require the same level of fertilization 
as corn--does not provide proof of what Landowner would have done and 
intended to do had manure been provided.  
South Dakota 
 
Hoffman v. Van Wyk, 2017 S.D. 48, 900 N.W.2d 596. 
 
Landowners applied for a writ of mandamus to compel County Planning 
and Zoning Administrator and Planning and Zoning Commission 
(“County”) to revoke a building permit for a hog confinement unit applied 
for by another party, arguing that building the unit would be in violation of 
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County’s zoning ordinance. The circuit court denied Landowners’ request. 
Landowners appealed, and County, in a notice of review, argued that the 
court erred in determining that the unit was not a permitted use under the 
ordinance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the 
lower court decision, in part, determining that the hog confinement facility 
was a permitted use and did not require a variance or conditional-use 
permit. Further, although the court determined that the permit should not 
have been issued, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in denying 
Landowners a writ of mandamus, noting that construction of the facility had 
already been completed at the time of the trial and a writ of mandamus 
would be ineffective.  
 
Easements - Federal 
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Green Hills Mall TRG, LLC v. BakerSouth, LLC, Case No. 16-5758, 2017 
WL 4217450 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017). 
 
Parking Lot Owner sued Property Owner for a declaratory judgment 
challenging Property Owner’s claim to a parking easement that was 
purportedly granted through the deed associated with Property Owner’s 
purchase. Long prior to Property Owner’s purchase, the deed’s trustee died 
without appointing a successor. Parking Lot Owner contended that the 
original deed no longer contained an enforceable easement because a 
deceased trustee’s heirs serve only as mere conceptual placeholders. 
Arguing the contrary, Property Owner repurchased the property after the 
deceased trustee’s heirs took title. Because Tennessee state law offers no 
explicit answer to what occurs with trust property when a trustee dies, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to state case law in holding that the 
trustee’s heirs only maintain “naked legal title” that automatically divests 
when the court appoints a successor. Thus, the court affirmed the lower 
court’s judgment that the conveyance did not give Property Owner an 
enforceable right to the easement as a trustee’s heirs may not freely convey 
trust property in fee simple to third parties under state law. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing as the case precedent. 
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Federal Circuit  
 
Caquelin v. United States, No. 2016-1663, 2017 WL 2684180 (Fed. Cir. 
June 21, 2017). 
 
Landowners owned property that was subject to a railroad easement. 
Railroad and its predecessors had held the easement since 1870, which was 
limited to railroad use only. In May 2013, Railroad sought to abandon the 
line, effective July 5, 2013. The Surface Transportation Board (“Board”) 
issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (“NITU”) that 
prohibited Railroad from abandoning the line for 180 days, which blocked 
the easement interest from reverting to Landowners. Landowners sued the 
United States under the Tucker Act, alleging that the temporary blocking of 
the reversion constituted a compensable temporary taking. Relying on a 
prior decision, the district court granted summary judgement in favor of 
Landowners, finding that a categorical taking had occurred. The United 
States appealed, arguing that the standard for regulatory takings and 
temporary takings should have applied. The Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case so the record could be 
further developed to determine whether the proper standard was used in 
resolving the merits of Landowners’ takings claim. This case is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Easements – State  
 
Alabama  
 
Commonwealth Savingshares Corp. v. Fayetteville Holdings, LLC, No. 
2150916, 2017 WL 2822317 (Ala. Civ. App. June 30, 2017). 
 
Servient Estate Owner (“Servient”) brought an action seeking an injunction 
and damages based on theories of trespass and nuisance. After an 
annexation in 2004, the properties became subject to Scottsboro Zoning 
Ordinance. Servient argued that the ordinance prohibits the presence of the 
Dominant Estate Owner (“Dominant”), an industrial conveyor, and 
extinguishes the easement. The general rule in Alabama is that “an 
easement given for a specific purpose terminates as soon as the purpose 
ceases to exist, is abandoned, or is rendered impossible of 
accomplishment.” Servient argued that the ordinance made the easement 
impossible for accomplishment. However, the ordinance allows 
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nonconformities to continue to exist if the nonconformities existed before 
the ordinance began to govern the property. Therefore, the court had to 
determine whether the use of the easement continued to exist. Existing use 
is determined regarding the fact of discontinuance or apparent 
abandonment. However, in Alabama, discontinuance in zoning ordinances 
is equivalent to abandonment. Under Alabama law, a temporary cessation is 
generally not held to be abandonment. The appellate court held that while 
Dominant was not actively using the easement during the annexation, 
testimony supports the lack of intent to abandon the use of the easement. 
Therefore, the court determined that Dominant qualified as a permissible 
nonconformity under the ordinance. Servient further argued that Dominant 
was not registered as a nonconformity and the easement should not be 
preserved. However, the court held that failing to register only creates a 
rebuttable presumption of abandonment and Servient failed to demonstrate 
an intent to abandon. The court further held that Servient is not entitled to 
damages for nuisance because Servient purchased the property with notice 
of the easement and presented no facts that Dominant acted outside the 
scope of the easement. 
 
Arkansas  
 
Clark v. Caughron, 2017 Ark. App. 409, 2017 WL 3724989. 
 
Landowner asked Neighbor for a right-of-way to gain access to landlocked 
property, but Neighbor refused. Landowner subsequently sued to quiet title 
for encroaching fence line and unlawfully removing timber belonging to 
Landowner. Neighbor counterclaimed that fence line established boundary 
by acquiescence, or in the alternative, by adverse possession. After a bench 
trial, the trial court held that “by acquiescence and open and notorious 
possession for a period in excess of seven years that the parties’ boundaries 
in the areas in dispute should be fixed by the old fences,” and found in 
favor of Neighbor. On appeal, the appellate court determined that the trial 
court was correct in finding that the fence boundary lines were established 
by acquiescence and further, that Neighbor owned the disputed property by 
adverse possession. As such, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, 
holding that its findings were not clearly erroneous.   
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California  
 
DIII Properties LLC, v. EDF Renewable Energy, Inc., A148356, 2017 WL 
3712454 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2017).  
 
The predecessor-in-interest of Landowner granted an easement over its land 
to the predecessor-in-interest of a wind energy project Operator to allowing 
Operator to maintain a wind farm to generate electricity (“Project”). A 
dispute arose over the scope of the easement and whether it allowed the use 
of underground lines placed by Operator across a corner of Landowner’s 
property to transmit electricity generated by wind turbines on neighboring 
pieces of property. Landowner brought this action for declaratory relief, 
quiet title, and trespass. The trial court concluded the written easement, as 
clarified by a subsequent letter agreement, did allow the placement of the 
line and its use to transmit off-site electricity. It accordingly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Operator on Landowner’s claims. 
Landowner appealed and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that 
because a letter agreement and related email correspondence show that the 
easement allows the placement of lines transmitting energy from all of the 
Project’s turbines, and because the evidence shows the Project includes 
turbines not located on the property in dispute, the Landowner could not 
prevail on its claims for relief and summary judgment in favor of the 
Operator was proper. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 
state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Hawaii  
 
Gold Coast Neighborhood Ass’n v. State, 403 P.3d 214 (Haw. 2017). 
 
Neighborhood Association sued State, seeking a declaration that State was 
required to maintain a seawall. State filed a separate declaratory judgment 
against Neighborhood Association, seeking a declaration that it did not 
have an easement over the seawall. The two actions were consolidated. 
State contended that state law requires State’s formal consent as a condition 
of implied dedication of private property, while Neighborhood Association 
argued that state law did not require State’s formal acceptance as a 
condition of implied dedication. Relying on common law and case law, the 
court held that formal acceptance is not a necessary prerequisite to implied 
dedication. Because of State’s statements and its repairs and maintenance of 
the seawall as well as its use by the public, the court ruled that State had 
acquired an easement over and across the seawall by virtue of implied 
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dedication and that State did not own the seawall or the real property 
underneath it by virtue of surrender.  
 
Idaho  
 
Fuquay v. Low, 397 P.3d 1132 (Idaho 2017).  
 
Property Owners sued Neighbors, seeking declaratory judgment for 
prescriptive easement across private road on Neighbors’ properties. District 
court granted summary judgment for Neighbors concluding that Property 
Owners failed to present evidence of any hostile or adverse taking, a 
required element in proving the existence of an easement by prescription. 
Accordingly, the trial court found the easement was permissive and could 
be withdrawn by Neighbors at will. Owners appealed. The Supreme Court 
of Idaho affirmed, holding first that Property Owners use of the easement 
was presumptively permissive because the use of the easement was “in 
common” with Neighbors and that Property Owners had not rebutted that 
presumption with an independent act that would have put Neighbors on 
notice that the use of the easement was no longer permissive. Second, the 
court reemphasized the need for an adverse taking and that no use can be 
considered adverse unless it constitutes an actual invasion on the rights of 
the owner.  
 
Regan v. Owen, No. 43848, 2017 WL 3927024 (Idaho Sept. 8, 2017).  
 
Easement Holder sued Landowner after a dispute arose as to whether a 
prescriptive easement was extinguished by operation of a former Idaho 
statute when the land was sold by a tax deed. This case represents the 
second time the issue has been appealed Supreme Court of Idaho. The first 
came after the district court found that the deed contained mutual mistake 
and should be reformed to reflect an express easement, but on appeal the 
court held that the deed should not be reformed. On remand the court found 
that the prescriptive easement was extinguished based on Idaho statute 
stating that tax deeds convey property free of all encumbrances. By the time 
the supreme court heard this case, the statute had been amended as a 
response to the court’s first impression so that title conveyed by tax deeds 
are free and clear of encumbrances monetary in nature, not all 
encumbrances. Regardless, the court began by determining that the district 
court was correct in finding that the prescriptive easement was an 
encumbrance, based upon the plain, literal interpretation of the statute, and 
was therefore extinguished in the tax deed conveyed to Landowner. Even 
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though the statute had been amended to prevent easements from being 
terminated by the conveyance of a tax deed, the court then determined that 
the amended statute did not apply retroactively. Additionally, the court 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Easement Holder’s due process 
claim that it did not receive notice of the pending issuance of a tax deed for 
the servient estate. Since the easement was prescriptive, there was no 
official filing that it existed. Therefore, the existence of the easement was 
likely unknown, even if valid, and notice to surrounding landowners not 
required, just to record owners or parties in interest.  
 
Kentucky 
 
Majestic Oaks Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 2016-
SC-00213-DG, 2017 WL 4310491 (Ky. Sept. 28, 2017).  
 
Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”) sued Developer to stop Developer’s 
continued use of an easement for ingress and egress after a majority of 
HOA members voted in favor of its termination. Developer’s recorded 
subdivision plat included a declaration of covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions incorporated in the homeowners’ deeds that provided 
Developer’s possessory interest terminated at any time by a sixty-seven 
percent vote. Holding that Developer’s easement in gross was defeasible 
through the declaration’s granting language, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky found the term easement to fit under the declaration’s covenant 
and restriction umbrellas. The court also noted the contract canon of contra 
proferentem that construes ambiguity against the drafter when a contract is 
susceptible to two meanings. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of HOA 
and found the easement to be defeasible and as having been validly 
removed.        
 
Shields v. Univ. of Louisville Found., Inc., No. 2015-CA-001679-MR, 2017 
WL 2705402 (Ky. Ct. App. June 23, 2017). 
 
Landowner and Neighbor each conveyed a one-half undivided interest to 
each other in their abutting property. At issue in the case is if Neighbor was 
also granted in fee simple the fifteen-foot roadway across Landowner’s 
property, or if Neighbor was only granted an easement across the property. 
Landowner argued that the roadway was an easement across its property for 
Neighbor’s use, whereas Neighbor argued it owned it in fee simple. Based 
on the language of the deeds, the trial court found for Landowner, that 
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Neighbor only had an easement across Landowner’s property. The appellate 
court affirmed.   
 
Massachusetts  
 
Baker v. Town of Plymouth, 16-P-996, 2017 WL 3623502 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Aug. 24, 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Town, claiming that a decree of registration for land 
written in 1911 gave Landowner an easement, and he sought to enjoin 
Town from interfering with the easement. The trial court granted Town’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that no easement existed beyond 
Landowner’s narrow implied easement to cross Town’s land to the sea. In 
affirming the judgment, the appellate court held that no express easement 
existed, because there was no language within any deed that suggested that 
Town, the dominant estate, intended to grant Landowner any easement. The 
language “with all the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging” is 
insufficient to create an easement. That language is similarly insufficient to 
create an implied easement, because the court could not infer an intent on 
the part of the grantor to grant an easement over Town’s land. Therefore, 
Landowner has no easement greater than any citizen who may use Town’s 
road for the limited purpose of traveling along one road to the sea. This is 
an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Michigan  
 
Oakland Twp. Parks & Recreation Comm’n v. Marlowe, No. 332020, 2017 
WL 2989062 (Mich. Ct. App. July 13, 2017). 
 
Landowners appeal the trial court’s decision favoring Township in a dispute 
regarding adjoining parcels of real property. The appellate court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision. In this case, a portion of real property owned by 
Township was utilized by Landowners without Township’s consent. 
Township sent many notices to Landowners to stop using the property, but 
to no avail. Township filed a four-count complaint against Landowners 
alleging claims of trespass and quiet title or ejectment. The issue was 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether ownership 
rights to the property at issue had vested to Landowners or the previous 
owner fifteen years prior. The appellate court reviewed the issue de novo 
and held that Landowners had no vested property rights in the disputed 
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property, affirming the decision of the trial court. This is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before 
citing the case as precedent. 
 
Montana  
 
Fox v. BHCC II, Inc., 2017 MT 218, 388 Mont. 443, 401 P.3d 705. 
 
Easement Holder (“Holder”) held a secondary easement that permitted him 
to distribute irrigation water and maintain an irrigation ditch on 
Landowner’s property. Holder sued Landowner, alleging that by planting 
trees and shrubs and expanding the landscape, Landowner had interfered 
with Holder’s easement because Holder was no longer able to access the 
ditch with his large equipment and the foliage shedding disrupted the flow 
of the water. Instead of ordering Landowner to remove the trees and shrubs, 
the district court accepted Landowner’s judicial admission and tender and 
found that Holder failed to prove that Landowner unreasonably interfered 
with Holder’s rights under the secondary easement. The Montana Supreme 
Court affirmed. The court noted that Holder could still access the property 
to inspect, repair, or maintain the irrigation ditch; while Holder may no 
longer utilize his large equipment, he could still use smaller equipment to 
maintain the ditch; and, moreover, Holder would not be required to 
purchase smaller equipment, because Landowner, and not Holder, had been 
performing the maintenance regularly since 1999. 
 
New York 
 
Bank of Akron v. Spring Creek Athletic Club, Inc., 59 N.Y.S. 3d 214, (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2017). 
 
Grantee held solar and wind energy easements over two properties. Bank 
initiated foreclosure proceedings regarding the two properties. Bank moved 
for summary judgment, and the lower court granted its motion. Grantee 
appealed, arguing that the easements he held were not subject to 
foreclosure. The court determined that the easements were interests in 
reality that were subject to foreclosure, and since the mortgage was prior in 
time to Grantee’s easements, the easements were subject to the mortgage. 
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Pennsylvania  
 
In re Petition of Adams, 170 A.3d 584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017). 
 
Landowner leased his land to a natural gas production company that created 
a private road (“Road”) for business operations that ran through Neighbor’s 
property. Neighbor initially used the Road as a convenient right of way, but 
then gates were erected to keep him out. Neighbor had a separate 
accessway to his property by way of a treacherous path once used by a 
logging operation to roll logs downhill. Neighbor filed a petition to open 
the Road. The trial court granted the petition and appointed a Board of 
View (“Board”) to visit the properties and determine if the use of the Road 
was necessary for access to Neighbor’s property. The Board found that the 
additional logging accessway would be too expensive and arduous to 
feasibly be created into a safe road, so Neighbor’s property was effectively 
landlocked without access to the Road. The trial court accepted the Board’s 
findings, and Landowner appealed. On appeal, Landowner argued that the 
Road was not necessary for Neighbor’s access to his property since the 
logging trail also granted access to the property. The appellate court, using 
state precedent, declared that “necessary” did not mean absolutely 
necessary, and that if all other accessways are “extremely difficult and 
burdensome” the land will be considered virtually landlocked. Neighbor 
argued that the use of the Road by the natural gas company supplied a 
public utility, and the taking was for a public use. Neighbor also argued that 
his property was dedicated for public hunting, which is also a matter of 
public concern. The appellate court found these arguments to be compelling 
and held that the taking was reasonably necessary and for a public use, 
affirming the trial court. 
 
Tennessee 
Stinson v. Mensel, No. M2016—00624—COA—R3—CV, 2017 WL 
2972219 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017). 
Landowner’s property was burdened by an easement for Neighbor to 
ingress and egress to its home. Landowner sued Neighbor, alleging that it 
unlawfully bulldozed the easement, encroached onto Landowner’s property, 
and used threats and intimidation to prevent Landowner from coming on or 
using the non-exclusive easement. Neighbor counter-sued, alleging that 
Landowner was preventing Neighbor from enjoying the peace and use of its 
easement, which was part of Neighbor’s driveway. The trial court found 
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that Landowner was liable to Neighbor for nuisance, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and invasion of property. The court enjoined 
Landowner from having any use of the easement. Landowner appealed and 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the 
nuisance claim, but reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy 
claims. The court reasoned that Neighbor could not have expected privacy 
or seclusion on the land encompassing the easement that it shared with 
Landowner. Furthermore, the court noted that Neighbor did not meet its 
burden of proof that it experienced "serious mental injury," as required in 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court also vacated 
the injunction against Landowner, noting that such an injunction would 
prohibit it from the lawful use of its property. 
Texas  
Muhammad v. Plains Pipeline, L.P., No. 12—16—00189—CV, 2017 WL 
2665180 (Tex. App. June 21, 2017). 
Company originally filed a petition in a condemnation action against 
Landowner seeking easement rights for the construction and operation of a 
pipeline through and across real property. In response to the petition, the 
trial court appointed three disinterested special commissioners to assess 
damages due to the acquisition through eminent domain. The special 
commissioners held a hearing to assess the damages, at which Landowner 
appeared in person. The special commissioners awarded landowner $3,191 
in damages, which was then filed with the court two weeks later. Neither 
party objected to the award. Company filed a motion for judgment in 
absence of any objections and the court held a hearing at which it entered a 
judgment of condemnation adopting the special commissioner's 
recommendation of $3,191 in damages. Landowner appealed. The appellate 
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because neither 
party filed objections to the special commissioners' award. It specifically 
referenced the property code and reasoned that no appeal can be taken when 
the trial court renders judgment based on an award to which neither party 
filed objections, because it is the judgment of the special tribunal. The court 
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
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Utah  
 
Garfield Cty. v. United States, 2017 UT 41, No. 20150335, 2017 WL 
3187505. 
 
Utah brought actions in federal court against the United States, “seeking to 
quiet title to 1,510 rights of way located on federal land.” The issue in the 
case at hand is whether a state code and its predecessor are statutes of 
limitations or statutes of repose. The Supreme Court of Utah addressed 
three main issues to this question: (1) should it address the certified 
question at the risk of issuing an advisory opinion; (2) should it interpret the 
code and its predecessor as statutes of limitations or statutes of repose; and 
(3) if it is to interpret the statutes as of repose, should it reform the statutes 
under its absurdity doctrine. After reviewing the case, the court held it 
should address the question on its merits, and that even though the plain 
language rendered them statutes of repose, the court construed the statutes 
as statutes of limitations as to the claims. The court points to the 
legislature’s intent and the triggering action to determine which to apply to 
the statute.  
 
Vermont  
 
In re Vermont Gas Sys., 2017 VT 83, Bo. 2016-396, 2017 WL 4216473. 
 
Utility Company, in 2012, had filed a petition with the Public Service 
Board (“Board”) to construct a natural gas pipeline, and under state law. 
Utility Company could not begin until Board issued a certificate of public 
good (“CPG”) authorizing the project. Board ultimately issued a CPG in 
2013 and Utility Company began construction in 2014. Utility Company 
subsequently sought an easement though a park to complete its pipeline 
expansion. A group of Vermont residents (“Intervenors”) appealed Board’s 
order authorizing Utility Company to condemn the easement. On appeal, 
Intervenors argued that Board erred in authorizing the condemnation as the 
park was already dedicated to a public use and the condemnation was thus 
necessary under the Vermont statute. The Supreme Court or Vermont 
concluded that because the easement would not materially impair use of the 
park, the prior use doctrine did not prohibit condemnation. Further, the 
evidence in the record supported a finding that condemnation of the 
easement was necessary. The court accordingly affirmed Board’s decision 
but remanded to amend the initial order to reflect that the town would have 
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a right to use the easement area pursuant to the restrictive covenant attached 
to the land and subject to specified limitations in Board’s order.  
 
Washington  
 
Schoenfelder v. Larson, No. 48885-o-II, 2017 WL 3726805 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Aug. 29, 2017). 
 
Neighbor sued Property Owner, alleging that Property Owner’s building of 
a fence along or near the road would interfere with the purpose of an 
expressed easement between the parties. Because Neighbor uses a section 
of Property Owner’s property to accommodate passing vehicles via turnout 
areas, Neighbor sought to quiet title in the express easement and for a 
prescriptive easement in the turnout areas. To determine whether Neighbor 
had established a prescriptive easement, the court examined whether the 
claimant had used the land for a period of ten years and showed that: (1) the 
claimant used the land in an open and notorious manner; (2) the use was 
continuous or uninterrupted; (3) the use was on a uniform route; (4) the use 
was averse to Property Owner; and (5) the Property Owner had knowledge 
of the use and could have asserted and enforced his rights. Property Owner 
argued that the prescriptive easement was unsupported by substantial 
evidence as it alleged that the former property owner had not blocked 
access to the turnout areas as an assertion of its ownership rights. The court 
ruled against Property Owner’s attempt to construct a fence in proximity to 
the easement and affirmed the trial court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intentions of the original parties due to the express 
easement’s ambiguity. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.      
 
Other Land Issues – Federal  
 
Supreme Court 
 
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (U.S. 2017).  
 
Landowners own two Lots, Lot E and Lot F, which they inherited from 
their parents in 1995 and 1994 respectively. The Lots were located along 
the St. Croix River, in Wisconsin, and subject to State preservation laws 
which said that separate lots must have at least one acre suitable for 
development unless neighboring lots, with less than one acre suitable for 
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development, were owned by separate owners in 1976, when the law was 
passed. Additionally, state law allowed for a merger of lots when 
neighboring lots came under common ownership, meaning that even if the 
lots fell under separate ownership regulations pre-1976, if sold or granted to 
a common owner after 1976, the neighboring lots would merge and the one 
acre suitable for development requirement would be instituted. 
Landowners’ parents held the Lots in separate ownership until they granted 
the Lots to Landowners, at which time the Lots merged. Landowners 
sought a variance from County, so that Landowners could sell Lot E to fund 
improvements on Lot F. County denied the variance sighting that the Lots 
had merged and that even with the merged Lots, the total land suitable for 
development was still less than one acre, therefore the variance to sell Lot E 
could not be granted. Landowners sued arguing that by not allowing the 
variance, the State effectively took their property without just 
compensation. The state courts held there was no taking under the merger 
regulations, the proper property unit was the combined Lot E and F, the 
decrease in value was less than ten percent, and Landowners knew the laws 
when they acquired the Lots. The Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed finding that Landowners had not experienced a taking under 
Lucas, which requires Landowners to be deprived of all economically 
beneficial use of their property, or under the more general Penn Central 
test. 
 
Third Circuit  
 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 870 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 
Railway sought a declaratory judgment that it was not in default of a Lease 
between Railway and Railroad Company. The district court determined that 
Railway was not in default any Lease provisions. The Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) the district court appropriately 
considered course-of-performance evidence in interpreting the Lease; (2) 
Railroad Company did not expressly reserve any subsurface rights in the 
Lease, which allowed Railway to enter into third-party subsurface 
extraction agreements; (3) Railway had not violated the Lease’s 
indebtedness provision; (4) the Lease did not require Railway to pay 
Railroad Company’s attorney or litigation costs; and, (5) Railway was 
entitled to nominal damages for fraud. 
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Forth Circuit  
 
Quinn v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Queen Anne’s Cty. 862 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 
2017). 
 
County planned to extend sewer systems to all streets on an island with 
failing septic systems. Both developed and undeveloped lots on those 
streets would receive the sewer service, but the service would not extend to 
streets with only vacant lots. This plan would also prevent future 
connections outside the initial service area, unless the lot fell within the 
Grandfather/Merger provision for lots smaller than the minimum size under 
the zoning regulation but are merged with larger contiguous lots. 
Landowner sued after realizing that he would be prohibited from 
developing his smaller isolated lots that fell outside of the initial service 
area. Landowner argued that County’s plan was a regulatory taking, 
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and County’s action 
violated his due process and equal protection rights. Landowner also argued 
the State violated his due process rights by approving the sewer extension 
plan. The district court dismissed Landowner’s claim against the State and 
granted County summary judgment. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the decision. The court rejected Landowner’s Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause claim based on his lack of sewer service due to: (1) the lack of 
economic harm suffered by Landowner; (2) the highly speculative nature of 
the initial purchase of land; and (3) the reasonableness of the 
Grandfather/Merger provision in preventing overdevelopment and health 
hazards from failing septic systems. The court denied Landowner’s due 
process challenge to the Grandfather/Merger provision because State law 
does not recognize a property interest in sewer services. Finally, the court 
denied Landowner’s equal protection claims, because County’s purposes of 
limiting costs for the sewer system and preventing overdevelopment 
provide a rational basis for the disparate treatment of landowners on the 
island.  
 
Schoene v. McElroy Coal Co., No. 16-1788, 2017 WL 3037455 (4th Cir. 
July 18, 2017).  
 
Landowner sued Mining Company for alleged damage to the surface estate 
and residence caused by subsurface operation. Landowner filed both 
common law claims for loss of support to the surface estate and statutory 
claims under the Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“Act”). Mining 
Company moved for partial summary judgment, alleging that a waiver 
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clause contained in the 1902 deed precluded relief on Landowner’s 
common law claim and that the Act did not authorize the relief Landowner 
sought in his statutory claims. The trial court denied Mining Company’s 
motion for summary judgment and eventually awarded Landowner 
$547,000. Mining Company appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The appellate court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia because deciding the issues on appeal—
specifically the deed language—in the case will require the application of 
competing principles of case law and the interpretation of West Virginia 
statutory and regulatory provisions that are silent on the disputed issues in 
this case. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Lyles v. RDP Co., Nos. 16-6346, 16-6347, 2017 WL 3393947 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 8, 2017).  
 
Lessors sued Lessees asserting numerous claims and a declaration that their 
leases granting Lessees a right to quarry limestone on their property is no 
longer valid. Lessors became frustrated with the quarrying operations, felt 
there was overuse under the lease, and the ability for the lease to be 
extended by Lessees. Both Lessors had separate, but similar, leases dating 
back to the 1977. Generally, the leases provided Lessees could mine for 
limestone on the property and provide a royalty payment to Lessor and that 
Lessees could extend the lease in five-year increments for ninety-nine years 
from the year of the original lease execution. At trial the court found for 
Lessees. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court 
held that any trespass claims brought by Lessors were without merit 
because Lessees had obtained a prescriptive easement on the property by 
continuing with the alleged overuse for more than fifteen years after an 
objection by one Lessor. Additionally, the court held that lease did not 
obligate Lessees to provide notice or some sort of writing when they elected 
to extend the lease for another five-year increment. Since Lessors continued 
to accept and cash royalty payment checks, many of their complaints that 
Lessees did not comply with terms of the lease were waived. The court also 
reviewed Lessors request that the leases be reformed because a change in 
circumstances rendered the lease unconscionable and because they were 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable when they were originally 
executed. The court rejected the request and affirmed the district court’s 
refusal to reform the leases. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
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therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.  
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. Zinke, No. 15-15221, 15-17069, 2017 WL 
3327828 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 
The Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians (“Tribe”) sued City for breach of a 
Land Disposition Agreement (“LDA”) between City and Tribe as well as 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Trial court 
granted City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the 
breach of contract and bad-faith claims, denied Tribe leave to amend, and 
awarded City legal fees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Tribe 
plead a plausible claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith, 
reasoning that a third amended complaint evidenced City violating such by 
interfering with Tribe’s ability to obtain federal approval for a casino, 
thereby preventing Tribe from satisfying a condition precedent of the LDA. 
The court agreed that the amended complaint regarding breach of express 
terms of contract were conclusory and unsupported by any specific 
allegations, however, Tribe should have been able to augment these 
allegations in a fourth amended complaint. Disallowing such, the court 
concluded, was an abuse of the lower court’s discretion and that 
determination is reversed. This opinion has not been released for 
publication; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing 
the case as precedent.   
 
E.D. Louisiana  
 
Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 16-713, 2017 WL 
3601215 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Pipeline Company, alleging that Pipeline Company failed 
to maintain canals which Pipeline Company’s predecessors constructed on 
a right of way servitudes across Landowner’s property. There was no 
dispute that the canals had grown to a size not contemplated in the original 
agreements, and Landowner brought actions for trespass, breach of 
contract, and negligence. The district court first dismissed Landowner’s 
trespass claim after deciding that Louisiana law requires intentional, 
affirmative action to establish trespass. The court then found that 
Landowner’s breach of contract claims had not prescribed because the 
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suppletive rules on servitudes, which Landowner argued imposed an 
ongoing duty to maintain the canals, applied to the servitude agreements at 
issue in this case. Because those suppletive rules applied in this case, the 
court granted Landowner’s motion for summary judgment on four of the 
breach of contract claims. The lack of particular language in the two 
remaining contracts, however, led the court to dismiss Landowner’s two 
other breach of contract claims. The court also denied Pipeline Company’s 
motion for summary judgment on its duty to dam the canals finding issues 
of fact to be resolved. Because it could not settle the prescription issue on 
the duty to dam claim, the court also denied Landowner’s summary 
judgment motion on its claim that Pipeline Company had breached its duty 
to dam. Finally, the court dismissed Landowner’s claims for negligence 
based on Pipeline Company’s failure to maintain the canal because the 
violation of the duty to maintain at most constitutes a passive breach of 
contract, which does not also give rise to a tort claim.  
 
E.D. Texas 
 
Tareco Properties, Inc. v. L&S Minerals, LLC, No. 6:16-CV-482, 2017 WL 
3414868 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2017). 
 
Development Company held two judgments against Debtors. Debtors 
quitclaimed 92.71 acres of property to Mineral Company; Debtors allegedly 
asked Mineral Company to pay them a bonus and to quitclaim the property 
back to them. Development Company sought to use the property to satisfy 
the judgments and initiated a lawsuit seeking a Turnover Order. 
Development Company moved for summary judgment against Debtors and 
Mineral Company, arguing that Debtors were still asserting a claim to the 
property against Mineral Company and further argued that it had a claim to 
the property because the property transfer lacked consideration. Debtors 
argued that they no longer had an interest in the property, they had no 
control over the property, and had further released any claim they would 
have against Mineral Company for the property. Mineral Company failed to 
respond to Development Company’s summary judgment motion. The 
district court granted Development Company’s motion on two grounds: (1) 
undisputed facts showed that the Debtors did have a claim to the property; 
and (2) the subsequent release was insufficient to release that claim since it 
did not expressly mention a contemplated claim against Mineral Company. 
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N.D. Alabama  
 
Ryals v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01879-JEO, 2017 WL 2984881 (N.D. 
Ala. July 13, 2017). 
 
Landowner acquired title to a forty-acre tract of land (“Property”) located 
within the Talladega National Forest (“Forest”) in 1993. Landowner had 
been familiar with the Property since the 1950’s. Landowner sued United 
States to quite title to the Property pursuant to the Quiet Title Act. United 
States argued that Landowner or his predecessors knew or should have 
known of its claim as early as 1936 and, therefore, the twelve-year statute 
of limitations bared Landowner’s claim. The district court held that the 
claim was not time bared for several reasons including: (1) the President’s 
proclamation in 1936 was insufficient to constitute notice because it did not 
specifically assert a claim to any private property located within the Forest; 
(2) the 1986 land survey did not properly mark the property so as to put 
Landowner or his predecessors on notice; (3) there was no evidence that a 
1997 forest map was widely disseminated so as to constitute notice; (4) 
Landowner repurchased the property in 2014 to remove a cloud from the 
title; (5) Landowner had been paying the taxes on the Property since he 
purchased it in 1993; and (6) Landowner complained to the Forest Service 
about a control burn in 2010 or 2011 which damaged the Property. 
Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the United States’ 
motion to dismiss. 
 
S.D. California  
 
United States v. Kriegsmann, Case No. 15-cv-02744-BAS-BGS, 2017 WL 
3966580 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017). 
 
In August of 2017, Landowner, Bank, and the Government filed a Joint 
Motion to Enter Judgment and for Order of Foreclosure and Judicial Sale. 
This order pertained to two parcels of land and a 1992 promissory note, 
secured by a deed of trust encumbering the two parcels of land at issue. 
Landowner executed the promissory note, promising to pay Bank the 
principal sum of $150,750.00 plus interest and other costs contained in the 
note. The Government had valid tax liens on all property and rights to 
property of Landowner. The Government protected its liens by filing 
Notices of Federal Tax Liens with the County Recorder. Therefore, the 
Government is entitled to enforce its liens against the property in order to 
apply the proceeds towards the tax liabilities of Landowner. The court held 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1083 
  
 
that the Government’s federal tax liens against Landowner’s property were 
foreclosed, thus authorizing the United States Marshal (“Marshal”) or an 
IRS Property Appraisal and Liquidation Specialist (“PALS”) to offer the 
property for public sale. The court then gave the Marshal or PALS 
representative the responsibility to, upon confirmation of the sale or sales, 
promptly execute and deliver a deed of judicial sale conveying the property 
to the purchaser or purchasers. The court also placed the responsibility of 
preserving the land, including all buildings, improvements, fixtures, and 
appurtenances thereon, upon the Landowner up until the property was sold. 
Once the property is sold by the Government, Bank’s lien will be paid in 
full from the sale proceeds before the federal tax liens or any other junior 
lienholders. 
 
W.D. Wisconsin  
 
Pronschinske Trust Dated March 21, 1995 v. Kaw Valley Cos., No. 16-cv-
640-slc, 2017 WL 3498712 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2017). 
 
Landowner entered into a Mining Lease Agreement (“Lease”) with 
Company granting Company exclusive right to conduct mining operations 
on Landowner’s property. The lease contained three separate provisions for 
sequential payments to be made by Company. These payments included an 
“Initial Royalty Credit” to be paid upon the execution of the lease, and the 
other two, “Commencement Royalty Credit” and “Production Royalties”, 
which were to be paid to Landowner subsequent to mining operations. 
However, Company walked away from the Lease before ever conducting 
any mining operations. While Landowner was paid the Initial Royalty 
Credit, it sued to recover the two remaining payments it believed it was 
entitled to. Company claimed the plain language of the Lease provide that 
the two remaining payments were not due to Landowner until materials had 
been extracted or mined from Landowner’s property. The court found that 
under a plain meaning of the Lease, the two payments subsequent to 
execution of the Lease were only payable upon commencement of mining 
operations on the land, not simply preparation for such operations. Thus, 
Operator’s motion for summary judgment was granted. This case has since 
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication. 
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Bankruptcy  
 
In re Eicher v. Candler, No. 1:12—bk—10283—NWW, 2017 WL 3732012 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2017). 
 
Debtors owned two pieces of property, Property 1 and Property 2, at the 
time of foreclosure. Because Tennessee is a title theory state, a trustee 
under a deed of trust, not the debtor, holds legal title to a property following 
foreclosure. In a motion to reconsider, Debtors argued that there was unity 
of ownership in Property 1 and Property 2 that was severed upon 
foreclosure of the former, and that upon foreclosure, an implied easement 
of necessity for the benefit of Property 2 resulted. However, the court held 
that there was no such unity and no implied easement. In its reasoning, the 
court noted that it could not be inferred that the Trustee intended to grant an 
easement over Property 1 for the benefit of Property 2 in which he never 
held an interest. Had the Debtors transferred their equitable interest in the 
property, an implied easement from prior use or by necessity may have 
arisen for the benefit of Property 2 through Property 1. However, because 
Debtors were not the granters or parties to the actual transfer at issue, any 
possible inferred intent on their part to reserve an easement for the benefit 
of Property 2 was irrelevant. The court also reasoned that Debtors did not 
own Property 2 at the time Mortgagee’s deed of trust encumbering Property 
1 was executed, so they did not have unity of ownership in Property 1 and 
Property 2 that could be severed with the execution of the deed of trust 
encumbering only Property 1. The court also held that even if it was to be 
assumed that an implied easement arose upon the foreclosure of Property 1, 
it was then extinguished by the foreclosure. It reasoned that it is well-settled 
law in Tennessee that a foreclosure extinguishes interests in property, 
including easements, which are junior to the deed of trust. 
 
Other land Issues – State 
 
Georgia 
 
DeKalb Cty. v. Speir, 801 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App 2017).  
 
Lessor and Lessee sued County after a piece of their property was 
condemned for road improvements. Lessee operated a business from the 
property and claimed after condemnation and resulting alterations the 
property, its use for the business was no longer viable. At trial, damages 
were awarded to both Lessor and Lessee. However, part of the damages 
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awarded were based on the obligation of Lessee to continue making lease 
payments to Lessor for the duration of the lease, even if the business was no 
longer viable. County challenged the ruling that allowed in the evidence 
regarding the post-taking lease obligation used in calculating damages, 
claiming that the evidence should have been limited to the market value of 
the land before the taking and immediately after, and not any post-taking 
lease payments. Upon review, the appellate court noted that business loss 
evidence is admissible for calculating damages to a lessee after a 
condemnation action if the evidence shows that there was a diminution in 
value of the land not condemned.  Additionally, the court held that the 
correct measure of damages awarded to a business after condemnation is 
the value of the business before and after the taking. Therefore, the 
obligation to pay the future lease payments affected the market value of 
Lessee’s business after the taking and was properly included.  
 
Idaho 
 
Fletcher v. Lone Mountain Rd. Ass’n, 396 P.3d 1229 (Idaho 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Road Association (“Association”) seeking a declaration of 
rights and obligations regarding a road adjacent to Landowner’s property 
because Landowner wanted to address the dust clouds created by the road’s 
use near his home. The district court found that the lot owners on the 
property lot that used the road had waived their right to demand 
contribution to the road from the owners that had not used the road. The 
court also found that Association’s covenant regarding maintenance of the 
road was ambiguous, and that each owner who used the road had a right to 
maintain the road but could not force any other owner to contribute to the 
maintenance without a two-thirds vote of the owners that used the road. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that: (1) Association’s covenant was not 
ambiguous; (2) there was no waiver of the right to demand contribution for 
maintenance of the road after two-thirds of the landowners on each property 
voted in favor; (3) the dust on the road was not an additional burden on 
Landowner’s servient estate; and (4) Association had no right to maintain 
the road or obtain involuntary contributions for past expenditures.  
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Kansas 
 
Grimmett v. Luellen, 399 P.3d 292 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Landowner and Neighbor own adjoining parcels of land. Landowner sued 
Neighbor to assert he had either an easement by prescription or by 
implication for a water meter and water lines serving his parcel of land and 
an easement area adjoining parcels of land owned by both Landowner and 
Neighbor. The lower court wholly denied Landowner’s petition. Appellate 
court reviewed this case to determine whether the lower court relied on 
“substantial competent evidence” to support its findings. First, the court 
held that Landowner did not have an easement by implication for the water 
lines and water meter on Neighbor’s property because—in direct conflict 
with a state law factor of implied easements— “the water meter and lines 
are the servitude and were ‘in uses at the time of severance.’” Moreover, 
nothing stopped Landowner from installing his own water lines and meter. 
Second, Landowner does not have an implied easement for the area 
adjacent to his parcel because despite Neighbor’s placement of a fence in 
the area both claim right to inconvenience Landowner’s mobile home 
tenants, Landowner failed to prove his claimed easement was necessary. 
Third, Landowner does not have a prescriptive easement for the water lines 
and meter because he failed to show exclusivity. Namely, there is no 
exclusivity because water service to Landowner’s parcel continued after 
Neighbor capped off what he believed to be the only water line. Landowner 
also fails to show he has a prescriptive easement over the disputed area 
between the parcels for the same reason. Specifically, Landowner’s claim 
that Neighbor’s testimony that he had not used the property for storage 
units is insufficient in proving exclusivity because that testimony does not 
mean the disputed property was not at all used. Landowner is entitled to no 
easements. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Shepherd v. Thompson, 397 P.3d 1257 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Seller sold property to Buyer after a divorce where Seller was the sole 
owner of the surface and water rights. Seller delivered Buyer with a general 
warranty deed conveying “the surface and water rights” to the real property 
reserving unto grantor a life estate in and to all the oil, gas, and other 
minerals lying in and under that may be produced. A few years later a writ 
of execution was issued in the divorce case of Seller and spouse. The sheriff 
executed an order of sale that directed the mineral rights of Seller’s 
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property conveyed to Seller’s spouse. After the death of Seller, Buyer filed 
petition to quiet title the real property arguing that after the death of Seller, 
Buyer was the sole owner in fee simple to the mineral rights of the 
property. The Kansas Supreme Court found that the deed granted Buyer 
surface and water rights in the real property and reserved life estate in all 
oil, gas, and other mineral rights to Seller. The court found the deed 
remained silent as to who received the mineral rights after the death of 
Seller. The court looked at the rule of construction in interpreting the deed 
and based on that found that the use of “life estate” showed Seller’s intent 
to retain something less than fee simple title to the mineral rights. This case 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Michigan  
 
Goodrich v. Cook, No. 333418, 2017 WL 3441495 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 
10, 2017). 
 
Landowners purchased four parcels of land, three of which were properly 
conveyed to them while the fourth was mistakenly left out of the 
conveyance. Despite this mistake, Landowners occupied all four parcels, 
including the disputed property, believing it had been conveyed to them 
along with the other three parcels. Five years later, Landowners constructed 
a barn that was partially situated on the disputed fourth parcel of land. After 
Landowners defaulted on their mortgage, Buyers moved into the house and 
disputes began concerning the use of a well and liquefied petroleum tank on 
Buyers’ land. Buyers built a fence that blocked an easement that 
Landowners used to access the water well, meanwhile Buyers also learned 
that the disputed fourth parcel of land had never actually been conveyed to 
Landowners. After consulting the tax assessor and discovering who the 
actual owners were, Buyers contacted said owner, who subsequently 
deeded the disputed property to them. Buyers then served Landowners with 
a notice to quit, requesting that they remove their belongings from the 
disputed property. Landowners refused and filed a quiet title action based 
on adverse possession. The trial court found for Landowners and the 
decision was appealed. The appellate court found no basis for reversal, 
holding that Landowners showed they possessed the disputed property 
openly, adversely, exclusively, and continuously for the statutorily-
specified minimum period. Specifically, the court noted that there was 
privity of estate between Landowners and their predecessors in interest and 
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that Landowners never intentionally relinquished their claim to the disputed 
property. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Minnesota 
 
Wescott v. Wabasha Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A16-1358, 2017 WL 
2729597 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26, 2017). 
 
Citizen appealed the decision of the County Board to grant a conditional 
use permit to construct and operate an agronomy center in a land zoned for 
agricultural use. The appellate court stated that the threshold question under 
state statute for determining if a permit was wrongfully granted was 
whether there was material evidence of potential significant environmental 
effects. The court held that Citizen had not established material evidence of 
potential significant environmental effects, thus County Board’s grant of 
the application for a conditional use permit is appropriate. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the cases as precedent. 
 
Nebraska 
 
Andrew v. Vill. of Nehama, No. A-16-208, 2017 WL 2774067 (Neb. Ct. 
App. June 27, 2017). 
 
In July 2014, Landowners began to install two 12,000-gallon anhydrous 
ammonia storage tanks upon their property, 0.5 miles north of Village 
limits, without first notifying Village and requesting a building permit. In 
September 2014, Landowners submitted an application for a building 
permit, which was ultimately dismissed by the Village Board of Trustees, 
who determined that the storage facility was unsafe and a nuisance to the 
public. In May 2015, the Board of Appeals denied Landowners’ appeal. 
Landowners subsequently filed a petition in error with the district court, 
seeking reversal of the decision that the storage tanks constituted a 
nuisance, reversal of the building permit application denial, and an order 
directing Village to issue a building permit. The court denied Landowners’ 
petition in error, and Landowners then appealed stating that the district 
court erred in; (1) placing the burden of proof on Landowners to prove the 
storage tanks did not constitute a nuisance; (2) finding that Village did not 
need to provide evidence that the storage tanks did constitute a nuisance; 
(3) finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the tanks did 
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constitute a nuisance; (4) finding that there was sufficient evidence to 
support Village’s finding that it lacked adequate protection from an 
anhydrous ammonia leak; (5) relying on an invalidly enacted Ordinance 
2014—1; and (6) failing to direct Village to issue a building permit. The 
appellate court affirmed the district court decision, holding that Village 
provided sufficient evidence to deny the permit because the tanks did 
constitute a nuisance. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing as precedent.  
 
New Hampshire  
 
Carlson v. Latvian Lutheran Exile Church of Boston and Vicinity Patrons, 
Inc., No. 2016-0251, 2017 WL 4182892 (N.H. Sept. 21, 2017). 
 
Church and Trustee both claimed rights to use a third party’s private 
driveway to access a lake and property on the lake. The trial court issued a 
ruling that Trustee lacked standing to quiet title to the driveway, but that 
she did have standing to pursue her claim for declaratory relief against 
Church, ruling that Church had no right to use the driveway. Both parties 
appealed. Church argued that an easement holder, such as Trustee, only has 
standing to challenge an alleged trespass if the trespass interferes with the 
easement holder’s rights. Conversely, Trustee argued that regardless of 
interference, she had standing to challenge Church’s trespass. The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s judgment in favor of 
declaratory relief against Church, reasoning that Church’s claimed right to 
use the driveway is not inherently adverse to Trustee’s right to use the 
driveway. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Church’s use of the 
driveway interfered with Trustee’s use of the driveway, and there was no 
evidence that Church was likely to overburden or interfere with Trustee’s 
right in the future. Trustee’s asserted invasion of rights she seeks to prevent 
is purely speculative. The court also reasoned that because an easement is a 
non-possessory interest in land, Trustee cannot bring an action that is 
traditionally established to protect possession, such as trespass and 
ejectment. The court then affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Trustee had 
no standing to maintain a quiet title action against Church because the 
relevant statute provides that a person may only bring a quiet title action 
against another who may claim to have an adverse interest. Here, no such 
adverse interest exists. 
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North Dakota  
 
Paving Dist. 476 Grp. v. City of Minot, 2017 ND 176, 898 N.W.2d 418. 
 
Landowners sued City, alleging that the errors in City’s notice of roadway 
improvements violated Landowners’ constitutional due process rights and 
therefore City’s assessments should be invalidated. City performed a 
special assessment to establish the costs of a proposed roadway 
improvement project. Notice of the results of that assessment were sent to 
Landowners, as well as published in the local newspaper. That notice 
contained maps of the assessment and the cost of the assessment for each 
property, along with the time and date of a public hearing on the 
assessment. The City Council approved the assessment one month later, but 
at the hearing it was made known that the published notices contained an 
error in the description of the assessment—the resulting fix did not increase 
the cost, and no new notice was sent out. Three months after the assessment 
was approved, Landowners sued City for improper notice. The district court 
granted City’s motion for summary judgment without reaching the question 
of the notice requirement because Landowners failed to follow the state 
statute requiring such actions to be filed within thirty days of the adoption 
of the resolution. The Supreme Court of North Dakota did examine the 
notice requirement, and held as follows: 1) City’s decision to create the 
assessment district and make improvements did not deprive Landowners of 
property rights, and therefore they had no constitutional right to notice and 
opportunity to be heard; and 2) North Dakota’s constitutional “gift clause” 
does not reach claims such as this. The decision of the district court, 
granting City’s motion for summary judgment, was affirmed. 
 
Ohio  
 
Ford v. Baska, 7th Dist. Harrison NO. 16 HA 0008, 2017 WL 2665144 
(June 19, 2017). 
 
Landowner-1 sued Landowner-2 for breach of warranty deed and seeking a 
declaratory judgment quieting title against Landowner-2. The trial court 
granted Landowner-2’s motion to dismiss because a previous landowner 
“lacked authority to transfer the entire mineral interest estate [to 
Landowner-1] because she did not own the minerals.” On appeal, 
Landowner-1 argues, among other things, that Landowner-2 relied on the 
wrong state law in its motion to dismiss. Although this court agreed with 
Landowner-1 on this particular issue, this case instead turns on whether 
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Landowner-1 was a bona fide purchaser of the land at issue. Landowner-1 
could not be a bona fide purchaser if he knew or was on constructive notice 
of Landowner-2’s mineral interests at the time he believed he purchased the 
land. The court concluded that Landowner-1 was on constructive notice of 
Landowner-2’s mineral interest because Landowner-1’s “certificate of 
transfer referred to the underlying probate matter” which outlined the 
proper and enforceable conveyance of mineral rights to Landowner-2. 
Appellate court affirmed the case’s dismissal.  
 
Texas 
 
Carter v. Harvey, 525 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Majority Owner, owning 7/8 interest, of a tract of land brought a partition 
action against Minority Owner, owning the remaining 1/8 interest. Minority 
Owner responded by raising a claim for equitable adjustment, claiming that 
improvements on the property that he made through a previously dissolved 
corporation entitled him to over one-quarter of those improvements. 
Majority Owner filed and was granted a motion for partial summary 
judgment as the court held “that the claim in question [was] a corporate 
claim of [the corporation] that was required to have been brought within 
three years of [the corporation’s] dissolution … [and] was not.” Upon later 
bench trial, the court found that partition in-kind would significantly 
diminish the value of the land and thus ordered a public sale of the land 
with the net proceeds being split between the two parties according to their 
respective ownership shares of the land. Minority Owner appealed claiming 
that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his equitable adjustment 
claims and that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it did not join a 
necessary party to the case. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, overruling all of Minority Owner’s claims. It stated that he could 
not stand in the shoes of a dissolved corporation and bring an equitable 
adjustment claim that the corporation, itself, could not bring; that the sale of 
the property was in the best interest of both parties and the trial court was in 
the best position to determine so.  
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Wisconsin 
 
Scenic Pit LLC v. Vill. of Richfield, 2017 WI App 49, 377 Wis. 2d 280, 900 
N.W.2d 84.  
 
Operator managed a solid waste facility and desired to purchase an 
abandoned gravel pit for a “clean fill” facility, a low hazardous waste 
landfill. After purchase, Municipality told Operator that land would need to 
be rezoned for such purpose and that construction, storm water, and erosion 
permits must be obtained. Operator applied for permit, and Municipality 
denied. Operator sought declaration that it need not comply with any local 
approvals. The lower court granted summary judgment for Municipality 
because the local approvals were not “diametrically opposed” to state 
interests. Operator appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) local 
ordinances that conflict with state legislation are preempted by state law; 
(2) state law exempts clean fill facility operators from applying for local 
approvals; (3) zoning was expressly enumerated as a local approval by state 
law; and (4) state law was broad enough to include permitting requirements 
as a local approval. Thus, the Municipality had no power to require 
Operator to comply with local approvals. The court reversed and remanded.  
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Traditional Generation  
D.C. Circuit  
 
City of Orangeburg v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 862 F.3d 1071 
(D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
Citylocated a willing supplier of wholesale power in neighboring North 
Carolina but, according to City, the deal was scuttled by the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission (“NCUC”). The Federal Power Act (“Act”) states that 
authority over interstate wholesale power sales belong to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), not state agencies like NCUC. 
City alleges that, in exercising its retail ratemaking authority, NCUC 
interposed itself as a gatekeeper for access to the neighboring state’s most 
affordable and reliable wholesale power, thereby intruding upon FERC's 
exclusive jurisdiction. City challenged FERC’s approval of an agreement 
between two utilities, arguing that the agreement constitutes an 
authorization of NCUC’s “unlawful regime.” FERC interposed a threshold 
objection to City’s petition, arguing that City lacks constitutional standing 
for reviewing such a petition. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals emphasized that the Act affords judicial review only to parties who 
have been “aggrieved” by an order issued by FERC and a party is 
“aggrieved” only if it has standing. To satisfy these “twin demands,” City 
must show an actual or imminent injury in fact, traceable to the challenged 
agency action, that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. The 
court held that City had standing to challenge FERC’s approval because 
City demonstrated an imminent loss of the opportunity to purchase a 
desired product (reliable and low-cost wholesale power), and that injury is 
traceable to the FERC’s approval of the agreement at issue. Accordingly, 
the court vacated in part the orders approving the agreement and denying 
rehearing, and remand to FERC for further explanation.   
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Traditional Generation – State  
 
New York  
 
Riverkeeper Inc. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 59 N.Y.S.3d 806 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017).  
 
Environmental Group sued Department of Environmental Conservation 
(“DEC”) after DEC issued updated operating permits to the owners of an 
electrical production Station. Prior to issuing the permits, DEC made 
available draft versions which the public could comment on or raise 
objection to. Environmental Group argued that DEC was also required to 
hold a public adjudicatory hearing prior to issuing the final permits, and 
thus sought declaratory judgment to annul the final permits and DEC’s 
determination that Station would have no significant impact on the 
environment. The lower court dismissed Environmental Group’s claim; its 
appeal followed. The appellate court affirmed. The court reiterated the 
premise that its judgment is not substituted for that of the agency 
responsible for making the determination, but may only ascertain whether 
there is a rational basis for the agency’s decision or whether it is arbitrary 
and capricious. The court held that DEC’s determination that an 
adjudicatory hearing was not required prior to issuing permits was not 
arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that the burden fell upon Environmental 
Group to raise its concern which would illuminate a need for such a 
hearing, which it did not met. The court also held: (1) DEC had rational 
basis to conclude that discharge of hot water would comply with regulatory 
requirements; (2) DEC’s determination that owner of Station was not 
required to undergo new source review under Title V of Clean Air Act was 
rational; and (3) DEC complied with state law.  
 
Renewable Generation - Federal 
 
Second Circuit  
 
Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F. 3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 
The State legislature enacted a Statute authorizing the Department of 
Energy and Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) to solicit proposals for 
renewable energy, select winners, and direct the state’s utilities to enter into 
power purchase agreements with the winners. Development Company 
submitted proposals for five solar projects; none were selected. 
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Development Company sued DEEP, alleging that implementation of the 
Statute effectively fixed wholesale energy prices and was preempted by the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”). Development Company sought to void the 
contracts with the chosen projects and further sought to enjoin DEEP from 
violating the FPA or the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
(“PURPA”). There was a question as to whether Development Company 
had standing, which was ruled in the affirmative by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Still, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss Development Company’s complaint. The court found 
that the Statute’s authorization of DEEP to direct utilities to enter into 
contracts did not amount to compulsion and, therefore, did not violate the 
FPA. Regarding Development Company’s preemption claim, the appellate 
court found that State had the regulatory power to specify the sizes and 
types of generators that may bid into the 2015 request for proposal, and, 
furthermore, incidental effects on wholesale prices did not amount to a 
regulation of the interstate wholesale electricity market that would infringe 
on FERC’s jurisdiction. Regarding Development Company’s dormant 
commerce clause claim, the appellate court rejected the claim of 
discrimination against two of its facilities for two reasons. First, the court 
found that DEEP’s rejection of another state’s renewable energy certificate 
simply had an indirect effect of interstate commerce. Second, the court 
found that Company failed to show that the charged it alleged were 
discriminatory were anything more than use fees. This case has since been 
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.  
 
Forth Circuit  
 
City of Rockingham v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 15-2535, 
2017 WL 2875112 (4th Cir. July 6, 2017). 
 
Anticipating expiration of its license, Operator filed a renewal application 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for its two 
North Carolina hydroelectric facilities. After FERC issued its “Order 
Issuing New License” to Operator, City filed a petition for review claiming 
that FERC violated the: (1) Federal Power Act (“FPA”); (2) the National 
Environment Policy Act (“NEPA”); and (3) the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”). First, City does not claim that FERC’s order falls outside its 
discretion pursuant to the FPA, it only claims that its preferences for what 
should have been in FERC’s order were not properly considered. However, 
because City’s preferences were not specifically required by law and FERC 
sufficiently addressed City’s concerns in its order and elsewhere, the court 
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reasoned that FERC did not violate the FPA. Additionally, several of the 
conclusions made by FERC in its order were made with scientific 
expertise., which the court readily deferred to. Second, City failed to prove 
FERC violated NEPA because it conceded that FERC’s “considered and 
rejected” it’s proposal regarding water flow that City now requests be 
reviewed. Third, the court reasoned that FERC did not violate the ESA 
because FERC’s choice to use a particular type of analysis falls squarely 
within its discretion and such a “scientific determination” is not a decision 
the court was willing to make. Further, FERC’s decision to not consider 
City’s alternative plan for minimum water flow was not found to be 
arbitrary and capricious. Ultimately, because City failed to prove the 
violations of law it claims FERC made and review of the order is therefore 
denied. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. This case has 
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 
Renewable Generation - State 
 
Alaska  
 
Daggett v. Feeney, 397 P.3d 297 (Alaska 2017). 
 
Landowner cancelled a Contract with Renewable Energy Contractor 
(“Contractor”) to install wind turbines on his property after discovering that 
it would violate subdivision’s land-use covenant. The Contract expressly 
held that Contractor would be responsible for all permits, variances, and 
height restriction waivers. Landowner sued to rescind the Contract and to 
recover his down payment to Contractor. The lower court found that 
Contractor was not properly licensed and Landowner was entitled to 
rescission for misrepresentation. Additionally, the court awarded damages 
to Landowner minus Contractor’s equitable setoff. After Contractor failed 
to satisfy judgment with ninety days, the lower court issued an amended 
final judgment and concluded that Contractor’s successor company was 
liable to Landowner. Contractor appealed and Landowner cross-appealed 
the determination of the setoff amount. The Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that the lower court had clearly erred in its the setoff calculation because it 
used what was supposedly paid and not the lower wholesale price actually 
paid by Contractor. While Contractor was entitled to offset its cost, the 
court concluded, it could only do so to the “extent that their costs are 
greater than the profit they gained.” Therefore, the court reversed and 
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remanded to the lower court to determine the setoff amount, and affirmed 
the remaining judgements. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Hommrich v. Commonwealth, No. 674 M.D. 2016, 2017 WL 3203437 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. July 28, 2017). 
Resident sought to develop alternative renewable energy assets, specifically 
solar facilities, for his own use and for the benefit of himself and his heirs. 
He planned to build one facility per year between 2017 and 2019, each 
facility having a nameplate capacity of 3,000 kilowatts in size. The 
proposed projects were within the service territory of Pennsylvania's 
electric distribution companies (“EDCs”). The General Assembly 
authorized Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) to develop technical and net 
metering interconnection rules under state law. Resident claimed that PUC 
exceeded its statutory authority by deciding eligibility for net metering, 
arguing that his proposed projects qualify for net metering under the state 
law but could be disapproved under PUC's imposition of new regulatory 
definitions and review process. This regulatory threat, Resident argued, 
would prevent investors and lenders from even participating in the due 
diligence phase, thus preventing him from obtaining funding for his 
projects. PUC responded with preliminary objections, asserting that the 
regulations have no direct and immediate effect on Resident. The court 
sustained PUC's preliminary objection for legal insufficiency, reasoning 
that Resident did not allege how the application of the regulations against 
the existing projects would cause him present harm to justify bypassing the 
normal post-enforcement review process. 
Vermont  
 
In re New Haven GLC Solar, LLC, 2017 VT 72, SUPREME COURT 
DOCKET NO. 2016-125, 2017 WL 3668583. 
 
Town appealed decision of the Public Service Board (“Board”), which had 
issued a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Company for construction of 
a net-metered solar array within Town. Town asserted that Board acted in 
excess of its authority by issuing the CPG without: (1) holding a hearing on 
issues raised by Town; (2) giving due consideration to Town’s 
recommendations or Town plan; and (3) following its own mandatory 
regulations on interconnection procedures. The Supreme Court of Vermont 
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held that while Board was required to hold a technical hearing to consider 
the project’s ability to interconnect with the existing system, it was not 
required to hold a hearing based on Town’s general objections. The court 
reversed the Board’s CPG issuance and remanded to consider Town’s 
comments.  
 
In re Programmatic Changes to Standard-Offer Program & Investigation 
into Establishment of Standard-Offer Prices, 2017 VT 77, Case No. 2016-
399, 2017 WL 3662392.  
 
Applicant appealed State Board’s denial of a motion to reconsider 
following the decision of State Board to award standard offer contract to 
five wind projects and two solar projects. Applicant argued on appeal that 
State Board was required to award standard-offer contracts to several solar 
projects because they provided sufficient benefits to the operation of State’s 
electric grid, as noted in state statute. The Supreme Court of Vermont held 
that because Applicant’s claims related to benefits to the electrical grid 
were not raised or decided previously, the court must decline to address 
them on appeal. The court concluded that State Board did not err in denying 
Applicant’s motion of reconsideration.  
 
Rate Case – Federal  
 
Sixth Circuit 
 
MISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 
837 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 
Members of an association of public utilities (“Members”) petitioned for 
review orders of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) that 
permitted two departing utility members to not pay costs under provisions 
of Tariff for projects that an independent system operator approved after 
announcement of their departure but before they left. On appeal, Members 
claim that FERC’s interpretation of the Tariff was incorrect and did not 
align with the rational of its prior orders. The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed FERC’s interpretation based on several findings. First, 
based on the language of the Tariff, departing utility members had no 
monetary obligations when they left because construction of projects had 
not begun. Second, departing utility members could not be responsible for 
future costs after departure because the Tariff reallocates costs annually to 
members based on energy withdrawn. Third, prior orders of FERC related 
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to projects that preceded the existence of current projects, and thus could 
not conflict with the orders in this case. The court denied Members’ petition 
for review.  
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 691 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) petitioned the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) “bandwidth remedy” which outlined 
the maximum difference of production costs for several energy-producing 
companies. LPSC made a complaint to FERC that because energy 
companies in different states use different depreciation rates to calculate 
their production costs, Louisiana customers were put at a disadvantage 
because other states used depreciation rates in a way that was “unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential.” FERC did not agree 
with LPSC’s arguments and continued use of the “bandwidth remedy.” 
LPSC makes three arguments which are reviewed on an arbitrary and 
capricious standard—thus affording FERC substantial deference. First, that 
FERC did not give appropriate consideration to evidence submitted by 
LPSC regarding undue discrimination for Louisiana customers under the 
“bandwidth formula.” Although, LPSC sufficiently demonstrated that states 
use different depreciation rates, FERC considered this issue and determined 
LPSC did not meet its burden, which meets this court’s requirement that the 
evidence be confronted. Second, FERC did not depart from its own rules 
requiring it use its own depreciation rates because it was only overseeing 
the “bandwidth agreement”—not engaging in ratemaking itself. Finally, 
FERC did not unlawfully delegate its jurisdiction over wholesale rates 
because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear on this same 
argument because it has lawfully “exercised, and intends to exercise its . . . 
review authority.” For these reasons, the appellate court denied LPSC’s 
petition for review. 
 
Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 861 F.3d 
230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Electrical Cooperative claimed Power Company overcharged it for 
electricity. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) accordingly 
ordered a refund, but Electrical Cooperative claims it was entitled to a 
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larger refund for overcharges arising out of Power Company’s applied rate. 
Electrical Cooperative alleged that Power Company violated Schedule 4 of 
the tariff governing rates that Power Company may charge. Electrical 
Cooperative claimed that: (1) FERC improperly interpreted the twenty-
four-month time-bar provision in the service agreement to limit Power 
Company’s refund liability; and (2) that Schedule 4 of the tariff required 
Power Company to use apportionment, rather than non-apportionment, to 
calculate Electrical Cooperative’s charges. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that; (1) FERC was correct in concluding that the 
service agreement between parties required Electrical Cooperative to make 
any challenges within twenty-four months of receiving the bill; and (2) 
FERC was reasonable in interpreting ambiguity in tariff to allow Power 
Company to use non-apportionment to charge Electrical Cooperative for 
deviating from scheduled usage because the text of the tariff did not compel 
apportionment. Thus, the appellate court denied Electrical Cooperative’s 
petition for review. 
 
Rate Case – State  
 
California  
 
Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, 397 P.3d 210 (Cal. 2017).   
 
City imposed a surcharge on electricity bills, which Consumers challenged. 
Consumers argued that the surcharge is an improper tax, because it was not 
approved via community-wide vote. The Supreme Court of California 
determined the surcharge qualified as “compensation for use of government 
property” rather than a tax. The court holds that Proposition 218, which 
Consumers rest their argument on, does not place restrictions on City’s 
ability or authority to gather payment for selling or leasing City property, as 
long as the compensation is reasonably proportional to the value of the 
property interest conveyed. If it is disproportionate, then it is considered a 
tax, but the court held this fee is not disproportionate. The court asserts that 
Proposition 218 does not actually impose any limitations on fees, only on 
taxes. The court determined that the restrictions are mainly in place to 
combat abuse, so they only limit disproportionate, outrageous fees. The 
court overturned the appellate court’s order supporting summary 
adjudication for Consumers, but affirms the appellate court’s reversal of the 
grant of City’s motion for judgment.   
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Russell City Energy Co. v. City of Hayward, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017).  
 
Utility formed a Cooperation and Option Agreement (“Agreement”) with 
Municipality in 2005 to facilitate the construction and operation of 
Operator’s power plant. Agreement contained a Payments Clause that stated 
Municipality was prohibited from imposing any taxes on the “development, 
construction, ownership and operation” of Utility’s power plant except 
those taxes linked to the ownership of real property. In 2009, voters 
approved a Utility Users Tax Ordinance (“Utility Tax”) on the usage of 
electricity and gas. In 2011, Municipality informed Utility that it had to pay 
the Utility Tax. In 2014, Utility filed a claim against Municipality for 
breach of contract. Municipality argued that the Payments Clause violated 
article XIII, section 31 of the California Constitution. Section 31 states that 
the power to tax may not be surrendered by contract. Utility argued that the 
Payments Clause should be interpreted as a PILOT (payment in lieu of 
taxes) agreement and is an exercise of Municipality’s taxing power. 
However, the court found, and Utility conceded, that the complaint does not 
refer to the Payments Clause as a PILOT agreement and should be 
interpreted as claimed. Additionally, the court concluded that the Payments 
Clause, whether interpreted as stated or as a PILOT agreement, violated 
section 31 and is therefore invalid and unconstitutional. However, the court 
did conclude that Utility should be allowed to amend its complaint to allege 
a quasi-contractual restitution claim.   
 
Colorado 
 
Carestream Health, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2017 CO 75. 
 
A health corporation (“Corporation”) was a customer of the Public Service 
Company of Colorado (“Provider”). Though Corporation was a new 
customer, Provider used information from the previous customer’s meter to 
calculate Corporation’s energy usage resulting in an underreport of about 
15%. When Provider realized the mistake three years later and attempted to 
back-bill Corporation for the resulting $716,919.71, Corporation filed a 
formal complaint with Provider stating that although Provider’s tariff 
allows it to recover for billing errors, it is required to “exercise all 
reasonable means to assure accurate computation of all bills for gas 
service,” which Corporation argued it did not. Upon a formal hearing, an 
ALJ determined that Corporation’s complaint should be denied because it 
failed to prove a direct violation of a tariff provision. Corporation’s 
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exceptions to the decision were denied by Provider which stated that 
“[Corporation] did not provide sufficient evidence from which it can be 
concluded that [Provider] should have foreseen the problem and thereby 
taken reasonable means to prevent it,” and that decision was affirmed in a 
district court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado agreed with 
Provider and the district court and compounded that the language “all 
reasonable means” as read in the tariff meant that rather than requiring 
some bright-line rule, the tariff called for appropriate measures to be taken 
given the circumstances; wherein Provider served millions of customers 
and could not be expected to prevent unforeseeable errors. The court 
determined that the tariff correctly contemplated this issue by realizing that 
undercharges were inevitable and creating a policy to back-bill customers to 
make up for these mistakes. The court also noted that “[a] foreseeability 
requirement confines the inquiry to those errors [Provider] could have taken 
reasonable steps to avoid.” 
 
Massachusetts  
Energy Express, Inc. v. Dept. of Pub. Util., 80 N.E.3d 309 (Mass. 2017). 
Because of the unbundling process that took place in Massachusetts in the 
1990s, some consumers began purchasing their gas from one entity (a 
marketer) and having it transported to them by another (a local distribution 
company). Here, Marketer of natural gas, competing as a supplier of natural 
gas in the Commonwealth, requested a proportional share of Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s ("FERC") ordered pipeline-rate refunds 
that Local Distribution Company ("Company") received and had to pass on 
to its customers under an order from the Department of Public Utilities. The 
issue in this case was whether the assignment of pipeline capacity by 
Company to Marketer causes Marketer to become a "customer" of 
Company, such that Marketer is entitled to a share of that refund under 
State law. The Supreme Judicial Court accepted the conclusion that only an 
end consumer, not Marketer, is entitled to the refund. It held that Marketer 
was not Company's customer and did not actually consume the gas, so it did 
not qualify it for the department-ordered refunds. However, the court noted 
that the department-ordered refunds to Marketer's customers, rather than 
Marketer, did not violate the filed-rate doctrine, which requires that 
interstate power rates filed with FERC must be given binding effect by 
State utility commissions determining intrastate rates. 
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Ohio 
 
In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., 150 Ohio St. 3d 437, 2017-Ohio-5536, 82 
N.E.3d 1148. 
 
Utility Company’s predecessor operated one or two manufactured-gas-plant 
sites, making Utility Company liable for remediation of those sites under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). After a third party purchased one of the sites and 
announced plans to construct a residential development on the land, Utility 
Company initiated remediation of both sites through the Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Voluntary Action Program. Utility 
Company then applied to the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) 
to have its future remediation costs deferred. Commission granted the 
application without determining whether Utility Company could recover its 
deferred costs before filing an application for cost recovery. Utility 
Company then applied to increase its natural gas distribution rates and to 
recover its deferred costs. Commission authorized Utility Company to 
recover its remediation costs, holding that while shareholders should bear 
some responsibility, Utility Company instituting a “Rider MGP” to recover 
costs from ratepayers on a per-bill basis is appropriate under state law. 
Ratepayers appealed the decision of Commission. The Ohio Supreme Court 
held that: (1) Commission was correct to refuse to apply the “used-and-
useful standard” because Utility Company sought to recover costs for 
environmental remediation not capital investment, and (2) Commission did 
find a relationship between Utility Company’s recovery of remediation 
costs related to manufactured-gas-plant sites and its current distribution 
service provision, thus it is proper to allow Utility Company to recover 
those remediation costs from current distribution customers. The court held 
that Ratepayers were required to demonstrate Commission’s order was 
either unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful, and that it failed to do so. 
Accordingly, the court affirmed Commission’s order. 
 
Virginia  
 
Old Dominion Comm. for Fair Utility Rates v. State Corp. Comm’n, 803 
S.E.2d 758 (Va. 2017). 
 
State Corporation Commission (“Commission”), regulates electric company 
rates, and reviews occur every two years. During this biennial review, “the 
Commission considers the company's rates, terms, and conditions for the 
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provision of generation, distribution and transmission services for the 
preceding two years.”. In 2015, the state legislature enacted legislation 
which suspended Appalachian Power Company's (“APCO”) biennial 
reviews until 2020 (to review 2018–2019) and prohibited Commission from 
adjusting APCO's base rates for any part of this interim period, except for 
possible temporary, emergency increases requested by APCO. This 
essentially effected a four-year base rate freeze for APCO. An association 
of large industrial customers of APCO (“Association”), filed a petition 
asking the court for: (1) a declaratory judgment that legislation violates the 
state constitution and, accordingly, that APCO is to make biennial review 
filings in 2016 and 2018 and (2) an order directing APCO to make such 
filings. Association asserted that state constitution does not grant the 
legislature the power to transfer the Commission’s ratemaking authority to 
itself and that this legislation does just that. Commission stated instead that 
the constitution was not intended to bequeath to it a plenary power to 
legislate that is exclusive and superior to that of the legislature as 
Association implied. The Supreme Court of Virginia stated the same and 
upheld Commission’s decision that the legislation is constitutional. 
 
Washington  
 
King County v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, Case No. 49347-1-
II, 2017 WL 3601890 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2017). 
 
County appealed Commission’s order that denied County a declaration that 
Utility Company was obligated to replace an electrical extension line and 
recover replacement costs through customer rates. County argued that 
Commission’s order was erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious because it: (1) 
found that the electrical extensions line was not a part of the Utility 
Company’s general distribution system (2) misinterpreted Utility 
Company’s service agreement with County; (3) considered Utility 
Company’s economic feasibility; and (4) applied a fact-based analysis. 
County further argued that the order was discriminatory because it granted 
undue preference to Schedule 24 customers and resulted in rate 
discrimination. The trial court affirmed Commission’s order. On appeal, the 
appellate court held that the order was neither erroneous, arbitrary, or 
capricious because it was not willful and unreasoning or taken without 
regard to the attending facts and circumstances. The court declined to 
review the discrimination issue because there was no actual or existing 
dispute regarding a discriminatory effect of any rate requiring County to 
replace the electrical extension line.  
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Transmission - Federal 
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 
656 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Organizations objected to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
(“FERC”) approval of revisions to the rules governing the capacity markets 
operated by a regional transmission organization. The regional transmission 
organization wanted to ensure organizations that made capacity 
commitments in the capacity market provided electricity when their 
capacity was needed, so the regional transmission organization received 
approval of revised capacity market rules to FERC. After approval by 
FERC, Organizations raised numerous challenges on appeal to the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. First, it claimed that FERC did not 
adequately consider the increased costs of the new rules being just and 
reasonable under the Federal Power Act (“Act”). The court held that FERC 
properly weighed the various costs and benefits of the new rules prior to 
approval. Next, the court deferred to FERC’s determination that some of 
the proposed rules were reasonable and just while also determining that 
some of the prior rules were unreasonable and unjust under the Act. The 
court also deferred to FERC’s finding that the penalties a resource will face 
if it fails to fulfil its capacity commitment are not too low and inadequate to 
ensure performance by all resources. Additionally, the court deferred to 
FERC’s finding that the default offer cap in the capacity market was 
appropriate. The new rules also allowed bids from non-year-round 
resources to pair up together in the capacity market, but year-round 
resources were forbidden from doing so. Organizations claimed this 
aggregate offer accommodation imposed undue discrimination, but FERC 
did not believe there was undue discrimination and the court agreed. The 
court also rejected a claim that FERC accepted the rules without adequate 
explanation by the regional transmission organization. Lastly, the court 
agreed with FERC that capacity performance penalties were acceptable 
even when operating limits caused non-performance in the capacity market. 
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S.D. California  
 
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Case No.: 15-
CV-1576-AJB-RBB, 2017 WL 4228832 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). 
 
The dispute centered on access to California’s electric transmission grid. 
Imperial Irrigation District’s (“IID”) alleged that California Independent 
System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) duped IID into incurring 
millions of dollars in expenses and then used IID’s facilities, without 
authorization, to import substantial out-of-state power. IID alleged that this 
unauthorized use of its facilities rendered such use unavailable to IID and 
the entities it served. Also, IID asserted that those burdens ultimately 
affected the rates passed onto the public. So, IID filed suit alleging 
conversion and a claim under California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”). 
CAISO moved for judgment on the pleadings. CAISO argued that the 
conversion claim failed because conversion only applied to personal 
property, and transmission lines are real property. Furthermore, CAISO 
argued that the unfair UCL claim must fail because there was no harm to 
competition based only on the increase in prices. Before the record before 
it, the court could not determine whether the transmission lines were real or 
personal property, and thus denied CAISO’s motion to this claim. Next, 
CAISO argued that injury to a competitor is not injury to competition, and 
an increase in consumer prices is insufficient to show harm to competition. 
However, as the court pointed out, this argument ignored that when these 
two categories of allegations are coupled, they can state an “antitrust injury 
or an injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent” and, thus an unfair 
UCL claim. Therefore, CAISO’s motion was denied on this claim. Also, the 
court found it appropriate to allow IID to amend its complaint because it 
had done so only once before, and granting the request would not delay the 
proceedings because they were still in the early stages.  
 
Transmission – State  
 
Illinois  
 
Illinois Landowners All., NFP v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2017 IL 
121302.  
 
Illinois Commerce Commission (“Commission”) granted a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity to Company for a project to construct 
power transmission lines to connect with wind generation facilities. Various 
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parties sought administrative review. The appellate court reversed finding 
that because Company could not meet the requirements of Illinois’s Public 
Utilities Act (“Act”) to qualify as a public utility, the Commission had no 
legal authority to issue Company a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity. Commission, Company, and others appealed to the Illinois 
Supreme Court alleging the appellate court: (1) “adopted an unreasonable 
and erroneous construction and application of the governing statutes”; (2) 
did not follow recognized principles of administrative review; and (3) 
usurped the power of the Commission in the regulatory process. The court 
concluded that to qualify as a public utility under the Act, a company must 
presently own, control, operate, or manage a plant, equipment, or property 
associated with the transmission of power. As such, the court held that 
Company lacked ownership to qualify as a public utility and was ineligible 
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by 
Commission. Thus, the court affirmed the appellate court’s decision.   
 
Indiana  
 
NIPSCO Indus. Group v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 78 N.E.3d 730 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
Utility brought action against Regulatory Commission appealing 
Regulatory Commission’s enactment of a state statute that designated 
improvements to gas transmission, distribution, and storage systems 
through a seven-year plan. Utility estimated the plan to exceed projected 
estimated capital costs by $149.1 million and filed an appeal, which the 
court found to be lacking in sufficient detail regarding whether the 
proposed plan was “reasonable” and a “best estimate of the cost” of the 
improvements. Utility argued on appeal that Regulatory Commission erred 
in approving the fourth proposed plan. The appellate court found 
Regulatory Commission to have erred in approving the fourth plan, holding 
that the updated plan did not include new projects and that the subsequent 
identifying of improvements that had been previously approved by 
Regulatory Commission was proper. 
 
New Jersey  
 
Cty. of Cumberland v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., No. C-70-15, 2017 WL 
2797431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2017). 
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County sued Electric Company to pay for the movement of high-voltage 
power lines that were in the way of County’s courthouse improvement 
project. The Law Division judge ordered that Electric Company show cause 
for why it should not pay to move the lines. Electric Company answered, 
counterclaimed against County, and named Contractor as a third-party 
defendant. The judge heard arguments from all parties and ruled that 
Electric Company was responsible for bearing the cost of the movement of 
the lines because under the common law a public utility is financially 
responsible for relocation in return for the allowance to use the public right-
of-way. Electric Company appealed the judgment. On appeal, the appellate 
court reversed the lower court and held that precedents only require a public 
utility company to bear the costs of moving power lines if the government 
is engaging in a road widening project, therefore Contractor must pay the 
cost of moving the lines even if the costs end up being shifted to County by 
Contractor. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Merger and Acquisition 
D.C. Circuit  
Office of the People’s Counsel v. Pub. Service Comm’n, 163 A. 3d 735 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
In June 2014, various related entities (“Companies”) requested a merger 
approval from the Public Service Commission (“PCS”). After multiple 
community hearings and evidentiary hearings, PCS concluded the merger 
was not in the public interest in August 2015. Just two months later, 
Companies moved to reopen the record where PCS would consider a Non-
Unanimous Settlement Agreement (“NSA”) executed by Companies, the 
Office of the People’s Counsel (“OPC”) and several other parties. PCS 
agreed to consider the NSA, reopened the record, and held multiple 
hearings, after which it determined the NSA was still not in the public 
interest in February 2016. One PCS Commissioner concurred with the 
decision and proposed a Revised NSA (“RNSA”) that she believed would 
be in the public interest and Companies were instructed to file a notice with 
PCS indicating their opinion concerning the RNSA or instead to request 
further relief. When they did neither, PCS approved the merger under the 
terms of the RNSA and denied Companies’ resulting application for 
reconsideration. Companies brought the matter to the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that PCS made procedural errors, 
exceeded its statutory authority, approved merger terms that are contrary to 
law or unreasonable, did not clearly explain its reasoning, and failed to 
make an independent finding that the merger was in the public interest. 
Upon appeal, the court determined that PCS’s legal conclusions were 
reasonable and based upon factors within its expertise. Specifically, the 
court concluded that rejection of the NSA was made upon logical reasoning 
and with a proper consideration of alternatives, namely the RNSA, and that 
the explanation of the decision was reasonable and sufficient when 
considering the extensive proceedings involved in considering the merger. 
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Patent Issues – Federal   
 
Federal Circuit 
 
In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 
Company appealed decision of United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) Patent and Trial Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming Examiners 
rejection of Company’s patent claims. The claims were for an expandable 
tool used for drilling oil and gas wells. The case turned on the proper 
interpretation of the term “body.” The PTO Examiner rejected the claims, 
determining that “body,” as read in the context of the claims, referred to 
multiple components of the tool, meaning there is no definition or limiting 
features of the term “body.” Board affirmed PTO Examiner’s rejection of 
the claims based on the broad reading of the term “body.” The Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Board’s interpretation was 
unreasonably broad, holding that Company’s failure to expressly define the 
term “body” in its claims did not preclude Company’s interpretation of the 
term—that it does not include other separately identified components. For 
that reason, the court reversed the Board’s rejections of the appealed 
claims.   
 
E.D. Louisiana  
 
Wright’s Well Control Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., CIVIL 
ACTION NO. 15-1720, 2017 WL 3706344 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2017) 
 
This case involves Patent Holder’s motion for summary judgment against 
Company for infringing on one of its patents and Company’s partial motion 
for summary judgment. Patent Holder and Company are both involved in 
providing “hydrate remediation services for the oil and gas industry” and 
Patent Holder developed a system that remediates hydrates “from subsea, 
deepwater pipelines.” The court granted Patent Holder’s motion for partial 
summary judgement which, in turn, dismissed Patent Holder’s patent 
infringement claim. The court came to this conclusion by first determining 
that because this is a method claim, Patent Holder must first demonstrate 
that Company used the patented method. Consequently, because Patent 
Holder failed to prove “use,” it legally cannot prove infringement of its 
patent. 
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E.D. Texas 
 
Effective Expl., LLC v. Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00607-
JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3193322 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 2017). 
 
Patent Applicant-1 (“Applicant-1”) and Patent Applicant-2 (“Applicant-2”) 
filed claims disputing the meaning of several terms used in a patent (“840 
Patent”). Applicants made eight claims, and court found as follows. First, in 
construing the phrase “subterranean zone or shale” and “wherein the 
subterranean zone is shale,” the court applied the plain language of the 840 
Patent and construed these terms to mean “the depth interval includes one 
or more layers of rock composed primarily of shale and is in the aggregate 
composed primarily of shale.” Second, the second disputed phrase, “a . . . 
wellbore extending from the surface . . . and a . . . substantially horizontal 
drainage bore,” carries the plain meaning of the language used in the 840 
Patent. Third, the phrase “proximate to the subterranean zone” means “in or 
near the subterranean zone” as depicted in the figures and as the most 
common and ordinary meaning of the word “proximate.” Forth, the phrase 
“extended in the subterranean zone in different directions of each other” 
means “in different drainage regions within the subterranean zone.” Fifth, 
the phrase “extend in substantially opposite directions” was insufficient to 
“inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope 
of the invention” and, thus, the meaning was indefinite. Sixth, that 
“different types of measurements or measurement locations could lead to 
different results.” And finally, the word “cavity” carries its plain and 
ordinary meaning as the specification did not support either of the 
Applicant’s proposed constructions. 
 
Other Issues – Federal  
 
First Circuit  
 
Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. United States, 871 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 
Insurance Company sued Marine Company and United States under the Oil 
Pollution Act (“OPA”) to recover monies paid to reimburse an insured’s 
cleanup costs that resulted from a ship’s oil spill. Insurance Company also 
sued for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to United 
States and Marine Company; it also dismissed Insurance Company’s 
negligence claim sua sponte. Insurance Company appealed. The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did not err by 
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considering documents outside the pleadings – a contract between United 
States and Marine Company – when it decided United States’ motion to 
dismiss, because the OPA exempts public vessels from liability, and the 
contract was necessary to make such determination. The court further held 
that the ship was “operated” by the United States because Marine Company 
was acting under the operational control of United States. Additionally, the 
court reinstated Insurance Company’s negligence claim against United 
States, holding that the OPA did not affect admiralty and maritime law as 
applied to public vessels prior to the OPA’s enactment. However, as a 
result, the negligence claim against Marine Company could not stand due to 
the Suits in Admiralty Act’s exclusivity provision, which stated that “if a 
remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be exclusive of any other action 
arising out of the same subject matter against the . . . agent of the United 
States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 
 
Third Circuit 
 
In re Semcrude L.P., 864 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
Midstream Company had bankruptcy protection agreements with 
Purchasers, but not Producers. Subsequently, when Midstream Company 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Purchasers were paid in full, but Producers 
were only paid in part. The Bankruptcy Court recommended summary 
judgment in favor of Purchasers because the oil was purchased free of any 
security interest either as: (1) buyers for value or (2) buyers in the ordinary 
course. The district court overruled Producers’ objections to the 
recommendation and granted summary judgment to Purchasers. On appeal, 
the Third Circuit held that Texas and Kansas Producers cannot rely on the 
Uniform Commercial Code’s (“U.C.C.”) language granting Producers an 
automatically perfected security interest which would require Purchasers to 
pay off Producers’ liens. The court held that this reliance on the U.C.C. was 
improper because: (1) the security interests were not perfected;(2) 
Purchasers bought the oil from Midstream Company, qualifying them as 
“buyers for value”; and (3) Purchasers did not have knowledge of the 
Producers’ security interests. The court also rejected Producers’ claims of 
fraud for lack of evidence. Purchasers invested heavily in premiums to 
secure a price in oil and protect themselves against an oil-price increase. 
The fact that Midstream Company did the opposite was a risky strategy that 
did not pay off does not demonstrate that Purchasers ever intended to take 
oil from the Producers without payment. Additionally, Oklahoma Producers 
cannot rely on the Oklahoma state law that Producers claim implied a trust-
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like relationship between all oil producers and any downstream purchasers. 
The Third Circuit refused to extend this trust-like relationship to “anyone 
who has unwittingly filled a gas tank with Oklahoma-produced oil.” The 
court affirmed the ruling of the district court, and upheld summary 
judgment for Purchasers. 
 
Fifth Circuit 
 
United States v. Third Coast Towing, LLC, CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-34-
CWR-FKB, 2017 WL 4051766 (5th Cir. Sep. 12, 2017). 
 
The United States sued Barge Owner (“Owner”), Tug Boat Operator 
(“Operator”), and Insurer under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) 
following an accident involving a tug pushing a barge that struck a bridge 
spilling oil into the Mississippi River. The United States sued for “oil spill 
removal costs and civil penalties.” Before the court is Operator and third 
party’s motion in limine, their motion for summary judgment, and the 
United States’ motion for partial summary judgment. Predominantly, the 
parties disagreed about who is liable for the removal costs and damages. 
The court granted United States’ motion and denied the others. First, the 
court noted that the OPA creates strict liability for the “responsible party” 
which is statutorily defined as “any person owning, operating, or demise 
chartering the vessel.” Because this language is rather vague, the court 
turned to the Coast Guard’s analysis on the common understating of what it 
means to “operate.” In this case, because the tug had control over the 
barge’s movement, it was determined that it was the “operator.” Therefore, 
it is liable for more of the removal costs and does not enjoy compensation 
from the OPA’s oil spill trust fund. Second, because this court found 
Operator liable, the issue of whether it waived reimbursement is irrelevant. 
Finally, the administrative record, including the Coast Guard’s finding that 
Operator is not entitled to reimbursement will not be stricken because there 
is no authority to do so and Operator failed to show that the disputed 
portions of the administrative record are material. This case has since been 
appealed, but there is no decision form the higher court as of publication. 
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C.D. Illinois  
 
Monsanto Prod. Supply L.L.C. v. Rosentreter, No. 3:16-cv-03038, 2017 
WL 4284566 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017). 
 
Production Company sued Farmer for patent infringement of its seeds, 
which contained Production Company’s biotechnology, and sought a 
permanent injunction. The court granted the permanent injunction, holding 
that: (1) Production Company would suffer irreparable harm because 
infringement of seeds could cause widespread proliferation of Production 
Company’s technology; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law because 
Farmer is likely to continue infringing on Production Company’s patent 
without a permanent injunction, which would require a multiplicity of 
lawsuits; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in favor of granting the 
permanent injunction because Farmer would still be able to farm without 
using Production Company’s technology, it does not create a new burden 
on Farmer, and Production Company would be prevented from fully 
protecting its intellectual property without the injunction; and, (4) no public 
interest would be disserved by the injunction. The court awarded 
compensatory damages based on a hypothetical contractual price. 
Furthermore, due to the willful nature of Farmer’s infringement and 
Farmer’s litigation misconduct, the court held that enhancements and 
attorney fees and costs were warranted. The court also awarded 
prejudgment interest to accrue from the date on which Farmer should have 
made royalty payments. 
 
E.D. Louisiana  
 
Wolverine Indus., LLC v. Monforte Expl., LLC, CIV. ACTION NO: 16-
14691, 2017 WL 2599211 (E.D. La. June 15, 2017). 
 
Company sued Operator alleging that Operator had failed to pay Company 
over $460,000 for labor, services, equipment, and supplies used in drilling 
two oil wells. Company moved for summary judgment on the theory of an 
open account. The court found that Company’s submission of invoices sent 
to Operator seeking payment could not establish the existence of an open 
account. Operator’s denial of the existence of an open account creates a 
material issue of fact; summary judgment, therefore, was improper. 
Company’s other theory for summary judgment rested on the recognition of 
its privilege on the two wells pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act 
(“LOWLA”). Operator claimed that LOWLA did not apply to the oil wells 
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at issue, because the wells were located on the Outer Continental Shelf 
(“OCS”), and exclusively regulated by federal law. The court held that 
because Louisiana is an adjacent State to the OCS, State law is applicable 
as surrogate law so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law. Therefore, 
Company can qualify as a contractor or laborer under LOWLA, but that 
alone cannot entitle Company to summary judgment. Company failed to 
prove the existence of a contract between the parties showing Operator 
owes an obligation. Because no obligation had been established, the court 
denied Company’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
N.D. California 
 
Oster v. Caithness Corp., Case No. 16-cv-03164-WHO, 2017 WL 3727174 
(N.D. Cal Aug. 30, 2017).  
 
Employee brought an action against her former Employer alleging that she 
is entitled to invest in an energy project but was denied. The court affirmed 
Employer’s motion for summary judgment because Employee failed to: (1) 
establish that a contract existed; (2) establish fraud and misrepresentation; 
and (3) prove promissory estoppel. Employer is an energy corporation. 
Employer approached Employee regarding the Vice President position. 
Before accepting, Employee requested to become a partner. Employer said 
not right away, but mentioned she could have a potential opportunity to 
become an investor in the projects she worked on. Employee accepted the 
Vice President position. The employment agreement outlined the salary and 
the target performance bonus and job benefits. Employer offered Employee 
the opportunity to invest in a specific project. Employee did not receive any 
details or any paperwork regarding the equity investment. Employer stated 
that if Employee won the bid on the project then she could invest. She did 
not win the bid and never received paperwork regarding the bid. At 
different times Employer mentioned that “she would have the opportunity 
or right to invest” but nothing official happened, no terms were agreed 
upon, and no paperwork drafted. The court found that Employee failed to 
demonstrate she reasonably relied upon any promise to her detriment made 
before or after her employment with Employer. Therefore, the district court 
granted Employer’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. This case 
has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
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S.D. New York  
 
Schiller v. Duthie, No. 15-CV-4933 (CS), 2017 WL 3726993 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 2017).  
 
Energy Service Consultant (“ESC”) brings an antitrust and conspiracy 
action against multiple Energy Service Consultants (“Consultants”). To 
survive a motion to dismiss by Consultants, ESC must describe the 
applicable geographic market, assert an antitrust injury, and assert behavior 
in violation of antitrust laws. Consultants filed a motion to dismiss stating 
that ESC did not allege an antitrust injury. ESC alleged four alternative 
theories for an antitrust injury. First, ESC alleged that it is competitors of 
Consultants and Consultants actions made the market less competitive. 
Second, ESC alleged that it competes in a market in which it is 
subcontractors of its energy suppliers. Third, ESC alleged that Consultants 
participated in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. ESC did not elaborate how this 
theory constitutes an injury to ESC. Fourth, ESC contended that its injuries 
were “inexplicably intertwined” with the injuries of market participants. 
However, after analyzing the four theories presented, the court concluded 
that ESC did not satisfy the injury requirement of an antitrust claim. ESC 
also alleged that Consultants conspired with a Municipality to publicly 
discredit and defame ESC in retaliation for challenging Municipality’s 
conduct. The court determined that while ESC did sufficiently allege a 
conspiracy against Municipality, ESC did not plausibly allege a conspiracy 
claim against Consultants. The court concluded that ESC did not assert any 
facts to support that there was an agreement or meeting of the minds among 
Consultants and the mere fact that Consultants were involved in the 
incident with Municipality does not establish a conspiracy.  
 
W.D. Louisiana  
 
Hilcorp Energy Co. v. JP Oil Co., No. 6:16CV0598, 2017 WL 3528865 
(W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2017).  
 
Owner bought gas and oil leases from Seller. Pursuant to an agreement, 
Owner agreed to indemnify Seller for “obligations and liabilities.” Owner 
then sold the same lease to Buyer. Buyer agreed to indemnify Owner for 
“obligations and liabilities.” Two property owners filed law suits against 
Seller alleging that oil and gas operations of Seller and Buyer had 
contaminated their property. Seller requested that Owner defend and 
indemnify the action. Owner did so and then requested that Buyer 
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indemnify Owner. Owner filed suit against Buyer in federal court 
requesting reimbursement for the $100,000 that Owner paid Seller. Each 
side filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted Owner’s 
motion for summary judgment finding that the assignment sale was clear as 
to the terms and Buyer agreed indemnify Owner for “obligations and 
liabilities” arising from the leases. The court reasoned that broad 
indemnification terms did not preclude this action because the language in 
the assignment of the lease to Buyer conveyed the intent of Buyer to take 
over all of Owner’s obligations arising from the property.  
 
Bankruptcy  
 
McDermott v. Fonner (In re Fonner), 573 B.R. 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2017). 
 
Bankruptcy Trustee claimed that Debtor fraudulently failed to disclose 
signing bonus payments for oil and gas leases mere months prior to his 
Petition for Bankruptcy. At the Creditor’s Meeting Debtor testified that his 
report of assets was correct, but later acknowledged leases to the 
Bankruptcy Trustee (“Trustee”). Two separate attorneys contacted Trustee 
on behalf of Debtor, mentioning some, but not extensive details about the 
leases and undisclosed income. Debtor was granted discharge 
approximately one month later, and Trustee filed an Amended Complaint to 
seek revocation of said Discharge due to Debtor’s fraud a year earlier. The 
court granted the revocation for the following reasons. One is that Debtor 
had a duty of candor, but failed to disclose relevant and essential 
information. The court found that this negatively modified the balance 
between protecting Debtor and creditors. The court found this to be 
evidence that Debtor had little regard for the legal system, since he openly 
defied direct advice from his trustee by cashing a check. Debtor made a 
materially false statement at the Creditors’ Meeting and the court does not 
believe that he could have forgotten about the lease payments in such a 
short amount of time, or did not understand that he needed to disclose the 
lease payments. Another reason the court found that the Trustee did not 
know of the fraud prior to the discharge, so it is proper to revoke the 
discharge.  
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Other Issues - State 
 
Alabama  
 
Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Kinder Morgan Operating LP “C”, No. 
2:16-cv-00345-SGC, 2017 WL 3149442 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2017). 
 
Company and Transporter entered a long-term contract (“Agreement”) to 
transport coal via Transporter’s terminal. Under the Agreement, Company 
must meet a minimum yearly volume of coal to be handled by Transporter’s 
terminal. If the minimum volume was not met, penalties were to be paid to 
Transporter. After an increase in environmental regulations on coal use, the 
market for coal substantially decreased and Company was consistently 
unable to fulfil the volume requirements of the contract resulting in 
substantial monetary penalties. Therefore, Company sought a declaration 
that it not be required to fulfil the requirements of the Agreement or face 
the monetary penalties for the remainder of the contract term, citing four 
claims: (1) frustration of purpose; (2) force majeure (3) impossibility or 
impracticability of performance; and (4) excused performance due to 
Transporter’s inability to perform. Under the Agreement, New York law 
controlled. First, the district court found that frustration of purpose as 
insufficient for Company’s breach because environmental regulations 
affecting the market for coal were foreseeable. Second, in the analysis of 
the force majeure clause of the contract the court found that after a narrow 
interpretation of the clause, environmental regulations did not constitute a 
force majeure event within the definition of government intervention. 
Third, the court found that financial hardship and a reduction in the coal 
market did not serve as grounds for applying impossibility to the contract. 
Lastly, the court allowed the claim for excused performance to continue 
because there was an actual dispute regarding Transporters obligations if 
Company was unable to meet volume requirements and the financial 
implications of not meeting those requirements.  
 
Alaska  
 
Comsult LLC v. Girdwood Mining Co., 397 P.3d 318 (Alaska 2017).  
 
Corporation sued Consultant it retained to obtain new capital investments, 
seeking declaratory judgment that consulting contract violated state 
securities law and seeking both equitable rescission of contract and 
cancellation of shares of stock and royalty interests granted under the 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1119 
  
 
contract. The trial court determined that the contract was illegal and denied 
relief to both parties. Corporation appealed. The Supreme Court of Alaska 
held that state law, which bars suits based on contracts that violate Alaska 
securities law, did not render unenforceable stock and mineral royalty 
interests stemming from illegal contract. The court reasoned that because 
“both stocks and mineral royalty interests are property,” both are protected 
by sources of law outside of state contract law. Therefore, Consultant owns 
the stock and royalties, and its rights to enforce them remain valid.  
 
Missouri  
 
Union Elec. Co. v. Estes, No. WD 80659, 2017 WL 4244396 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Oct. 13, 2017). 
 
Public Utility Company (“Company”) appealed the State Tax 
Commission’s (“Commission”) determination affirming valuation of 
Company’s real property interest in natural gas pipeline. Tax assessors were 
tasked with valuing the property at hand for tax purposes. Assessors were 
given a form promulgated by Commission for guidance. This form required 
considering depreciation. However, the assessors did not affirmatively 
consider depreciation because they believed the figures provided to them by 
Company had already factored in depreciation. Meaning, they believed that 
if they had accounted for depreciation, Company would enjoy “double 
depreciation.” During a hearing before Commission, however, the assessors 
admitted this was not the case. Therefore, because Commission adopted a 
valuation method which required accounting for depreciation, the court 
determined that it was unlawful for Commission to decide which excluded 
depreciation. The court’s determination stands despite a couple of the 
assessor’s claims. First, even though the assessor’s expert’s valuation 
comes close to the valuation including depreciation, the court found no 
authority to side with assessors’ valuation method just because it was 
‘close’ to a valuation method accounting for depreciation. And second, 
there is no authority to support the contention that the assessors’ valuation 
method is ‘correct’—it was entirely within Commission’s authority to use a 
valuation method including depreciation. Because of that, however, 
Commission is now legally obliged to account for depreciation.  
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Texas 
 
Tex. Black Iron, Inc. v. Arawak Energy Int’l Ltd., 527 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
A Seller distributes oil and gas drilling equipment entered into a deal and 
executed a purchase order with Purchaser to supply various sizes and 
quantities of casing and pup joints at set prices. Purchaser prepaid $2.8 
million to Seller for the services. Seller delivered nearly all the purchased 
materials and refunded Purchaser $400,000 for the equipment that was 
never delivered. Purchaser then returned the rest of the equipment, seeking 
an additional refund of $768,304 for those materials under the buy-back 
condition of the parties’ contract, but Seller did not refund any of this 
amount. Purchaser filed suit against Seller in Texas district court claiming 
breach of contract and suit on sworn account, also requesting a temporary 
restraining order and temporary injunction against Seller. During trial, it 
was asserted that Seller did not pay the additional refund because the 
market was weak and it did not have the money to do so. Purchaser 
requested the injunction because it was concerned that Seller might resell 
the equipment to someone else while the court proceedings were being 
held. The court recognized this concern and issued an injunction against 
Seller and set trial for a later date. Seller appealed arguing that the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting the injunction as it fails to set forth 
sufficient reasoning for its issuance. The appellate court determined that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Purchaser’s probable 
right to recover nor did the trial court overstep in choosing the terms of the 
injunction. 
 
Wyoming  
 
PacifiCorp, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 2017 WY 106, 401 P.3d 905. 
 
Utility engages in the manufacture of electricity through coal-fired 
electrical generation facilities, and petitioned for judicial review of the 
Board of Equalization’s (“Board”) decision affirming the Department of 
Revenue’s (“Department”) denial of Utility’s exemption from sales tax on 
chemicals and reagents used in the generation of electricity sold to 
customers. Specifically, Utility thought it qualified for either the 
manufacturers’ sales tax exemption or the wholesalers’ sales tax exemption 
because it manufactured electricity and purchased its chemicals as a 
wholesaler. Board found that certain chemicals, because they are not used 
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directly to generate electricity, are not exempt from sales tax under state 
statutes. Board also found that the purchases of certain chemicals and 
catalysts do not constitute wholesale purchases exempt from taxation under 
the statute. Utility’s sales tax refund request was denied. Department argued 
that because the electricity produced by Utility contains no coal, Utility 
cannot be considered a manufacturer; Department cited the definition of 
manufacturing: “the raw or prepared material must be produced into a final 
form of the same material.” The court found this definition and reasoning of 
the Department’s to be unconvincing and held that Utility is a manufacturer 
under the Wyoming statutory definition. However, the court also held that 
because the chemicals used by Utility in its water and pollution control 
systems are not ingredients or components of the electricity produced, they 
are not subject to the manufacturers’ sales tax exemption. Finally, the court 
held that because Utility does not purchase the chemicals at wholesale for 
the purpose of selling them in a subsequent sale, the Board did not err when 
it determined that Utility does not qualify for the wholesalers’ exemption in 
this case. 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
Forth Circuit 
 
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 861 F.3d 529 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 
Company brought a suit against EPA alleging violations of the Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”). Company claimed that EPA failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty under CCA. The district court granted Company’s 
motion for summary judgment. The CCA section at issue provides that the 
“[a]dministrator shall conduct continuing evaluations of potential loss or 
shifts of employment which may result from the administration or 
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.” Company requested that 
EPA conduct evaluations and be prohibited from engaging in regular 
activities until it conducts the evolutions. The district court ruled in favor of 
Company and EPA appealed. On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the CAA provision imposed a broad, open-ended 
mandate to the administration and enforcement of the CAA on a continuing 
basis. Therefore, EPA is left with considerable amount of discretion in the 
management under that CAA provision. The court further found that 
because the provision falling under the operations of an agency the court 
lacked jurisdiction because the CAA did not authorize the suit in this instant 
case. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the 
higher court as of publication.  
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. McGraw-Edison Co., No. 16-1264, 2017 WL 
2829379 (6th Cir. June 30, 2017). 
 
Insurer sued Manufacturer seeking a declaration that Manufacturer released 
its insurance claims regarding groundwater pollution from Manufacturer’s 
wastewater-treatments system, or settling pond, at one of Manufacturer’s 
battery plant. Many years earlier, there was a claim for contamination on a 
separate battery plant on the same property in which the Insurer sued 
Manufacturer. That suit resulted in a settlement where Manufacturer 
released any claim for coverage that involved contamination from part of 
that plant. Therefore, as the EPA notified Manufacturer that a local river 
may be contaminated from plant operations, Insurer claimed that this 
release in the earlier settlement precluded Manufacturer from making a 
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claim from contamination for both plants on the property not just the one 
involved in the earlier settlement. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
analyzed the settlement agreement to determine if the agreement intended 
to waive claims for the entire property or just the plant involved at that 
point. The court held that the agreement unambiguously referred to only the 
plant involved and not all plants on Manufacturer’s property. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Newell Brands, Inc. v. Bosgraaf, Nos. 16-2331/2403, 2017 WL 2629054 
(6th Cir. June 19, 2017). 
 
Buyer bought land from Seller knowing that chemicals pollutants 
contaminated the land.  
Under Michigan law the prior owner of land is responsible for cleaning up 
pollution. To clean up pollution Seller needed access to the land which 
Buyer denied. According to state law, courts may “provide compensation to 
the property owner or operator for damages related to the granting of 
access.” Seller brought an action against Buyer to gain access to the land. 
Buyer counterclaimed for damages for the court to grant compensation 
when it grants access onto someone’s land for the loss of the use of 
property. Seller and Buyer stipulated to an order of the court granting Seller 
access to the land. Seller moved for summary judgment arguing the lack of 
Buyer’s entitlement to damages because Buyer knew of the pollution when 
purchasing the land and that even if damages were proper the limit should 
be to the fair market value of a license to access the property. The district 
court granted Seller’s motion to limit damages to the grant of access 
opposed to the ongoing presence of contamination itself. On appeal the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court because during 
the litigation, Buyer never drew a link between damage to the court 
granting access as opposed to the pre-existing pollution. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
All. For the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization brought action against United States Forest 
Service (“USFS”), arguing that USFS violated the National Forest 
Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act when it 
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approved a forest restoration project for a national forest. Environmental 
Organization sought a preliminary injunction against USFS. In order to 
receive a preliminary injunction, Environmental Organization had to show 
that: (1) it was likely to succeed in its merits; (2) it is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of 
equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. The 
district court found that Environmental Organization did not satisfy any of 
the four required factors, and thus denied the request for an issuance of a 
preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision, holding that Environmental Organization did not provide proof it 
met all four factors.   
 
Cent. Or. Landwatch v. Connaughton, 696 Fed. App’x 816 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 
City has long sourced drinking and municipal water from two creeks—both 
tributaries of a river which runs through Deschutes National Forest 
(“Forest”)—and has been authorized by the United States Forest Service 
(“USFS”) to operate an intake facility and pipeline for withdrawing that 
water. Conservation Group sued after USFS approved issuance of a Special 
Use Permit (“SUP”) authorizing City to upgrade its intake facility, 
construct a new pipeline, and operate the system for twenty years subject to 
certain requirements (collectively, the “Project”). Conservation Group 
alleged that USFS’s decision to authorize the Project was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”), National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed, affirming the validity of the Project. In doing so, the court held 
the Project was not arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that “substantial 
deference” must be given to USFS’s determination that the Project is 
consistent with the Forest’s Plan. The court also held that the Project 
satisfied the requirements under NEPA because USFS included a “brief 
discussion of reasonable alternatives” during the proposal of the Project. 
Lastly, the court held that because USFS provided an explanation as to why 
a “quantitative” analysis of the Project’s impact on climate change could 
not be provided, a discussion in “qualitative” terms was permissible under 
NEPA. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing as the case as precedent.   
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Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power & Conservation Council, No. 15-71482, 
2017 WL 3049570 (9th Cir. July 19, 2017). 
 
Environmental Group petitioned for review of the 2014 fish and wildlife 
program promulgated by Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
(“Council”) alleging that Council: (1) “improperly equated its mandate” 
under the Northwest Power Act (“NPA”) with the “substantive 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”); (2) arbitrarily and 
capriciously failed to adopt “quantitative, measurable biological 
objectives;” (3) rejected recommendations for improper reasons; (4) 
arbitrarily and capriciously refused to include environmental measures that 
would be in effect unless the “economical and reliable power supply” of the 
region was threatened; and (5) was improperly influenced by the Columbia 
Basin Fish Accords (“CBFA”). The court found that Council: (1) did not 
improperly equate its mandate because the aims of the NPA and ESA 
largely coincide; (2) did adopt quantitative biological objectives, although 
the quantitative measures could be improved; (3) did not improperly reject 
recommendations because the recommendations were either economically 
infeasible or possibly harmful; (4) was not required to take every 
environmental mitigation step until the region’s power supply was 
threatened; 5) may have misunderstood its obligations under the CBFA, but 
the misunderstanding did not affect the outcome of the program. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
W. Watersheds Project v. Ruhs, No. 15-17031, 2017 WL 3034308 (9th Cir. 
July 18, 2017). 
 
Environmental Group challenged United States Bureau of Land 
Management’s (“BLM”) issuance of an environmental assessment. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of BLM, and 
Environmental Group appealed, arguing that the assessment violated the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by: (1) failing to carefully 
consider the assessment’s potential effects on surrounding habitat; (2) 
inadequately considering impact of other past, present, and future projects 
in the area; and (3) failing to assess potential impact of the project’s 
“rangeland improvements.” The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment, holding that Environmental Group failed to 
show that the assessment was deficient under NEPA. This case is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Wild Equity Inst. v. EPA, No. 15-70199, 2017 WL 3700996 (9th Cir. Aug. 
28, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization sought review of EPA’s denial of its Petition 
for Objection to Permit. A local California entity responsible for enforcing 
elements of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) permitting requirements issued a 
Title V Permit to Utility Company for its Gateway Generating Station in 
California without objection from the EPA Administrator. Environmental 
Organization then filed its Petition for Objection to the Title V Permit, 
which was denied by EPA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed 
Environmental Organization’s Petition and determined that EPA did not err 
in its determination that Environmental Organization failed to demonstrate 
that the Title V Permit failed to comply with the CAA. The court pointed to 
Utility Company’s permitting history with EPA to justify its determination 
that EPA did not err in judgment, and therefore denied Environmental 
Organization’s Petition. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.  
 
Wild Wilderness v. Allen, 871 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 
The Dutchman Flat and Tumalo Mountain (“Mountain”) is ideal for both 
snowmobilers and cross-country skiers, creating conflict between motorized 
recreationalists and non-motorized recreationalists, further fueled by the 
lack of parking. In 2006, the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) began 
considering the effects of adding a parking structure, began an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), but then withdrew the EIS and 
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact and an Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”). Organization first alleged that USFS’s 2006 approval 
violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”). NFMA states 
that USFS’s actions must be consistent with the governing Land and 
Resource Management Plan (“Plan”). The Plan states that when conflicts 
develop between non-motorized and motorized recreationalists, certain 
steps will generally be taken. The court concluded that the Plan articulates 
“an aspiration, not an obligation.” Organization then alleged that USFS 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). NEPA states 
that when USFS determines an EIS is no longer needed, USFS must publish 
a withdrawal notice. Organization argued an additional and implicit 
requirement is established that USFS must issue a reasoned explanation for 
why an EIS is not needed. However, the court concluded that Organization 
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provided no support for this requirement. The court also concluded that 
USFS did not violate NEPA by failing to provide a convincing statement of 
reasons why the plan would not significantly affect the environment. When 
analyzing the significant impact on the environment, USFS must analyze 
both context and intensity of the impact. One factor of intensity is the 
degree to which the plan impacted the environment is not likely to be 
highly controversial. However, the court determined that controversial 
refers to the size or nature of the plan, not whether or how passionately 
people oppose the plan.  
 
Tenth Circuit 
 
Chevron Mining, Inc. v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2017).  
 
Company sued Government under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking funds 
for cleanup costs arising from a mining operation. At issue is whether 
Government is liable under CERCLA as a “potentially responsible party 
(“PRP”),” and owes funds to Company to aid cleanup costs. CERCLA 
holds “covered persons” strictly liable for remedial action, and other 
necessary response costs. “Covered persons” includes: (1) owners’; (2) 
operators; (3) arrangers; and (4) transporters. Government did not assert 
any of CERCLA’s defenses to avoid liability. Owner liability reaches “any 
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned . . . 
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” Under 
CERCLA, an owner is also the legal title holder of contaminated land. 
Government held legal title to the lands where significant waste disposal 
occurred, and actively exercised its ownership by conveying portions of its 
land for waste rock disposal and for a tailings pond. The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Government was an owner of portions of the 
mining site, and therefore was a PRP that was strictly liable to contribute its 
share of the cleanup costs.  
 
Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222 (10th 
Cir. 2017). 
 
Activist sued U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), claiming that 
BLM’s approval of four mine leases (“Leases”) violated the National 
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”). Under NEPA, in evaluating a 
lease that may result in increasing carbon dioxide emissions, BLM had the 
option of approving the Leases or taking a “no action” alternative and deny 
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the leases. BLM reasoned that there was no real difference in carbon 
emissions between approving the Leases and the no action alternative, 
because other sources of coal would fill the void in the market if the Leases 
were denied. Furthermore, BLM reasoned that removing the coal from the 
market would not result in a higher demand from the product, with a 
corresponding increase in price. The district court found BLM’s actions 
were reasonable, and upheld the leases. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that BLM’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious. The 
court explained that BLM ignored the basic economic principle that a force 
that drives up the cost of coal would drive down consumption, thus leading 
to a decrease in carbon emissions. Furthermore, BLM neglected to include 
any data to suggest why that basic economic principle would not apply to 
the case at hand. BLM was therefore not entitled to any deference on behalf 
of the court. In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Tenth Circuit did not 
vacate the Leases; it instead remanded the case to the trial court, and 
entered an order requiring BLM to revise its studies and evidence.  
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Civil Case No. 11-1122 (RJL), 2017 WL 
4221057 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2017).  
 
Alaska sued the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) 
because it passed the Roadless Area Conservation Rule (“Rule”), limiting 
road construction and timber harvesting in national forests, including 
Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. Alaska claimed the Rule was mandated 
in an unrealistic timeframe, without considering the states’ needs, and 
without properly considering multiple-use management of national forests. 
Alaska brought these claims as violations of a multitude of federal laws. 
The court analyzed the claims by first addressing Alaska’s assertion that the 
Rule violated of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), in that 
USDA did not fully consider the environmental effects of its actions. 
However, after finding: (1) there was a true need for the Rule; (2) that 
USDA did not mislead the public as to the cumulative effects of the Rule; 
(3) that the USDA properly gathered informed comment and decision 
making regarding the accelerated adoption of the Rule; and (4) that the draft 
environmental impact study preceding the Rule and the final study were not 
substantially different enough to require a supplemental study, the court 
found that USDA complied with NEPA. Next, the court analyzed specific 
challenges to the Rule as it applied to Alaska. First, it addressed whether 
the Rule violated the Tongrass Timber Reform Act (“Act”) by rendering the 
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possibility of meeting timber demand under the Act impossible. The court 
found that USDA should try—but is not obligated to—meet demand under 
the Act. Second, the court found that USDA did not violate federal law by 
withdrawing public land from Alaska without congressional approval. 
Then, the court analyzed whether USDA violated NEPA as it specifically 
applies to Alaska and similarly found that USDA complied with the statute. 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no holding from the higher 
court as of publication.  
 
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 862 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
Organizations sought review of EPA’s rule defining “solid waste” under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) the requirement that 
secondary hazardous materials be handled as “valuable commodities” was 
reasonable; (2) EPA failed to demonstrate a rational basis for notice and 
recordkeeping requirements regarding recycling hazardous wastes into 
products for which there was a use; (3) EPA's update of the rule that 
excluded hazardous materials that were transferred to a third-party for 
reclamation from regulation under RCRA, was consistent with RCRA; (4) 
EPA failed to demonstrate a rational basis for an update of its transfer-
based exclusion that added a requirement that waste generators only use 
third-party recyclers that were approved by EPA or state regulators; (5) the 
court would sever and maintain the portions of EPA's verified recycler 
exclusion that severed and retained emergency preparedness and 
containment requirements; (6) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Organizations’ claim that EPA could not treat off-specification 
commercial chemical products as hazardous secondary materials subject to 
regulation under RCRA; and (7) the court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Organizations' challenge to EPA's decision to defer the decision on 
whether to apply containment and notification requirements to generators of 
excluded materials. 
 
Ams. for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
EPA announced a final rule that set several renewable fuel requirements for 
the years 2014–2017. Several environmental organizations challenged 
EPA’s final order on several grounds. Some felt EPA set the renewable fuel 
requirements too low, while others felt the requirements were too high. The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all challenges except 
one petition arguing that EPA erred in its interpretation of the “inadequate 
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domestic supply” wavier provision. The appellate court held: (1) EPA 
wrongly concluded that “inadequate domestic supply” applied to the supply 
of renewable fuel available to consumers rather than refiners, blenders, and 
importers supply of volume needed to meet statutory requirements of the 
provision and (2) EPA incorrectly considered demand-side factors affecting 
the demand for renewable fuel, instead of considering the supply-side 
factors as required by the provision. Thus, the court adopted this petition for 
review, vacated EPA’s decision to reduce the volume requirement for 
renewable fuel, and remanded the final rule to EPA for further 
consideration.   
 
Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
Environmental Organizations filed an emergency motion for stay regarding 
EPA’s decision to stay, pending reconsideration, implementation of 
portions of a final rule regarding methane and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Groups connected to oil and gas industry (“Industry Groups”) petitioned for 
reconsideration of the rule under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Under CCA 
there are two circumstances when EPA must reconsider a rule: (1) if it can 
be demonstrated that it was impracticable to raise such an objection within 
the notice and comment period: and (2) if such objection is of central 
relevance to the outcome of the rule. Industry Groups argued that those 
requirements were met because several provisions in the final rule were not 
in the proposed rule, therefore, they were unable to raise objections to said 
final rule. Environmental Organizations argued the stay violates CAA 
because the issues raised by Industry Groups were debated during the 
comment period, and therefore, Industry Groups could have raised 
objections. EPA then argued the court has no jurisdiction over this case, 
because the decision to grant reconsideration of the rule was not a “final 
action.” However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that it was a “final action” because it was a decision that could have legal 
consequences. Furthermore, the court held the only way EPA could grant 
the stay, is if CAA conferred to it that power. The court held that EPA had 
no authority because CAA only conferred authority to grant a stay if the 
two elements above were satisfied. The court held that those two elements 
were not satisfied because evidence showed that all issues Industry Groups 
claimed were not in the proposed rule, were debated during the comment 
period, and could have been raised. The court granted Environmental 
Organizations’ motion to vacate the stay. 
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Mexichem Flour, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Manufacturers petitioned for review of the EPA’s decision to remove 
Hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) from the list of substitutes for ozone-
depleting substances, placing it on list of prohibited ozone-depleting 
substances under Clean Air Act (“CAA”). EPA’s decision is based on its 
finding the HFCs contribute negatively to climate change. Manufacturers 
claimed the decision exceeded EPA’s authority under the CAA. The CAA 
requires manufacturers to “replace ozone-depleting substances with safe 
substitutes.” However, even though HFCs were placed on the prohibited 
list, EPA never made a finding that HFCs deplete the ozone. EPA’s new 
rule essentially forces manufactures and others to replace HFCs with 
substitutes without finding HFCs cause the damage some entities claim. 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used the Chevron 
analysis to determine whether, under the CAA, EPA had statutory authority 
to issue a decision regulating the use of HFCs. Under the step one analysis 
of Chevron, the court focused on the meaning of the word “replace” in the 
statute. EPA argued that because manufacturers “continue to ‘replace’ 
ozone-depleting substances with HFCs every time [they] use HFCs in their 
products,” EPA continues to have authority regulate manufactures’ use of 
HFCs. The court found this interpretation to be too broad and without 
limits. The court denied this interpretation of the term “replace.” The court 
found that the plain-text of the statute along with legislative history proves 
that Congress’ focus was on preventing the use of “ozone-depleting” 
substances. EPA’s new rule goes beyond the reasonable interpretation of 
the statute, and Congress’ intent, thus the court vacated EPA’s rule to the 
extent it requires manufacturers to discontinue the use of HFCs.  
 
Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 
2017).   
 
Landowners and Environmental Groups challenged Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) decision to allow three natural gas 
pipeline be built. A primary question is whether the Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) is adequate. The court looed to see if the deficiencies in 
the EIS hinder public participation in the process, according to National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The court said that one EIS for the 
three pipelines was adequate; it answered the question of whether the 
projects have a dramatically negative impact on certain subsections of the 
population. An EIS is required to be “reasonable and adequately 
explained,” but the path, or methodology, to that objective is given 
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deference. The court held this EIS is adequate in this regard because “[i]t 
discussed the intensity, extent, and duration of the pipelines’ environmental 
effects” and how those effects would impact certain environmental-justice 
communities. The court said that the EIS could have been more elaborate in 
some areas, but the statement still meets the goal of NEPA. The court said 
that FERC should have included an estimate of emissions in its EIS, or if 
such an estimate was not practical or possible, Commission should have 
explained why it did not include an estimate. FERC followed its 
jurisdictional precedent regarding return on investment, imposing a capital 
structure to make adjustments when it deemed a return on investment too 
high and thus imbalanced. The court held this decision was not arbitrary or 
capricious. Accordingly, the court remanded the petition for FERC to 
prepare an EIS including more information about emissions from the 
pipelines. 
 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
Environmental Group challenged Department of Energy’s (“Department”) 
compliance with National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the 
Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), for its grant of an application to export liquefied 
natural gas (“LNG”) using terminal and liquification facilities in Brazoria 
County, Texas. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
Department had complied with both NEPA and the NGA. In determining 
whether Department complied with NEPA, the court looked at whether 
Department had adequately considered and disclosed the environmental 
impact of its action and whether that decision is arbitrary or capricious. The 
court held that Department had adequately considered the potential 
environmental impacts of concern to Environmental Group, including 
impacts on water resources, greenhouse gas emissions, and coal usage. In 
determining whether Department complied with the NGA, the court 
considered whether the approved application was inconsistent with public 
interest. The court held that Environmental Group had not presented any 
evidence to show that Department worked contrary to public interest when 
it approved the application. Accordingly, the court denied Environmental 
Group’s challenged to Department’s decision.  
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C.D. Illinois  
 
E.O.R. Energy L.L.C. v. Messina, No. 3:16-CV-03122, 2017 WL 4181346 
(C.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 
Company sued Director of Illinois EPA and the Illinois EPA (collectively 
“IEPA”) after previous litigation was decided in the Illinois court. The prior 
case related to an IEPA complaint against Company that alleged Company 
unlawfully transported hazardous waste from Colorado to Illinois and that 
the waste had been disposed of unlawfully in Illinois injection wells 
without obtaining the proper permit. The Illinois Pollution Control Board 
(“Board”) issued orders affirming the violations made by Company and 
ordered them to cease. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed Board’s 
findings. In the current case, Company sought protection using the Ex Parte 
Young exception. The federal district court found that because the Illinois 
appellate court had already upheld Board’s finding that Company violated 
IEPA regulations that it was therefore powerless to overturn the Illinois 
court. The district court analyzed the implications of the Eleventh 
Amendment in connection with the case. The court reasoned that in this 
situation it had to determine whether Company is seeking protection from 
ongoing violations of federal law. The district court found that Company 
failed to establish facts supporting the argument that IEPA was continuing 
to violate a federal law. Therefore, Company’s claims fail. This case has 
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 
D. Alaska  
 
Gavora, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks, No. 4:15-cv-00015-SLG, 2017 WL 
3161626 (D. Alaska July 25, 2017). 
 
Property Owner sued Predecessor for the cost of past and present clean-up 
operations. For a period of forty years, Predecessor owned the property, and 
leased to Property Owner for twenty-one of those years. During this period, 
a dry-cleaning company operated out of the property, causing 
contamination to the surrounding soil and groundwater. The court looked at 
a number of factors in assessing liability for clean-up costs, including: (1) 
the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to the 
discharge of a toxin can be distinguished; (2) the amount of the waste 
involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the toxin involved; (4) the degree of 
involvement by the parties in the generation or disposal of the waste; (5) the 
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degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the toxin; and (6) the 
degree of cooperation by the parties with government officials to prevent 
any harm to the public health or the environment. The court found that it 
was equitable to allocate the Predecessor 55% of the recoverable response 
costs, and to allocate Property Owner 45% of the recoverable response 
costs. 
 
D. Arizona  
 
Concerned Citizens & Retired Miners Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-
16-03115-PHX-DGC, 2017 WL 3896290 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2017).  
 
San Carlos Apache Tribe (“Tribe”) sued the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”) 
to challenge its approval of Operator’s plan to gather environmental data 
related to Operator’s potential development of an underground copper mine 
(“mine”) and mine tailings storage facility (“TSF”). Operator thereafter 
intervened as a defendant. To plan for the possible construction of the mine, 
Operator proposed to conduct a baseline assessment of groundwater and 
subsurface conditions in proximity to the possible location. Tribe contended 
that the assessment violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
National Historic Preservation Act, and the National Defense Authorization 
Act (“NDAA”), as well as regulations related to these statutes. USFS 
approved the baseline assessment after conducting an environmental 
assessment through which it issued a Finding of No Significant Impact. The 
court noted that this approval of the baseline assessment by USFS did not 
constitute approval of the mine or the TSF. In determining whether the 
potentially subsequent mine construction is a “connected action” of the 
baseline assessment and, thus, should have been included in USFS’s 
assessment. The court reviewed whether the actions: (1) automatically 
trigger other actions that could require additional environmental impact 
statements; (2) cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken 
previously or in conjunction; or (3) are interdependent parts of a larger 
action and depend on the larger action for their justification. The court 
ultimately found the baseline assessment and mine construction to not be 
connected actions because the mine construction is not dependent on nor 
automatically triggered by the baseline assessment. As the baseline 
assessment had independent utility outside the scope of mine construction 
and because Tribe failed to show a violation of the NDAA, the court 
ultimately ruled in favor of Operator in terminating the action. 
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El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, No. CV-14-08165-PCT-DGC, 2017 
WL 3492993 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017).  
 
Natural Gas Company sued the United States under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 
hoping to recover costs incurred in remediating former uranium mines 
located on an Indian reservation. CERCLA holds liable virtually everyone 
that has a connection to the property or the contamination. This typically 
includes owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters. For purposes of 
holding the United States liable, Company moved for summary judgment 
for its claims that the United States is an owner and therefore potentially 
liable for remediation costs. The court found that the United States is a fee 
holder of the Indian reservation and that although the United States has 
granted a significant property interest to the Indian nation, it has retained 
substantial power over the land. Therefore, since the United States is an 
owner under CERCLA, the court granted Company’s motion for summary 
judgment.  
 
WildEarth Guardians v. Provencio, No. CV-16-08010-PCT-SMM, 2017 
WL 4286189 (D. Ariz. 2017).  
 
The Kaibab National Forest (“KNF”) is located in northern Arizona and 
consists of three ranger districts (“Districts”). All three Districts provide 
recreational opportunities, are home to several plant and animal species, 
and are home to numerous cultural resources. Each District undertook 
projects to designate a system of roads throughout their prospective districts 
to improve management of motorized vehicle use in accordance with the 
2005 Travel Management Rule. Each District also developed an 
environmental assessment presenting the results of the analysis of the 
direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental effects of the proposed 
action and alternatives to the proposed action. The decisions implementing 
the chosen actions for each District were documented in Decision Notices 
signed by the KNF Supervisor noting Findings of No Significant Impacts. 
Environmental Group commenced this action in January 2016 alleging 
violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other 
environmental preservation acts. Environmental Group moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the Forest Service violated the Travel 
Management Rule (“TMR”), NEPA, and the National Historic Preservation 
Act (“NHPA”). The court found in KNF’s favor in granting its cross-
motion for summary judgment, citing that KNF took every proper step and 
considered every potential violation in its actions and Environmental Group 
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made no significant show of any violation of the TMR, NEPA, NHPA, or 
any other statutory provision. This case has since been appealed, but there 
is no decision from the higher court as of publication.  
 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 
Environmental Group brought two actions against EPA alleging that it 
violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA) and the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”). EPA announced the 
registration of a new pesticide and invited public comment regarding it. 
EPA conducted an “Environmental Fate and Ecological Risk Assessment 
for the Registration of the New Chemical” that determined the chemical 
was “highly toxic or very toxic” to invertebrates such as butterflies and 
beetles. ESA mandates that “every federal agency ‘shall … insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species’” or threaten 
their habitat. ESA contains a broad citizen-suit provision allowing any 
person to “commence a civil suit on his own behalf” against any person, 
including the United States. FIFRA authorizes EPA to regulate the 
distribution and sale of pesticides to prevent the unreasonable effects on the 
environment. FIFRA contains a narrower civil suit provision granting 
jurisdiction only to appellate courts. EPA moved to dismiss Environmental 
Group’s suit. The district court granted it because the suit gave rise to an 
actual controversy as to the validity of FIFRA and therefore it did not have 
jurisdiction. The court relied on the fact that when there are special 
statutory review procedures Congress intended for those jurisdictions to 
have judicial review of those cases. Environmental group appealed 
requesting a consolidation of both its claims in district court. The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though EPA failed to 
have consultation regarding the new chemical and further failed to register 
it, registration should remain in effect until it is replaced by an order 
consistent with the court’s opinion to maintain enhanced protection. 
 
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1137 
  
 
D. Idaho  
 
Paradise Ridge Def. Coal. v. Hartman, No. 1:16-cv-374-BLW, 2017 WL 
3723636 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Administrator, claiming that Administrator’s extension of 
a highway over Landowner’s endangered ecosystem violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Landowner sought to enjoin any 
work on the project until Administrator complied with NEPA. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. In finding for Administrator, the court held 
that while NEPA requires agencies to “rigorously explore and objectively 
evaluate all reasonable alternatives” to a plan with significant 
environmental effects, the plan will be reviewed under a “rule of reason.” 
Therefore, Administrator only had to consider reasonable or feasible 
alternate plans, and the plan would be disallowed only if the reason for 
selecting a plan with significant environmental effects was arbitrary and 
capricious. Because Administrator had spent considerable time and 
resources investigating the effect on wetland erosion, wildlife collision, and 
crash data, the court found that its selection of the plan that crossed 
Landowner’s property was not arbitrary or capricious. Additionally, while 
Administrator did not obtain “prior occurrence” from State and Federal 
agencies for the plan, only about ten percent of the types of projects 
Administrator sought to complete require prior concurrence in the first 
place. This case has since been appealed, but there has been no decision 
from the higher court as of time of publication. 
 
D. Maryland  
 
SPS Ltd. P’ship LLLP v. Sparrows Point, LLC, No. JFM-14-589, 2017 WL 
3917153 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2017).  
 
Shipyard Owner (Owner) is seeking recovery under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
and four Maryland common law claims; negligence, trespass, nuisance, and 
strict liability. Owner asserted that Steel Manufacturer (Manufacturer) had 
caused an “ongoing and continuous discharge of pollutants” onto the 
property previously owned by Manufacturer, and now owned by Owner. 
Manufacturer acquired the property via an order under §363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which authorized it to acquire the property without 
assuming liability for any environmental contamination that occurred prior 
to the purchase date. However, if a hazardous substance was disposed of on 
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the property while Manufacturer owned said property, it could be liable. 
Although here, Manufacturer was not liable under CERCLA because it did 
not contribute to the contamination in any way, and because the bankruptcy 
order protected it from liability. Likewise, Manufacturer was granted 
summary judgment on all tort claims. Manufacturer was not negligent 
because it was unclear what its duty was to Owner, and whether it was 
breached. There was no trespass because Manufacturer did not control the 
hazardous substance on Owner’s property. And there were no grounds for 
private nuisance because Owner contributed to the flow of the hazardous 
substance by its own activities, and was aware of the contamination as early 
as 2004, eight years before Manufacturer purchased property. Furthermore, 
when Manufacturer purchased the property, it was not engaged in an 
“abnormally dangerous activity” simply because it was aware of the 
contamination. Rather, Manufacturer was engaged in remediating and 
redeveloping the property, and therefore, was not liable under strict 
liability. The district court granted Manufacturer’s motion and denied 
Owner’s motion.  
 
D. Nevada  
 
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
Case No. 2:14-cv-00226-APG-VCF, 2:14-cv-00228-APG-VCF, 2017 WL 
3667700 (D. Nev. 2017). 
 
To combat southern Nevada’s longtime water crisis, the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority (“SNWA”) has been developing a massive pipeline to 
convey water from eastern-central Nevada to Las Vegas since 1989. Under 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) the Bureau of 
Land Management’s (“BLM”) must decide whether to give SNWA 
permission to build the pipeline. The project also depends on SNWA’s 
ability to secure the right to water from the State of Nevada which it was 
grated in March of 2012 shortly before BLM approved its application for a 
right-of-way for the first phase of the project, which included the main 
pipeline. BLM decided to approve the project in stages because of the 
complexity and scope of the project. Environmental Group sued BLM on 
multiple counts related to violations of the National Environmental 
Protection Act (“NEPA”) and the FLPMA, namely focused on tribal, 
religious, and cultural land use rights. Both parties moved for summary 
judgment and because the court found at BLM failed to explain how it 
would mitigate losses of habitat in the development of the pipeline, it 
violated the NEPA’s requirements for its Environmental Impact Statement, 
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both motions were granted in part and denied in part and the case was 
remanded back to the BLM to address these deficiencies. The case has 
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 
D. New Hampshire  
 
Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Pease Dev. Auth., Case No. 16-cv-493-
SM, 2017 WL 4310997 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 
Non-Profit Organization filed claims under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
alleging Developer is discharging stormwater runoff containing pollutants 
from Developer’s airport without proper permits. Non-Profit Organization 
alleged eight violations by Developer. Developer argued: (1) it is a state 
agency and therefore immune from suits under the Eleventh Amendment; 
(2) it already has a CWA permit; and (3) the specific permit Non-Profit 
Organization is discussing expired in 2008. The immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment protects the states themselves and entities deemed 
arms of the state. The court applied a two-step process to determine if 
Developer is an “arm of the state”: (1) whether the state has indicated an 
intention that Developer share state’s sovereign immunity and if not then 
the structural indicators of the intention and (2) whether the state’s treasury 
would be at risk in the event of a judgment against the entity. The district 
court found that Developer fit under the arm of the state because the New 
Hampshire legislature shows the intent that the entity has sovereign 
immunity in several statutory provisions. The court further found that Non-
Profit Organization failed on its claim regarding the claims against the 
officers and directors of Developer for past failure. However, the court 
found the claim regarding continued failure of a federal law fell within the 
Ex Parte Young exception of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, 
the court dismissed some of Non-Profits claims, but not all.   
 
D. Rhode Island  
 
Emhart Indus., Inc. v. New England Container Co., C.A. No. 06-218 S, 11-
023 S, 2017 WL 3535003 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 
Industries and Container had been in litigation for ten years to determine 
which parties were responsible and what the appropriate remedy for toxic 
chemical pollution at a project site in Rhode Island. In the end, the court 
found that Industries was jointly and severally liable for the release of 
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dioxin at the site.  EPA created a remedial action plan (“Plan”) using the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”) and the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”), but the court 
found several decisions the Plan violated CERCLA as they “were arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” These decisions were: 
(1) labelling Source Area groundwater as potential source of drinking 
water; (2) assuming that there are no largemouth bass in Allendale Pond; 
and (3) using fourteen grams as the reasonable maximum consumption rate 
for anglers fishing at the Site. The court held that until the issues with 
decisions are resolved, Industries is not required to pay fines or fees 
accruing from non-compliance during this time.  
 
D. Utah 
 
Grand Canyon Trust v. Energy Fuels Resources (U.S.A.) Inc., Case No. 
2:14–cv–243, 2017 WL 4122614 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2017).  
 
Advocacy Organization sued Uranium Mill (“Mill”) seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief for Mill’s violations of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). 
Advocacy Organization alleged that Mill did not comply with Subpart W of 
the CAA by: (1) exceeding the two-cell limit for tailings impoundments and 
(2) failing to properly monitor and conduct testing of its radon emissions. 
The court granted summary judgement to Mill for several reasons. First, 
Mill did not violate the two-cell limit because one of the cells was an 
evaporation pond that did not count against the limit. Second, because there 
is five-year statute of limitations for CAA citizen suits, no other 
combination of cells could be considered since no other cell was 
constructed within five years of the complaint. Third, Mill did not exceed 
radon flux limit because cell two was not subject to Subpart W’s radon flux 
limit. Finally, the court deferred to the Department of Air Quality regarding 
proper scheduling and testing methods and concluded cell three was not in 
violation of the radon flux limit. Advocacy Organization’s claims were 
dismissed with prejudice.     
  
E.D. Washington  
 
Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., NO. 2:16-CV-
0293-TOR, 2017 WL 2962771 (E.D. Wash. July 11, 2017). 
 
Environmental Group sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) for 
creating a Community Protection Line (“CPL”) to address a wildfire that 
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had spread throughout the region. Environmental Group alleged that USFS 
violated the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) by 
constructing the CPL. Both parties motioned for summary judgment. NEPA 
requires that a federal agency consider and file public reports over the 
environmental impact of actions that could significantly affect the 
environment to the fullest extent possible. Because of the exigency of the 
situation, the trial court found that USFS did not need to incur the wait to 
compile an environmental impact report before addressing the wildfire by 
constructing the CPL and granted summary judgment for USFS. 
 
M.D. Tennessee  
 
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 3:15-cv-00424, 2017 
WL 3476069 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organizations sued the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(“TVA”) over TVA’s operation of a coal plant near the city of Gallatin, 
alleging that TVA: 1) unlawfully discharged pollutants in to state waters 
through hydrologic flow from its ash ponds; 2) was responsible for 
unauthorized point source discharges from its then active ash pond 
complex; and 3) violated four different sections of its National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit. The district court 
dismissed some of the claims on merit, others due to an ongoing state 
enforcement proceeding, and then held a bench trial on the remaining 
issues. The court stated that Environmental Organizations would prevail if 
able to show either that discharges from the “Non-Registered Site” were 
being made into a local river or that discharges from the Ash Pond 
Complex via hydrologic flows were taking place and were not seeps alone. 
The court found that: 1) the discharges did qualify as point source 
discharges; 2) discharges of pollutants from the Non-Registered Site into 
the local river constituted an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”); 3) the active ash pond complex was a violation of the CWA; 4) 
Organizations’ claims were not prohibited by a diligent prosecution bar 
because of the ongoing state action; 5) a finding that the CWA was violated 
was not precluded by the “permit shield doctrine;” 6) the ash pond complex 
violated the NPDES permit’s “removed substances provision;” and 7) the 
ash pond complex did not violate the NPDES permit’s provision requiring 
operation and maintenance which complies with the permit’s terms. 
Accordingly, the judgement was for TVA in part and for Environmental 
Organizations in part. 
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N.D. Illinois 
 
LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 13-CV-50348, 2017 WL 3922139 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 7, 2017).  
 
Illinois state court produced a Consent Order in 2010 requiring Company to 
remedy contamination from its facility onto Landowner’s property. 
Landowner contended that measures outlined in Company’s Remedial 
Action Plan (“Plan”) were inadequate to remove contamination and 
subsequently sought an injunction that would require Company to complete 
an investigation of the site to identify measures required to remove the 
contamination. Company argued that an injunction would be improper and 
would interfere with the parallel state-court order. Under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), to obtain a permanent 
mandatory injunction in federal court, Landowner was required to establish: 
(1) it had suffered irreparable injury; (2) legal remedies were inadequate to 
compensate for injury; (3) an equitable remedy was warranted; and (4) the 
public interest would not be disserved by such an injunction. The court 
accordingly denied Landowner’s request for a mandatory permanent 
injunction, holding that it had failed to establish that it would suffer any 
irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.  
 
N.D. Oklahoma  
 
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. TCI Pacific Commc’ns., Inc., Case No. 11–
CV–0252–CVE–PJC, 2017 WL 2662195 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2017). 
 
Owner sought to hold Predecessor liable for contribution under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”), claiming some of the costs related to the release of 
hazardous substances from a zinc smelting site were the fault of 
Predecessor. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court 
found that in order for Owner to hold Predecessor liable under CERCLA, it 
must prove that: (1) Predecessor is a “covered person” under CERCLA; (2) 
a “release” or “threatened release” of any “hazardous substance” at the site 
in question has occurred; (3) the release or threatened release caused Owner 
to incur costs; (4) Owner’s costs are “necessary” costs of response; and (5) 
Owner’s response action or cleanup was consistent with the National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”). The court 
denied both motions for summary judgment, finding that: (1) Owner had 
produced evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
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whether Predecessor was a “covered person” under CERCLA; (2) 
hazardous substances were released from the disputed facility; (3) a genuine 
dispute of material fact exists as to whether air emissions from the plant 
caused Owner to incur costs; and (4) Owner produced evidence that at least 
some of the response costs incurred were necessary.  
 
United States v. Doe Run Res. Corp., Case No. 15-CV-0663-CVE-JFJ, 
2017 WL 4270526 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 26, 2017).  
  
United States and the State of Oklahoma (“State”) submitted a proposed 
consent decree that would resolve prior claims against two mining company 
Operators under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) for violations occurring in 
the Tri-State Mining District (“TSMD”) for most of the 20th century. In 
1983, the EPA placed approximately forty square miles of northeastern 
Oklahoma on the national priorities list and designated the area as the Tar 
Creek Superfund Site. Since then, the United States has resolved most of its 
claims with several potentially responsible parties for the damages to Tar 
Creek. This decree would protect Operators from contribution claims by 
any potentially responsible party. An Operator who previously settled with 
the United States for its negative contributions to Tar Creek, objected to the 
decree arguing that it has an interest in protecting its right to contribution 
against the Operators, and claimed that the United States failed to present 
evidence that the settlement was the result of an arms-length negotiation. 
The Operator also objected to the proposed decree because it was not 
permitted to participate in the settlement negotiations. The district court 
disagreed with these assertions. The court held that, from the plain language 
of CERCLA, the right of contribution of a settling potentially responsible 
party against a non-settling party is subordinate to the interests of the 
United States, and CERCLA permits the United State to cut off a settling 
party’s right to seek contribution with other such parties. Thus, the court 
reasoned, the fact that Operator was not permitted to participate in the 
negotiation of the decree does not show a lack of procedural fairness in the 
proposed consent decree. The court also found that the negotiations lasted 
for years, and that both parties had ample opportunity to weigh the 
strengths of their cases, and this was enough to satisfy the “arms length” 
requirement of fair negotiating. Accordingly, the court approved the 
proposal, thus cutting off Operator’s right to contribution from remaining 
Operators.  
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N.D. New York 
 
Benoit v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 1:16-CV-930, 2017 
WL 3316132 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017).  
 
Citizens sued Manufacturer alleging that it contaminated groundwater by 
discharging perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) from its manufacturing 
facility that operates within the village. Due to the contamination, Citizens 
alleged that they suffered from decrease in property values, and 
accumulation of PFOA in their blood serum and bodies. Manufacturer 
argued that Citizens cannot allege decreased property values due to 
contaminated groundwater because Citizens do not own groundwater in 
New York. Therefore, Manufacturer argued Citizens had no standing to 
sue. Next, Manufacturer argued that the “vast majority” of Citizens alleged 
a risk of increased illness, not a present illness caused by PFOA. Lastly, 
Manufacturer argued that Citizens’ nuisance and trespass claims should fail 
because the injury was common across thousands – not special to one or a 
few. The district court granted Manufacturer’s motion in part, and denied in 
part. Citizens that alleged decreased property values, and only rented the 
home, had their claims dismissed because Citizens cannot recover for 
damage to property they do not own. Next, the court upheld Citizens’ 
personal injury claims because precedent did not state they needed present 
symptoms to ask for medical monitoring. Lastly, Citizens alleged trespass 
and nuisance claims. The court dismissed the trespass claims regarding 
Citizens that received their water from the city, but did not dismiss the 
claims of Citizens that had private water wells. The court found similarly 
regarding the nuisance claims. Citizens that had private water wells did not 
have their claims dismissed because they had sustained a special loss, 
unlike those who received their water from the state.  
 
Donavan v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 1:16-CV-924, 2017 
WL 3887904 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017). 
 
Manufacturer was found responsible by the EPA for polluting a town’s 
water supply. Landowner, a member of the town, alleged that the water 
pollution had caused him both health problems and property damage 
because, although his own well was not contaminated, wells near his 
property were contaminated and allegedly dropped his property’s value. 
Manufacturer moved to dismiss the property damage complaint because 
Landowner did not show that the pollution had adversely affected his 
property. Landowner argued that the pollution in nearby areas had 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 1145 
  
 
stigmatized his home and reduced its value, so contamination of nearby 
properties should be enough. Landowner also alternatively moved to amend 
his complaint to allege actual damage to his property. The trial court 
granted Manufacturer’s motion to dismiss because Landowner had to show 
that contamination affected his property—which he did not—for a 
negligence claim, and granted Landowner’s motion to amend because the 
amendment would not prejudice Manufacturer and was not in bad faith. 
 
S.D. California  
 
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., Case No. 07-cv-
01995-BAS-WVG, 16-cv-02026-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 2655285 (S.D. Cal 
June 20, 2017). 
 
Company and Successor leased property in District’s ports, with both 
companies using the property to test various designs of boats and 
submersible vehicles. Company leased the property from 1954 to 1970, and 
Successor leased the property from 1970 to 1983, and again from 1986 until 
1991. After concentrations of pollutants in the leased properties were 
discovered, District sued Successor to recover costs for the cleanup of the 
site. The estimated cost to remove the contaminated sediment at the site 
was $3.3 million. After lengthy settlement negotiations, Successor agreed to 
be solely responsible for costs related to the cleanup up to $2.5 million. 
Company agreed to contribute to $850,000. In exchange, District agreed to 
not bring claims for further damages to the land in dispute. All parties 
sought approval of the settlement agreement and an order providing them 
with contribution protection under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). CERCLA 
encourages settlements by preventing participating parties from being later 
sued for contributions by other joint tortfeasors. In scrutinizing the 
settlement reached by the parties, the court analyzed whether the agreement 
was procedurally and substantively “fair, reasonable, and consistent with 
CERCLA’s objectives,” which the court concluded it was. Accordingly, the 
court approved the settlement. 
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S.D. New York  
 
Cytec Indus. Inc. v. Allnex (Luxembourg) & CY S.C.A, 14-cv-1561 (PKC), 
2017 WL 2634177 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2017). 
 
Buyer and Seller entered into an Agreement for the purchase of a coating 
resins business and several facilities owned by Seller. A disagreement arose 
as to which party was responsible for the environmental remediation costs 
of a particular facility contemplated in the Agreement. The Agreement 
stipulates that Buyer was to assume all liabilities “relating to Environmental 
Laws with respect to any facilities.” Seller sought declaratory judgment that 
Buyer is responsible for the costs of cleanup, while Buyer contends that the 
Agreement limits its liability to contamination caused only by coating 
resins (not in dispute). Both parties moved for summary judgment. The 
court first noted that because the parties previously agreed that the 
provisions of the Agreement were unambiguous, the Agreement must be 
interpreted without considering extrinsic or parole evidence. The court then 
considered the plain language of the Agreement and held that Buyer had 
assumed “any and all” liabilities pertaining to environmental remediation 
and as such, were bound by the Agreement to remediate the facility in 
question. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from 
the higher court as of publication.    
 
S.D. Texas 
 
USOR Site PRP Grp. v. A&M Contractors, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2441, 2017 
WL 3310942 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2017). 
 
Pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act 
(“TSWDA”), several Corporations sued City to collect response costs and 
expenses related to environmental contamination at one of its treatment 
facilities (“Site”) and a recycling facility (“Facility”). Corporations sought 
partial summary judgment against City, claiming that t City was subject to 
liability for the release of hazardous substances prior to selling the 
treatment plant. The court found that City had admitted the genuine facts it 
had alleged was in dispute. City admitted to: (1) “using hazardous 
substances in its wastewater treatment process; (2) the presence of 
hazardous substances and discharges of sludge; and (3) that various spills, 
leaks, releases, and overflows from the treatment facility had occurred.” 
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The court found that based on those facts, City was subject to liability under 
CERLA and TSWDA and granted Corporations motion. 
 
W.D. Virginia 
 
S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Zinke, Case No. 2:16CV00026, 2017 
WL 4171391 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2017).  
  
Two environmental groups (“Groups”) sued pursuant to the judicial review 
provision of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) 
alleging that they were aggrieved by and administrative decision of the 
Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”). The district court noted that when 
Secretary has reason to believe someone is violating a SMCRA requirement 
or permit condition, Secretary must notify the state regulatory agency by 
issuing what is known as a ten-day notice. If the state does not appropriate 
action to correct the violation, then Secretary must “immediately order 
Federal inspection of the surface coal mining operation at which the alleged 
violation is occurring.” And if a state fails to enforce its federally approved 
program, Secretary may provide for federal enforcement. The court 
subsequently held that Secretary’s decision that no SMCRA violation 
existed failed to address key evidence, and Secretary’s finding that a water 
sample showed no violation of Virginia’s water quality standards runs 
counter to the record evidence and fails to address an important aspect of 
Groups complaint. In contrast to Secretary’s argument, the court held that 
Groups do not have to provide samplings from four consecutive days, as it 
would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome. What the Groups did 
instead, the court concluded, was to appropriately rely upon data provided 
by the state. This data showed that a mine was violating SMCRA, and 
because the state organization charged with correcting such a violation did 
not take the required corrective action, Secretary should have ordered an 
immediate federal inspection. Failure to do so, the court concluded, was an 
arbitrary and capricious decision and Secretary was thus directed to conduct 
a federal inspection to address the allegations made by Groups. 
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State 
 
California  
 
Cleveland Nat’l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts, 397 P.3d 989 
(Cal. 2017). 
 
egional Planning Agency (“Agency”) was sued by Environmental 
Organizations challenging the adequacy of an environmental impact report 
(“EIR”) prepared in preparation of Agency’s regional development plan 
meant to plan for transportation infrastructure. The California 
Environmental Quality Act (“Act”) requires public agencies to report the 
impacts their projects will have on the environment and whether the project 
will result in a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions. A 2005 
Governor’s Executive Order (“Order”) set greenhouse gas emission targets 
for California and mandated that by the year 2050 emissions be reduced to 
eighty percent below 1990 levels. This began a slew of regulatory and 
legislative actions by California to address and reduce the effects of climate 
change. Agency was accused of inadequately preparing its EIR by not 
addressing the potential impact of the regional development plan on 
greenhouse gas emissions and the requirements of the Order. Even though 
Agency updated its plan to address the Order, the Supreme Court of 
California reviewed the case to determine whether a prepared EIR must 
analyze the Order’s 2050 greenhouse gas emission requirements to comply 
with Act. The court held in favor of Agency that its original EIR was 
adequate because the varying analysis and methods used in the report could 
adequately inform on the project’s impact to greenhouse gas emissions. 
Further, the court noted however that Agency’s report should not be a 
template for other planning agencies’ EIRs and they should instead ensure 
their Act analysis stays in line with changing scientific updates and 
regulatory plan of the state.  
 
Orange Cty. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, 222 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
District brought an action against Industrial Site Operators (“Operators”) 
under the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act 
(“HSAA”) for allegedly contributing to groundwater contamination. 
District also brought common law claims against Operators for negligence, 
nuisance, and trespass. Operators argued that summary judgement was 
proper because District never incurred any recoverable costs under the 
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Orange County Water District Act (“OCWD”), and that District’s incurred 
costs were wholly investigatory and not encompassed within recoverable 
remediation costs. The trial court entered judgments in favor of Operators 
on all of District’s claim, summarily adjudicating each one. District 
appealed and the appellate court held that Operators did not demonstrate 
their entitlement to summary adjudication of the District’s HSAA claim. 
The court reasoned that reasonable costs actually incurred in cleaning up or 
containing the contamination or pollution are recoverable under the 
OCWD, without regard to whether they could also be characterized as 
investigatory. The court also held that Operators failed to adequately 
address District’s negligence claim and did not meet their burden to show it 
had no merit. Regarding District’s trespass claim, the court held that 
District did not have a possessory property right sufficient to support a 
claim for trespass, and that the trial court’s summary adjudication of that 
claim against District was appropriate. Finally, the court held that because 
the District had relevant, appropriate water rights based on its recharge 
activities, Operators were not entitled to summary adjudication of District’s 
nuisance claim. The court accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part 
the trial court’s decision.  
 
Illinois 
 
County of Will v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 2017 IL App (3d) 150637-U.  
 
Pollution Control Board (“Board”) implemented ‘front-end’ regulations on 
construction materials, but rejected provisions calling for groundwater 
testing for pollution that may be residual from the construction materials. 
County appealed Board’s decision to reject the groundwater testing 
regulations. County argued that ‘back-end’ groundwater testing regulations 
are a valuable safeguard against operators who fail to comply with the 
front-end regulations and a way to monitor contamination from older 
materials not covered by the revised front-end regulations. Essentially, the 
groundwater testing subpart is a necessary supplement to the front-end 
materials regulations and is still extremely cost effective, so greatly benefits 
the public. County needed to show that Board regulations are invalid in its 
challenge. The court considered three factors for determining whether 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. First, the court looked at whether the 
consideration of ‘waste’ in evaluating the statute was relevant and not 
improper, considering the intent of the legislature. Second, whether Board 
considered past occurrences and practices, as well as the subpart’s costs and 
their impact on regulations as vital parts of the issue. Lastly, whether the 
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explanation for Board’s decision deviates dramatically from the evidence 
presented or is implausible and not simply justified by Board’s specialized 
expertise. The court found Board met all three factors, therefore its decision 
is proper, not arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the decision of the Board 
is affirmed. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
D & L Landfill, Inc. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 2017 IL App (5th) 
160071. 
 
Applicant sought review of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(“IEPA”) denial of certification of completion of post-closure care of a 
sanitary landfill. Illinois Pollution Control Board (“Board”) granted IEPA’s 
motion for summary judgment on the matter and Applicant sought further 
review with the state appellate court. Applicant argued that per a state 
statute, it was only required to monitor its landfill for fifteen years after 
completing the final cover. IEPA counter-argued that Applicant could be 
required to monitor its landfill longer if future violation of state law were 
possible. The appellate court held that IEPA has the authority to order 
Applicant to continue to monitor groundwater exceedance until such a time 
as it reaches acceptable levels, even if this period exceeds the fifteen-year 
post-closure rule in the statute.  
 
Louisiana  
 
La. Envtl. Action Network v. Welsh, 16-0906 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/14/17); 224 
So.3d 383. 
 
Environmental Groups challenged an order from the Louisiana 
Commissioner of Conservation (“Commissioner”) that approved an 
application for construction of a waste transfer station on four grounds: (1) 
Commissioner failed to consider conflicts with the local city’s master plan; 
(2) the facility’s storage tanks would not with stand a 100-year flood as 
mandated by the Commissioner’s rules; (3) the facility violates local zoning 
ordinances; and (4) Commissioner acted arbitrarily by allowing the 
company to open a second facility before closing its first one. The trial 
court upheld Commissioner’s order. However, on appeal, the appellate 
court over turned the trial court’s decision on the basis that the 
administrative record provided no rational basis for the decision to allow 
the company to operate both transfer stations. Case was remanded to the 
trial court.  
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Massachusetts  
 
Cave Corp. v. Conservation Comm’n of Attleboro, 79 N.E.3d 1096 (Mass. 
App. 2017). 
 
The Conservation Commission of Attleboro (“Commission”), was 
established as part of the Wetlands Protection Act (“Act”) “to protect the 
wetlands, water resources, and adjoining land areas in Attleboro…” 
Corporation filed a notice of intent with Commission, proposing 
construction of infrastructure associated with subdivision development in a 
land area acknowledged as having the presence of vegetated wetlands. 
Commission approved the proposal with certain conditions. Corporation 
appealed the conditions to the Department of Environmental Protections 
(“DEP”) and was awarded a superseding order. Additionally, Corporation 
issued a notice of intent for work on certain lots in the proposed subdivision 
that was not approved until after the twenty-one days required for a hearing 
under the Act. Corporation sought and was granted another superseding 
order of conditions from DEP. However, Commission still considered the 
proposed work precluded by its order and Corporation filed with the trial 
court, seeking review and declaratory relief. The court concluded that the 
conditions issued by Commission remained applicable to the subdivision, 
notwithstanding the superseding order of conditions issued by DEP. 
Corporation appealed on the grounds that the order by DEP should 
supersede any conditions imposed by Commission, that Commission lost 
jurisdiction over the work described in the second notice of intent when it 
failed to hold a timely hearing, and that the record does not contain 
substantial evidence supporting the imposition of the conditions for the first 
notice of intent. The court affirmed holding that, by the language of the Act, 
Commission may impose more stringent requirements than DEP, and that 
Commission did not lose jurisdiction in the second notice of intent because 
its conditions for the work in the first notice still covered the work 
described in the second. 
 
Michigan  
 
Lowery v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 898 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 2017).  
 
Company was responsible for an oil spill that released 840,000 gallons of 
crude oil. This spill eventually made it into the Kalamazoo River and 
spread nearly forty miles. Homeowner alleged the oil spill caused him to 
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experience illness, and eventually injury. The Supreme Court of Michigan 
held for Company, and reversed and remanded because Homeowner 
attempted to show “cause in fact” through speculation, by arguing that 
Company was responsible for his illness because his symptoms did not 
appear until after the spill. While this may be true, the court held that a 
temporal relationship is not enough to show “cause in fact.”   
 
Montana  
 
Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2017 
MT 222, 388 Mont. 453, 401 P.3d 712. 
 
Environmental Organization petitioned for review of environmental 
assessment used by Department of Environmental Quality (“Department”) 
in issuance of groundwater pollution control system permit for a 
contemplated commercial development. The trial court granted summary 
judgment to Environmental Organization finding that Department violated 
the Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) in failing to consider 
environmental impacts other than water quality impacts, and that 
Department failed to identify the actual contemplated owner and operator of 
the facility. Department appealed. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed 
the lower court’s summary judgment because Department had violated the 
MEPA for failing to consider environmental impacts other than water 
quality impacts. The court held that the lower court erroneously concluded 
that Department had violated MEPA because the issuance of the permit was 
not a legal cause of environmental impacts of the larger construction and 
operation of the facility unrelated to water quality or construction of 
required wastewater treatment system. The court, however, affirmed the 
lower court’s summary judgment that Department must identify the actual 
owner or operator of the facility because it is required to do so under the 
MEPA.   
 
New Jersey  
 
In re Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. A-2316-10T2, 2017 WL 3225723 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organizations sued the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (“DEP”) after it accepted a plan by Developer 
and released conservations restrictions on the conversion of protected land, 
a former landfill, into a solar energy facility. Several state laws placed 
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conservation restrictions on the land that prohibited the release of these 
restrictions unless DEP approved. DEP partially released the restrictions 
based on the idea that the solar project would provide the public with needs 
and benefits, have no irreparable impacts on the habitats of plants and 
animals, and that there were no feasible alternatives. In reviewing the issue, 
the appellate court noted that its ability to review an administrative agency 
decisions are severely limited, only reversing if the decision is: (1) 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) in violation of express or implied 
legislative policies; (3) in violation of the State or Federal Constitution; or 
(4) lacking support from substantial and credible evidence in the record.  
The court began by weighing the competing public interests of leaving the 
land in its natural state and providing a public interest of renewable energy, 
concluding that DEP acted within its authority in determining that the land 
use would provide a substantial public benefit. After Environmental 
Organizations claimed that DEP violated its own rules which rendered its 
decision arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. However, the court held 
that due to the DEP’s considerable expertise and experience in making 
development and conservation decisions, its decision was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.  
 
Oklahoma  
 
City of Bethany v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., CIV-16-1005-D, 2017 WL 
3741556 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2017).  
 
Before the court is Company’s Motion to Dismiss City’s claims for 
injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a 
claim. Furthermore, Company moved for partial dismissal of the complaint, 
challenging a claim under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”), and claims of nuisance and trespass. The district court found 
that City’s RCRA claims and its demands for injunctive relief were barred 
by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and that City’s action should only 
proceed on the tort claims. At issue was the alleged contamination of soil 
and groundwater, and a threat to City’s public water supply wells, caused 
by Company. Company voluntarily began remediation under the 
supervision of the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 
(“DEQ”). The requirements of clean-up would be satisfied when DEQ gave 
written notice that Company had demonstrated that all terms of the order 
had been completed. Company moved to dismiss City’s RCRA claims for 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, moved to dismiss City’s tort claims, and 
moved to dismiss the RCRA action for failure to state a claim. Furthermore, 
Company asserted that City’s claims were moot because there was already 
a consent order in place that would serve the same purpose as the 
injunction. The court reserved the issue of mootness for decision upon 
further factual development. However, the court held that the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction did apply, and that City’s RCRA and tort claims should 
be deferred because DEQ is responsible for enforcing environmental 
regulations in Oklahoma. 
 
Pennsylvania  
 
Borough of St. Clair v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1026 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 
2883246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 7, 2017). 
 
Town petitioned for review of an order of the Environmental Hearing 
Board (“Board”) after it upheld the issuance of a solid waste management 
permit, in the neighboring town, for the development of a landfill. Town 
appealed the decision arguing that the Department of Environmental 
Protection (“Department”) interpreted the Harms/Benefit regulation 
erroneously, that the contract between Township and consulting group 
(“Consultants”) was invalid because it gave Consultants impermissible 
powers in operating the facility, and that the permit must be revoked 
because a mining permit was not issued in conjunction. A trial was held, 
and the matter was remanded for further review. However, Department 
reissued the permit for the landfill. Town appealed and another trial was 
held. Again, Board upheld the issuance of the permit and Town appealed. 
The appellate court affirmed the order of Board. The court found that 
Department did not erroneously interpret the Harms/Benefit regulation by 
choosing not to consider potential costs or liabilities of the landfill. The 
court found that it was not necessary for Department to perform an in-depth 
analysis of the finances of a project, and that Department interpreted the 
Harms/Benefit regulation reasonably. Next, the court found that the 
contract between Township and Consultants was not impermissible because 
Consultant’s powers did not override Township’s duty to comply with the 
law. Furthermore, the court found that Town had no standing to challenge 
the contract because it had not been aggrieved by said contract. Lastly, the 
court found that a mining permit did not have to be issued in conjunction 
with the waste permit. The rule is that if applicant has a reasonable 
likelihood of acquiring one when it comes time to mine, it does not have to 
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be issued in conjunction. Testimony showed obtaining such permit when 
the time came, would not be an issue.  
 
Consol Pa. Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 112 C.D. 2017, 2017 WL 
3271480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 2017). 
 
Company petitioned for review an order issued by the Environmental 
Hearing Board (“EHB”) that prohibited Company from conducting 
longwall mining within 100 feet of any portion of the Kent Run Stream. In 
2007, Company sought to expand its mining business into the Bailey Mine 
Eastern Expansion Area which consisted of five longwall panels. In May 
2014, the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) issued Permit 
Revision No. 180, which authorized longwall mining in those five longwall 
panels, but not under Polen Run or the Kent Run Streams. In February 
2016, Company sought a permit to mine beneath these two areas, and DEP 
authorized it December 2016, on the condition that Company implements 
an approved stream restoration plan. Third parties attempted to halt the 
mining when they filed an application for supersedes. EHB granted the 
application for supersedes in part preventing Company from mining 
beneath and within 100 feet of Kent Run, but since Company had already 
completed mining beneath Polen Run before the EHB could hear the 
petition for supersedes, that issue was moot. In May 2017, Company filed a 
report that effectively stated it would forego longwall mining beneath Kent 
Run. Because Company agreed to forego mining in Kent Run, the court 
refused to grant Company the relief it requested with respect to the 
supersedes order. 
 
Moretran Realty, LLC v. Baldev Patel & Son, LLC, DOCKET NO. A-2753-
15T3, 2017 WL 3611595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 23, 2017). 
 
Realtors purchased commercial real estate (“Property”) in 2009. An 
environmental report revealed two environmental issues on the Property. 
Both issues involved contamination discovered after two underground 
heating oil storage tanks were removed. Following remediation efforts for 
both issues, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection issued 
a No Further Action letter. In 2012, Developer contracted to purchase 
Property from Realtors. Pursuant to a separate agreement, Realtors placed 
funds in escrow for environmental issues; the funds were to be released 
within six months from the closing date or upon an adjacent facility 
(“Facility”) assuming cleanup of the Property, whichever occurred first. 
Facility denied responsibility for cleanup, and Realtors refused to take care 
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of the cleanup or release the escrowed funds for Developer to use for clean-
up costs. Developer sought a declaratory judgment under the Spill 
Compensation and Control Act that Realtors were liable for clean-up costs 
and indemnification. The trial court granted Developer’s motion for 
summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that, under the 
escrow agreement, the funds had to be released no later than six months 
after closing, and, furthermore, that the discovery of contamination on the 
Property would not have had a bearing on whether the escrow funds had to 
be released. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization brought declaratory judgment action against 
Commonwealth challenging, under the Environmental Rights Amendment, 
whether budget-related decisions that resulted in additional oil-and-gas 
lease sales was constitutional. The lower court granted summary relief to 
Commonwealth and Environmental Organization appealed. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with 
six holdings: (1) “laws that unreasonably impair the right to clean air, pure 
water, and environmental preservation are unconstitutional;” (2) “proceeds 
from the sale of oil and gas from the public trust remain in the corpus of the 
trust;” (3) assets of the natural resources trust should only be used for 
conservation and maintenance purposes; (4) “the appellate record was not 
sufficiently developed to conclude whether all revenues generated by leases 
remained in corpus of trust;” (5) “public trust provisions of the 
Environmental Rights Amendment are self-executing;” and (6) “statutory 
provisions relating to royalties are facially unconstitutional.” The court 
looked to the language of the statutes to determine that the intent of the 
statutes was to benefit all the people and that it unambiguously and clearly 
indicates assets of the trust are to be used for conservation and maintenance 
purposes. 
 
Utah  
 
Living Rivers v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2017 UT 64, 
No. 20160503, 2017 WL 4172929. 
 
This is a second appeal by an Environmental Organization of State 
Department of Environmental Quality decision to grant permits. The court 
determined that Environmental Organization failed to adequately address 
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the claim that Environmental Organization waived its right to challenge 
because a previous, identical claim precluded the new claim. Environmental 
Organization challenged the issuance of permits to Operator for tar sands 
mining on grounds of potential water pollution caused by the operation. The 
court held that through the “permit by rule” process Operator used to obtain 
its permit, the operation was deemed to have a “de minimus” impact on the 
groundwater. The court held that Environmental Organization repeated its 
earlier challenge to the permit by rule process and that was rejected because 
it failed to present any independent grounds for the challenge. The court 
determined that Environmental Organization had an opportunity to present 
a fresh argument with the new challenge, but merely duplicated its prior 
argument. Even if explicitly targeted at modifications to the plan rather than 
the original plan, this redundant argument failed to illuminate why the prior 
decision was improper and should be reversed. Therefore, the challenge is 
dismissed.  
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